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 PREFACE 
 
 This work began as my 1981 Ph.D. dissertation at 
Duke University.  I have made modifications to reflect 
changes in my thinking over the years, to improve 
felicity of wording, and to be gender neutral in 
language for God. 
 The general climate in theology and religious 
studies is more skeptical regarding claims about 
ultimate reality than when I first wrote this thesis.  
Nevertheless, my developing a concept of panentheism is 
based on the convictions that belief in an ultimate 
reality that is the source of the universe is 
reasonable and that, given that basic belief, 
understandings of the nature of ultimate reality can be 
more or less plausible, more or less coherent.  My hope 
is that I have offered a plausible and coherent vision 
of the nature of God. 
 
      David H. Nikkel 
      Youngstown, Ohio 
      June, 1992 
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 As my title suggests, I believe both Charles 
Hartshorne and Paul Tillich can, on the whole, rightly 
be labelled panentheists.  As far as Hartshorne is 
concerned, the above statement is not surprising or 
controversial.  He has used the term "panentheism" (as 
well as "surrelativism," "superrelativism," and "neo-
classical theism") to describe his doctrine of God.  
And to my knowledge, no one has disputed the 
appropriateness of the term in that connection.  
Tillich on the other hand has rarely used the term and 
only once directly in connection with his own 
thinking.i  Though he then favorably applied the term 
to his understanding of God, hardly anyone has 
explicitly acknowledged the strong panentheistic flavor 
of Tillich's theology, except James F. Anderson and 
Jacob Faubes,ii and to some extent Hartshorne himself 
in noting aspects of Tillich's thought akin to his 
own.iii  And even less so has anyone argued for or 
developed the idea of Tillich as panentheist--by taking 
central concepts, phrases, and formulations such as 
"being-itself," "the ground of being," transcending 
"the subject-object cleavage," God as knowing God's 
self through the finite individuals, God as being 
nearer to the creatures than they are to themselves, 
and that God is not a being and by showing that Tillich 
has meant these panentheistically and that they are 
interrelated.  Therefore, this aspect of my project is, 
I believe, original and significant for fully under-
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standing Tillich, as it will take an idea or ideas that 
are at the heart of his doctrine of God and unpack, 





 At this point it would be good to describe the 
concept of panentheism.  I will be guided by the use of 
this term by previous thinkers, as well as by my own 
sense of the basic thrust of the concept.  
"Panentheism" literally means "all in God."  (The word 
was coined by the early nineteenth-century German 
philosopher, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause.)  It 
holds that the non-divine individuals are included in 
God, are fully within the divine life.  God knows all 
that exists without externality, mediation, or loss 
(though God's knowledge and valuation are more than the 
creaturely experiences that are wholly included in the 
divine experience).  God empowers all that exists 
without externality, mediation, or loss (though there 
is genuine indeterminacy and freedom of choice and 
action which God empowers in the creaturely realm).  
This is in contrast to traditional theism, which has 
tended to regard God as utterly distinct from the 
creation and the creatures.  Deism is an extreme of 
this tendency.  On the other hand, panentheism also 
distinguishes itself from pantheism (literally "all 
[is] God").  It holds that God is not reducible to the 
nondivine individuals, to the universe as a whole, or 
to the structure of the universe; but rather God 
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transcends them, having a reality--an awareness and a 
power--that includes but is not exhausted by the 
reality of the creation and the experiences and actions 
of the creatures. 
 A distinction between a "passive" and an 
"active" aspect of God as panentheistically understood 
figures crucially in the structure and purposes of this 
work.  As presaged in the preceding paragraph, the 
passive aspect refers to divine knowledge, while the 
active aspect refers to divine power.  By using the 
term "passive," I am implying that by knowing what 
occurs, God is in some sense qualified or affected by 
it.  The extent to which God is active and controls 
what happens in the universe is not prejudiced by this 
formal definition per se.  Even for the traditional 
theist who believes that God totally controls our 
actions, that divine knowing and acting are utterly 
one, we could say that God's decisions affect or 
qualify the divine self and that the "passive" and the 
"active" aspects merge.  However, in that case, 
practically speaking, the distinction would not be 
useful.  Thus, only when, as in panentheism, it is 
accepted that the creatures have some indeterminacy 
with respect to action and that God is aware of their 
actions is the distinction likely to be significant.iv
 Hartshorne has written extensively about the 
cognitive aspect of the divine inclusion of creation, 
my "passive" aspect.  Indeed, he often equates divine 
inclusion with God's direct and complete knowing or 
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perceiving.  In contrast to the creatures, who exclude 
much of the fullness of the experiences of others, for 
whom these are, relatively speaking, indirect and 
external, God experiences or feels precisely what we 
experience and feel as we experience or feel (though as 
above God will also have knowledge, feelings, and 
valuations in relation to a situation in addition to 
those of the individuals perfectly included).  So 
unqualifiedly to say that God and the creatures are 
distinct beings is misleading, since our experiences 
are at the same time (without mediation though with 
addition) experiences of God. 
 As panentheistically active, God coinheringly 
empowers all that exists--without externality, 
mediation or loss.  The active aspect then refers to 
God's being the very power of being in all that is, the 
very power of acting in every action--but in the 
radical sense that whatever power we have is God's 
power and whatever action we take is in a (qualified) 
sense God's act, in that in panentheism there is no 
power that can be unequivocally distinguished from or 
contrasted to God's power, no power (just as no knowing 
or feeling) that is external to God as the ultimate 
power (and knower).  There is no separation or 
mediation with regard to God's power as well as with 
regard to God's knowledge.  Here again it should be 
remembered that God transcends as well as includes, so 
that divine power is more than God's power in the form 
of or in the manifestations that are the creaturely 
lives per se. 
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 The preceding formal definition of the active 
aspect is not meant to preclude God's granting to those 
whom God immediately empowers the power to freely 
determine the divine experience to some extent.  
Indeed, that is the sense in which every action's being 
an action of God must be qualified.  For, as has been 
said before, panentheism upholds the mutual 
transcendence of God and the creatures with respect to 
freedom.  God does not make our decisions for us, so 
far as those are indeterminate.  That panentheistic 
empowerment is compatible with some indeterminate 
creaturely freedom will be argued in chapter 6. 
 One could say that, insofar as there is 
indeterminacy in creaturely actions, the creatures are 
in that sense "external" to God.  One could also speak 
of a further "separation" to the extent they willfully 
act contrary to the divine will.  This latter 
separation is akin to more or less involuntary 
unawareness of God, in that these both are 
estrangements from the side of the creatures and do not 
involve separation by God as ultimate power and knower 
beyond the independence involved in creaturely freedom 
per se.  But such freedom need not I believe controvert 
that the creatures are not "external" to or "separated" 
from God in the sense that I have intended and will 
intend when I speak thusly:  namely, that God 
encompasses them, knowing perfectly and fully 
empowering whatever actions the creatures may take in 
their freedom. 
 In passing I will note that when I say "being," 
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as in "God is the very power of being in all that has 
being," I am not using it in contrast to "becoming."  I 
have no objection to "God is the very power of becoming 
in all that becomes."  For I endorse temporality with 
regard to both the world and God.  I have used "being" 
because it is more natural in our language (and less 
likely to make the reader feel some esoteric meaning is 
intended), and in common usage--in divergence from the 
philosophical and theological tradition--is not I think 
prejudiced in favor of staticity or timelessness. 
 I will now develop my initial contrast of panen-
theism with both traditional theism and pantheism.  I 
have indicated that the passive aspect refers to God's 
perfect knowledge.  But does not traditional theism 
affirm, indeed insist upon, divine omniscience?  
Tillich and Hartshorne both indicate that what I would 
consider panentheistic formulations are explicit 
expressions of what has been intuited by theists all 
alongv and which has not been without some voice in 
traditional theology.  For example, Tillich suggests 
that when God is said to be omniscient or to be nearer 
to us than we are to ourselves, the notion that God is 
a being or person who is clearly distinct or separate 
(as subject) from other beings (as objects),vi who 
"excludes" others from its "center"vii rather than 
includes "everything that is,"viii is countered.  But 
there is this other tendency in theology to view God as 
someone who relates, participates, or knows from "out-
side"ix or "alongside"x or as "external."xi  God it 
seems is pictured as someone who, though knowing 
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something about everything, knows in a glorified human 
way,xii
 Besides this general concern to maintain the 
distinctness and externality of the creation with 
respect to God, traditional theology also balks at the 
full inclusion of creaturely reality in the divine life 
on two other counts.  It has often been felt that God 
can be sufficiently ultimate or glorified only if 
divine experience is exclusively positive, only if God 
is unaffected by or "impassible" to any suffering or 
negativities.  Yet how can God experience our feelings 
of sorrow and frustration with no mediation or loss 
without being affected by them, without sympathy, 
without, in short, truly feeling them?  Hartshorne 
concedes that one could formally adhere to panentheism 
simply by saying suffering is included in God, apart 
from whether God feels it.
 being external to or separated from everything 
but looking (down) at it from some "heavenly" 
perspective. 
xiii  However he, as I, does 
"not see how a conscious being can contain suffering 
and not in some sense suffer."xiv
 The other incompatibility of much traditional 
theology (or "classical theism" to use Hartshorne's 
term) with respect to panentheism has to do with 
temporality.  There has also been the feeling that 
change, as well as suffering, is not reconcilable with 
God's majesty, and so "immutability" was paired with 
"impassibility" as a traditional attribute of deity.  
If it is granted that temporality, change, and some 
degree of indeterminacy regarding the actions of the 
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creatures are not mere illusion, then if God knows and 
feels our lives immediately and accurately, it would 
seem to follow that God is in some sense temporal and 
that the divine experience in some sense changes.  (As 
we shall see in chapter 5, Tillich cannot bring himself 
to break with traditional theism so as to allow 
unequivocally that God suffers and changes, despite his 
strong acceptance of the basic idea that God fully 
includes finite reality.) 
 I sense that some who do not necessarily share 
the above-indicated traditional tendencies of theology, 
but who are still uncomfortable with the notion that 
the creatures are included in or parts of God, 
misinterpret panentheism in the following way:  That 
things are contained in God in a materialistic or 
spatial, or quasi-materialistic or quasi-spatial, 
manner, such that God is material or spatial and thus 
limited in more or less the same way that the included 
realities are.  In connection with Tillich, this 
certainly is not part of his meaning.  While he affirms 
that God is not "spaceless"
xviii
xv and "participates in" or 
includes spatiality,xvi he denies that God is subject to 
spatialityxvii and declares that God transcends as well 
as grounds spatiality.   He specifically rejects the 
quasi-materialistic notion of God as a "substance" 
which is either localized or extended through space.xix
 Hartshorne is more likely to be taken in a 
quasi-materialistic fashion.  This is because 
Hartshorne employs a body analogy, an analogy of 
individual cells to a human person, to illuminate the 
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relationship of the nondivine individuals to God.  If 
Hartshorne's body analogy is taken apart from his 
qualifications of it, it could suggest certain 
properties not appropriate to God.  The general 
properties of our bodies not referable to God are two. 
 One is that our knowledge of and control over the 
cells of our bodies are hardly perfect; and indeed we 
are subject to death because of our lack of any 
ultimate control over them.  This will not do for God. 
 The other is that there are things and persons in some 
sense beyond or external to our cells and our bodies.  
Now there are no clear demarcation lines among what is 
my body, what is "in" it, and what is "outside" it.  
But we can speak of relative internality and 
externality.  The point is that our knowledge and 
control of our environment is very limited; we are far 
from being in full possession.  The same is not untrue 
with respect to our bodies.  And to the extent our 
cells are beyond our knowing and control, we could say 
they are "external" to us.  So in one way the two 
problems of the body analogy for God merge.  But 
generally our awareness and control of our bodies and 
cells, as in moving parts of our bodies, feeling 
emotions and sensations, and thinking, are more 
immediate and greater than that of other things and 
persons.  The claim that God has the world as a body 
could suggest something quite independent of God beyond 
the world with which God must contend by means of a 
body.  This would entail some ultimate dualism even 
more strongly than a lack of control over that which is 
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relatively "internal" to one. 
 In Hartshorne's defense, when he utilizes the 
body analogy, he clearly notes that God has no external 
environment and/or that God has perfect knowledge and 
control of the included lesser individuals.xx  Indeed, 
the very purpose of the analogy is to give us a human 
analogue by which to grasp the immediacy and the 
fullness of God's knowledge and control in relation to 
the world, as Hartshorne makes quite explicit at least 
once.xxi
 We have already covered the essential ways in 
which panentheism differs from classical theism.  It is 
now time to enlarge upon the distinction between 
panentheism and pantheism.  In relating that God's 
inclusion of non-divine individuals is not 
materialistic or spatial, a difference with certain 
types of pantheism has been implied.  But there is much 
more to be said, following a brief excursus.  I have 
indicated that to my knowledge just two writers apart 
from Hartshorne have expressly acknowledged Tillich's 
  Therefore, Hartshorne cannot be legitimately 
accused of rendering a spatial or quasi-materialistic 
sense of God's containment of finite reality.  Indeed, 
if one thinks about the immediate possession of what is 
felt by something, one can see that a spatial relation 
is not truly feasible.  For a spatial relation implies 
some distance between the perceiver and the perceived. 
 Ask yourself what the distance between the feeling, 
say, in your big toe, and "you" is.  The question is 
not appropriate.  Even less so is any question of 
spatial relationship between God and the creatures. 
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panentheism.  However, at least two other critics have 
more or less accused Tillich of pantheism
xxiii
xxii--though in 
no case do they offer anything like a thorough study of 
the key concepts and phrases that might with a measure 
of plausibility be interpreted pantheistically.  Some 
plausibility to so interpreting them is provided by 
Tillich's own insistence that any valid doctrine of God 
must have "a pantheistic element."   And Hartshorne 
in an early article refers to his and similar 
understandings of God (including Tillich's) as "the new 
pantheism," which serves as the title of the 
article.xxiv
 Just what then are the basic differences between 
the two?  In a brief definition earlier, I indicated 
that God is not reducible to nor exhausted by the world 
which God includes, but rather has a reality which is 
more than, which transcends, the universe.  This 
suggests that in panentheism there are qualities which 
apply to the including whole that most definitely do 
not apply to the included parts.  These are the 
properties of divinity, such as 
  Since then, of course, Hartshorne has 
found a term, "panentheism," more likely to ensure that 
people will not confuse the "new pantheism" with the 
"old." 
aseity
  Pantheism by contrast tends to attribute 
divinity and its attributes to the world as a whole or 
to parts of it or to its structure, in and of 
, omniscience, 
and omnipotence.  Thus, in panentheism there is no 
question of confusing the creation with the Creator, 
even though it is included in God. 
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themselves.  (It should be noted, though, that in most 
well-known forms of pantheism, there is some original 
divine substance that more or less transcends the 
world, even to the point of having impassibility and 
timelessness ascribed, as in classical theism.)  This 
seems to rest upon a quasi-materialistic understanding 
of the divine substance (which we have seen is not 
applicable to panentheistic inclusion).  There may be 
attenuations of this substance, so that things possess 
differing degrees of divinity (with nonliving matter 
usually lowest on the scale).  In acosmic pantheism, 
that is, where the material world is regarded as 
illusion or "maya," as in traditional Eastern panthe-
ism, the quasi-materialistic or substantialistic 
pattern is not broken.  Though the substance is here a 
"spiritual" one, it is still subject to manipulation 
appropriate to materials, being divided up or broken 
off from the original into individual selves who try to 
return to unity. 
 That God is more than the finite experiences and 
decisions suggests that God makes decisions not made 
for God by the creatures, that God is transcendent in 
the sense of having some freedom of action (in addition 
to being transcendent in the sense of the perfection of 
attributes, as above).  In itself, though, this does 
not tell us whether the creatures conversely have any 
transcendence with respect to God in the sense of some 
degree of genuine indeterminacy in their actions.  In 
much traditional pantheism, as with the Stoics and 
Spinoza, the tendency is towards determinism, for God 
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to wholly determine all actions in the world.  It 
should be stated that in much traditional theism, as in 
Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin, all creaturely actions 
are also completely decided by God. 
 This question might then be raised:  How much do 
classical theism and pantheism really differ?  Tradi-
tional theism is not substantialistic and does not tend 
to attribute divine status to the world.  Also, classi-
cal theism is less likely than pantheism to make God's 
decisions necessary (particularly in its holding that 
God might not have created the world).   
 This much can be said:  classical theism, which 
unlike pantheism stresses the distinctness of God vis-
a-vis the creation and divine transcendence of it, even 
to the point of making God impassible and completely 
nontemporal, has ironically and incompatibly, by 
denying genuine creaturely freedom, made finite 
individuals mere expressions of God (as pantheism, 
except that these manifestations of God are not 
regarded as divine themselves).  Panentheism maintains 
that the creatures are expressions of the divine life, 
but not mere expressions:  they have limited but real 
freedom; there is some real indeterminacy before they 
act, even from the divine perspective.  I submit that 
this is both truer to our experience and better 
preserves the divine transcendence and guards against 
pantheism than does the determinism of classical theism 
in combination with impassibility and immutability, the 
latter two of which compromise God's immanence.  As we 
shall see, though both Hartshorne and Tillich affirm 
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the creaturely freedom of panentheism, Tillich 
sometimes talks of the relationship between Creator and 
created in terms not fully consonant with that 
affirmation.  Hopefully the preceding contrast with 
traditional theism and with pantheism has furthered the 
reader's grasp of panentheism's raison d'etre.   
 The distinction between passive and active 
aspects will figure into the structure of my book in 
the following way:  Relatively speaking, Hartshorne 
emphasizes the passive aspect, and Tillich the active 
one, which should be discernible in chapters 3 and 2, 
respectively.  But they go beyond merely emphasizing 
one pole more than the other.  In chapters 4 and 5, 
respectively, I will argue that Hartshorne undermines 
his panentheism (especially) in relation to the active 
aspect, and that Tillich undermines his (especially) in 
relation to the passive.  The basic areas in which 
Tillich does this have already been mentioned in 
passing:  despite his desire to affirm the full inclu-
sion of temporality, of "non-being," and of creaturely 
spontaneity in the divine life, the pull of the 
theological tradition is evidenced in statements not 
wholly consistent with such intentions. 
 I will judge that when it comes to the active 
aspect of divine power Hartshorne in fact is not 
panentheistic.  There is no clear formulation in 
Hartshorne of God as (encompassing and working through) 
all power, as actively and immediately empowering 
everything.  Moreover, certain Hartshornean notions 
gainsay an utterly immediate empowerment.  A second 
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major problematic area is Hartshorne's model of divine 
governance, which con Hartshorne's contention does not 
involve any truly direct or unmediated control, and 
which is not compatible with the perfect divine control 
of the world's destiny which he envisions and panenthe-
ism demands.  These problems have undoubtedly played a 
part in the feeling of some that process theology does 
not do justice to the divine ultimacy and majesty.  
 In the final chapter I will employ what has 
preceded as the basis for further development of, 
defense of, and argumentation for a viable panentheism 
that is adequate with regard to both the active and 
passive aspects.  In this connection I will attempt to 
show that the two are not finally incompatible.  A 
possible contradiction for traditional theism as well 
as for panentheism is suggested by the concept of 
aseity, that God depends for existence and experience 
on no ontologically ultimately independent power, and 
thus by implication is the source of anything else.  
(Throughout this work, I will use aseity as meaning 
both the primary etymological sense of "self-existence" 
and its implication of being the sole ultimate source 
of anything else.)  On the one hand, there is then no 
power other than God to give being to the world.  On 
the other hand, if God possesses all power unrestricted 
by any external forces, should not God always possess 
all possible value and be subject to no negativities, 
and all this unchangeably?  But these latter qualities 
all seem irreconcilable with genuinely relating to, 
with truly creating and knowing, the world, let alone 
16    Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich 
 
relating with total immediacy.  Nevertheless, 
traditional theism, and to some extent Tillich, answer 
"yes" to that question.  I will avoid this incongruity 
in classical theism and attempt to overcome the general 
dilemma by arguing that God as genuinely (and perhaps 
intrinsically) temporal-- though with a perfect 
temporality not entailing our deficiencies--and as 
perfectly inclusive of, and thus partially affected by, 
experience of value by nondivine beings is quite 
compatible with aseity
 Thus, I will give evidence that the idea of God 
is not inherently incoherent.  And I will, I hope, have 
shown that a theology of process can be construed so as 
to do full justice to the divine majesty and holiness. 
 And I will, I trust, have rendered a Tillichian 
theology that does fuller justice to Tillich's desire 
to offer a "living God" in contrast to the Thomistic 
 and ultimacy.  Indeed, I will 
argue that on the whole the divine ultimacy implies 





The Nature of Theological Language Accord- 
  
ing to Hartshorne and Tillich 
 Before closing this introductory chapter, an 
overview of Hartshorne's and Tillich's respective 
understandings of how language applies to God is in 
order.  This will give some reassurance that they are 
meaning the same thing to a degree sufficient to be 
compared as panentheists, as well as point out some 
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differences between the two.  The similarities and 
differences concerning symbolism and analogy with 
respect to God parallel congruencies and 
dissimilarities in their doctrines of God and 
foreshadow some of the findings of future chapters.  
Especially in connection with Tillich, this may mean we 
will be getting ahead of ourselves a little and that 
some of these remarks may be clearer in retrospect. 
 Hartshorne (in keeping with his being more the 
rationalist in style than Tillich) is straightforward 
in his analysis of religious language.  He 
distinguishes three types of language with regard to 
God.
xxvii
xxv  Symbolic language involves particular, concrete 
parts of finite reality, such as calling God 
"shepherd."  Literal language is comprised primarily of 
categories that are purely abstract, such as necessity 
and contingency, potentiality and actuality, and 
absoluteness and relativity, and mutually exclusive 
(with respect to the same thing in the same sense), and 
that thus must apply to everything.  For example, 
Hartshorne contends that "that which is not literally 
'in some degree and quality made what it is by 
contingent relations,' i.e., relative, ...must be quite 
literally and entirely absolute."xxvi  Hartshorne also 
considers the concept of inclusion by God or of being a 
"constituent of the divine life" as abstract enough to 
be literal.   The third type of language, more or 
less between his "symbolic" and "literal," Hartshorne 
labels "analogical," a venerable theological term.  
Words like "know" and "love" are analogical.  They vary 
18    Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich 
 
in their meaning depending upon whether, say, a dog, a 
human, or God is doing the knowing.  Hartshorne 
recognizes a great difference, a difference in 
principle, between the divine instances and any 
other.xxviii  In general this means that only for God 
will such attributes be all-inclusive quantitatively 
and qualitatively, in scope and adequacy.  For example, 
only God will know all entities and know them 
completely.  Hartshorne does not believe that we can go 
beyond that type of abstraction and know concretely 
what it would be like to apprehend all or anything 
utterly.xxix
 According to Hartshorne there is a sense in 
which analogical attributes can tend to become 
literal.
xxxii
   
xxx  Hartshorne holds that everyone has some 
direct awareness of God, an opinion by the way shared 
by Tillich,xxxi who sometimes refers to this awareness 
as the "mystical a priori."   The more fully one is 
aware of God, the more one has an immediate sense of 
the perfection of attributes in relation to God (and 
the less need to analogize from nondivine cases).  With 
this lessening of our dependence on our experience of 
the ("literal") nondivine cases, our sense of what is 
"literal" changes; it could perhaps as well be said 
that God "literally" knows, since knowing for us is as 
much a matter of ignorance as of knowing, than that we 
know literally and God knows analogically.  Again, 
Hartshorne is not suggesting that this immediate or 
mystical awareness, no matter how strong, ever entails 
direct participation in what God concretely knows about 
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the world. 
 Overall it could be said that Tillich offers a 
two-pronged division concerning language about God:  
that which is symbolic and that which is either literal 
or on the boundary between literal and symbolic.  
Before the second volume of the 
xxxiii
Systematic, Tillich 
cited "being-itself" as the only term that could be 
literally applied to God.  In volume 2, he indicates 
that, when "we say that God is the infinite, or the 
unconditional, or being-itself, we speak rationally and 
ecstatically at the same time" and that these "terms 
precisely designate the boundary line at which both the 
symbolic and the non-symbolic coincide."  
 Except for "in passing" remarks, Tillich does 
not say much about how symbolic language applies to 
God.  (His articles and chapters on symbolism tend to 
devote only a portion to symbolism specifically in 
relation to God and here not to go beyond the 
generality that symbols participate in being itself, as 
well as being transcended by it.)  Making use of such 
remarks I will try to give a plausible interpretation 
of Tillich on God-talk in comparison to Hartshorne. 
 Tillich does not have a separate category for 
what might be called "poetic" language, such as calling 
God "shepherd."  But this is a trivial matter.  And 
though Hartshorne considers basic metaphysical 
categories as literal when applied to God, I find any 
pellucid contrast between these and "analogical" terms 
like "to know" questionable.  Though I quite agree with 
Hartshorne that God is in a genuine sense relative and 
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contingent, God does not "relate" nor is God "contin-
gent" in the same way that we relate and are 
contingent, any more than God "knows" just as we know. 
 And Hartshorne does not mean to imply otherwise:  for 
example, he denies that God is contingent in the senses 
that God could ever not exist or could be totally 
surprised by any future event. 
 The main question then becomes how the bulk of 
theological language--"analogical" language for Harts-
horne or "symbolic" language for Tillich--applies to 
God, why it does not apply literally.  The mere differ-
ence in terminology is not important for our purposes 
(though Tillichxxxiv 
 One aspect of Tillich's belief that (at least 
most) language cannot be literal in application to God 
is a general sense of mystery, a general uncertainty 
and intellectual humility, in the face of that which 
"infinitely transcends" us--a common Tillichian phrase. 
 For example, Tillich pens, "A deep feeling for the 
riddle of existence and for the mystery of being makes 
it impossible for these people [among whom Tillich 
numbers himself] to accept a too 'well-informed' speak-
ing of God."
xxxvi
and Hartshorne both have reasons 
for their preferences, Hartshorne's being his threefold 
distinction previously described). 
xxxv  Also, Tillich does expressly associate 
the symbolic character of the finite realm in applica-
tion to God with divine infinite transcendence.  
 More specifically and more formally, "mystery" 
is said to characterize "a dimension which 'precedes' 
the subject-object relationship."xxxvii  Since "ordinary 
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language" has grown out of, and is bound to, the 
subject-object scheme,"xxxviii
xxxix
 it cannot be applied 
literally to God.  Or to put it in a way that uses the 
not strictly symbolic "being-itself" as regulative with 
respect to symbolism:  "The unsymbolic statement which 
implies the necessity of religious symbolism is that 
God is being itself, and as such beyond the subject-
object structure of everything that is."   
 One type of Tillichian expression suggests one 




does that entail about symbolism? 
xl or structure.xli  For Tillich, this seems to 
mean both that God is not subject to any particular 
rational structurexlii and that being-itself is "the 
Unvordenkliche, as Schelling has called it ('that 
before which thinking cannot penetrate'),"  is 
impenetrable to reason, because "as something existing, 
it itself is based thereon."xliv  On this latter prong, 
he also writes that defining being-itself "is 
impossible, since it is the presupposition of any 
definition."xlv  If transcending the subject-object 
structure means being strictly beyond any rational 
structure, one could conclude that symbolism is 
necessary because language or anything else pointing to 
God involves some structure, rationality, and 
definiteness, whereas God is essentially beyond any and 
all such structure (or at least any structure at all 
analogous to creaturely structure).  But does not such 
a conclusion make any symbolism arbitrary and rule out 
any definite, reasonable thought about God?  On the 
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second prong, contrary to Tillich's assumption, it does 
not necessarily follow that the basis or presupposition 
of knowing is absolutely unknowable.  Obviously, if the 
impenetrability to thinking or impossibility of 
defining is taken strictly, then any language and 
thought about God, even symbolic, are blind and 
arbitrary.  At first glance Tillich may appear humble 
in relation to divine mystery in the above claim of 
divine transcendence of all reason or structure.  The 
most humble claim, though, would be an agnostic one:  
we do not know whether there is rationality or 
structure in God's being in itself, that is, apart from 
the world.  (This addresses Tillich's concern that God 
not be subject to any particular rational structure of 
creation.) 
 There are other comments which suggest that 
God's transcendence is such that nothing or next to 
nothing can be known about God and that language about 
God must be regarded as "symbolic" because it does not, 
in the final analysis, apply to God (or at least we 
have no idea whether it does).  Sometimes Tillich 
asserts that we can know God in relation to us, but not 
("at all," he says at one point
xlvii
xlviii
xlvi) in God's essence or 
self.   But unless this relation is to some extent 
constitutive of God in and to God's self, of which we 
know something, how can knowing God in relation to us 
be more than subjectivistic?   Tillich also writes 
that symbolic statements on God are not true or false, 
but rather constructive or destructive.xlix  For Tillich 
symbols are destructive if they are demonic or idola-
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trous, that is, claiming ultimacy for themselves rather 
than for God.  This seems especially appropriate to 
concrete symbols like persons, events, and physical 
objects, which can obviously become idolatrous, but 
could not such symbols also convey the nature of God 
more or less accurately?  While theological language 
can also become idolatrous in the senses of one's 
becoming overly bound or devoted to particular ways of 
saying things and of making a claim of ultimacy for a 
deity who is less than ultimate, would not this latter 
problem also entail relative misunderstanding and 
falsity?  Tillich seems here to have torn asunder 
knowing from valuing and doing. 
 Related to this is an aspect of Tillich's under-
standing of ultimate concern or faith.  Though all 
particular formulations and all concrete repositors of 
our ultimate concern involve risk and may come to be 
doubted, there is an immediate sense of ultimacy,l of 
the "God above God," as it is called in one work,li 
which cannot be denied.  While this "God above God" 
supposedly transcends "words and concepts,"lii it would 
probably not be false to Tillich's meaning to say that 
in experiencing it one senses that which depends upon 
nothing else to be and which is the ultimate source of 
everything (aseity).  For it is the "God above God," 
who gives the "courage to be" (even amidst doubt).liii  
The awareness of God as ultimate power, as almighty, 
allowing us to courageously conquer "non-being," 
anxiety and doubt, is an important Tillichian theme.liv 
 And, indeed, Tillich specifically identifies "the God 
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above the God of theism" with "the ground of the 
whole."lv  Aseity enters into another aspect of or 
perspective on "mystery."  Tillich writes, that there 
is something rather than nothing is the mystery.lvi
 With 
lviii
   
aseity we are starting to get some positive 
content to being-itself.  However, that the world is 
rooted in God as necessary ultimate source may not 
entail any further knowledge about God, at least in the 
opinion of some.  For instance, Plotinus sees God as 
ultimate source, but his undifferentiated One could not 
legitimately be said to know the world or to have any 
other attributes.  And some have regarded the Neo-
platonic one as the key to Tillich's "being-itself."lvii 
 The following statement by Tillich does evince 
agnosticism as to God's nature beyond being the 
ultimate source, though it does not speak for or 
against undifferentiation:  "I really do not know what 
past and future are in the ground of being, I only know 
they are rooted in it."  
 We have viewed one side of Tillich.  One 
suspects that there must be another or else he would 
not have spent so much time trying to describe God.  I 
will not pretend that each side is fully reconcilable 
with the other.  Perhaps one way of tying them together 
would be to say that the aseity
 Some general declarations that indicate we can 
talk rationally and significantly about God will be 
 or ultimacy that is 
immediately sensed is all that Tillich is absolutely 
sure of and that other statements can be made only with 
relative confidence. 
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listed first.  Tillich maintains that human reason 





lix  He argues against what he 
perceives as someone else's uncritical approach, 
advocating a "full, conceptually strict investigation" 
into "the range and the limits of meaning" of "the 
traditional Christian terms," even though this may 
sometimes point to the limits of understanding.lx  He 
sees a need to explore the meaning of various biblical 
symbols.lxi  He insists that on the basis of God's 
"ineffability much can and must be said about him."lxii 
 Moreover, he violates his stricture that the God above 
(the) God (of theism) is "undefinable,"  by offering 
a panentheistic description, both in contrast to the 
God of "theological theism"lxiv and more directly.lxv  
Finally, he does affirm an "analogy of being" in gen-
eral,lxvi and specifically one "between the basic struc-
ture of experienced life and the ground of being in 
which life is rooted."   He holds that everything 
must express something knowable about God,  that all 
dimensions of reality can provide valid (and even 
"true"!lxix) symbolic material,lxx
 Now as a general rule that which is rooted in 
something is not necessarily similar to it.  Be that as 
it may, what is important for us is that being grounded 
in the divine life does for Tillich entail some 
similarity or proportion.  (Though we cannot forget our 
previous section, the tenor of which diverged from 
this, and, in particular, the agnostic comment on past 
 because they are 
grounded in God. 
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and future as rooted in God.
lxxii
lxxi)  And Tillich does not 
trivialize this by saying that any symbol is as valid 
as any other, which would imply that, not some degree 
of intrinsic similarity, but the mere fact of being 
rooted in or caused by God is the basis of symbolism.  
Instead he discerns differences in "the finite-infinite 
proportion," such that, for example, "God is manifest 
according to his innermost nature in man but not in a 
stone."   The phrase "innermost nature" would seem 
to suggest that something can
 So what may be said more specifically about why 
or how symbolic language does not apply literally, 
beyond the general mystery and transcendence of God 
covered earlier?  A central aspect of the preceding of 
the subject-object relationship that characterizes 
"mystery" is the absence of separation or externality 
or ignorance, which was touched upon before and will be 
further developed in chapter 2.  Tillich often speaks 
of (God's transcending) the subject-object "cleavage," 
or like terms, suggesting the relative externality of 
nondivine things to each other.  Related to this is 
Tillich's ubiquitous insistence that God is not a 
being, even the highest, or a person, but being-itself 
or the power of being.  Beings or persons are 
"alongside" each other, relatively external, all of 
whom derive their existence and basic conditions of 
existence from the ultimate ground, who is not 
"alongside."lxxiii
 be said about God in 
God's essence or self. 
  Therefore, to use for God terms that 
normally or "literally" are used in reference to 
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persons must be symbolic.lxxiv
lxxvi
lxxvii
  Significantly, Tillich 
avows that since there are no "external" relations 
between God and the creatures, but only "internal" ones 
or "inner relations of the divine life," all relations 
(and most, if not all attributions, involve relations) 
are symbolic when involving God.lxxv  Tillich regards 
the word "cause" as symbolic with respect to God, 
because a "cause" is more or less external to its 
effects  and because a "cause" is one in a series of 
causes and effects, rather than the "cause" of the 
entire series.   
 Thus, we have here the panentheistic idea of a 
God who is not external or exclusive in relation to the 
creatures in either the passive or active aspect, in 
either knowledge or power.  This is comparable to 
Hartshorne's understanding of the analogous character 
of attributes as applied to God:  in God they are 
perfect in scope and adequacy, for God fully includes 
all.  What we have here, in effect, is Tillich's 
version of the 
 
via eminentiae.  Terms like "know," 
"cause," and "love" that ordinarily apply to "persons" 
are negated in a positive
 It is our sense of a term that is not strictly 
 and definite manner (in 
contrast to the above general caveat about God 
infinitely transcending us and our limitations).  When 
applied to being-itself they must be understood as 
involving none of the externality that they involve in 
normal usage.  Thus, as Hartshorne suggests, in a way 
they apply even more to God because they are free from 
deficiency. 
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symbolic, like "being-itself," that guides us in 
understanding how other language applies.  (Though, of 
course, without elaboration upon the term, perhaps 
including a statement of why other language is not 
literal, we will get nowhere.)  If one does not grasp 
what Tillich means by being-itself, one will not see 
why or how other language is symbolic.  The 
panentheistic aspect of being-itself provides a 
parallel to God's "inclusion" of things as "literal" 
for Hartshorne in offering a key for interpreting 
"analogical" or "symbolic" language.  And like 
Hartshorne, Tillich believes that an immediate 
awareness of God is needed to grasp the key to 
symbolism and analogy.  If an "ecstatic" experience of 
God is not associated with "being-itself" or the 
"infinite" we will not know what is meant by such 
terms.  For example, some might interpret being-itself 
as the abstract common denominator of whatever exists, 
a possibility Tillich recognizes and denies as his 
meaning.lxxviii  
 There is one other basic way in which ordinary 
language is symbolic in relation to God for Tillich.  
It lies somewhat between the general mystery of God and 
panentheistic eminence.  It gives a fairly specific 
sense in which ordinary language must be negated but, 
depending upon how it is interpreted, may not give us 
This is probably why Tillich changed his 
mind about calling "God is being-itself" a strictly 
nonsymbolic statement and held instead that when we say 
this "we speak rationally and ecstatically at the same 
time." 
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anything positive.  It is that everything in the divine 




 and therefore cannot be spoken of 
literally.lxxx  For example, he states that "one speaks 
symbolically of God as love," because "the divine life 
has the character of love but beyond the distinction 
between potentiality and actuality," and therefore "is 
mystery for finite understanding."   Indeed, "in the 
proper or nonsymbolic sense of the word 'life,'" "we 
cannot speak of God as living," of the "divine life," 
precisely because life "is the process in which poten-
tial being becomes actual being."   If all this is 
understood as a genuine temporality, but one without 
deficiencies, this could be seen as an aspect of 
panentheistic eminence and would be compatible with 
Hartshorne's thought.  If on the other hand it is taken 
to mean that God is in no real sense temporal, we have 
problems.  We can easily see how it can be reasonably 
said that God knows, even though--or indeed because--
there is an immediacy, an absence of externality, that 
we do not possess, and even though we do not know 
concretely what and how God knows.  But even on the 
abstract level, it is not clear what could be meant by 
saying that God knows the world even though there is no 
temporal movement or change in any sense in the divine 
experience.  Indeed, to say that the world is temporal, 
while God is wholly nontemporal, but that God is 
related to, causes, knows, and loves it, appears on the 
face of it contradictory, especially if any creaturely 
indeterminacy is granted.  Thus, if nontemporality is a 
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key for comprehending how ordinary language applies to 
God, it will not open any locks for me.  Rather it 
seems that with temporality translated or abstracted 
out for God, ordinary terms lose all positive content, 
at least insofar as God includes the world.  What 
Tillich does intend by "no difference between 
potentiality and actuality" is not at all obvious.  In 
chapter 5, we shall investigate where or whether 
Tillich comes down on temporality. 
 The tension in Tillich between the positive and 
the negative in symbolism, between eminence on the one 
hand and general mystery and perhaps the contention 
that God transcends potentiality and actuality on the 
other, can be looked at in terms of panentheism's two 
principles of God as embracing but transcending the 
world.  The question, which goes beyond just symbolism 
to the substance of Tillich's doctrine of God, is 
whether he holds the two together, of whether God is 
deemed transcendent in such a way as to compromise full 
inclusion of creation. 
 I will close with a word on mystery and 
rationalism.  While I would not contest that Hartshorne 
is more the rationalist, while Tillich emphasizes more 
the divine mystery, the difference may not be as great 
as some might think.  We have seen Tillich strongly 
affirm the need for rational analysis.  Hartshorne 
mentions often the "mystery"lxxxiii
lxxxiv
 and once even the 
"impenetrabil-ity"  of God with respect to God's 
concrete actuality.  The abstract divine essence, 
though, is another matter for Hartshorne, being much 
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more accessible to our grasp.lxxxv
lxxxvi
  Yet there may be in 
Tillich a parallel distinction between two types of 
knowledge about God and concomitant degrees of 
certainty.  Remember that for Tillich there is a direct 
sense of ultimacy or aseity that is certain, whereas 
concrete symbols and more definite formulations of the 
divine nature are always subject to risk and doubt.  
God's aseity is certainly part of the divine essence.  
Hartshorne does differ in believing aspects of the 
divine essence other than aseity to be equally open to 
our ken (and if aseity is understood to mean that God 
is not affected by our choices, Hartshorne rejects it 
as applying to God ).
 But ironically there is a sense in which Harts-
horne pays more homage to mystery than Tillich.  
Hartshorne confesses a number of times that he and 
anyone else could be mistaken about their basic meta-




  Though he shares with Tillich a belief in an 
immediate awareness of God by all persons, he is not 
bold enough to assert that this is so transparent as to 
give us any absolute or utter certainty.  Rather it is 
more or less "dim,"  "faint,"  though he be-
lieves "never wholly submerged."xc
 Finally, some may accuse Hartshorne of not 
giving mystery its due in allowing that God is subject 
to change (in the concrete contents of experience and 
in happiness) and suffering.  However, he well notes 
that traditional "negative theology" is far from 
humble.
 
xci For it definitely declares that God is not 
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contingent, relative, or passible.  The "humblest" 
position would be that we do not know whether or not 
God changes or suffers.  Now Tillich does not 
conclusively take the side of either Hartshorne or 
traditional theism here.  But as we shall see, this is 
not so much a matter of explicitly saying, "I don't 
know," as of being ambiguous or incoherent. 
 I trust I have shown enough similarities and 
parallels between Hartshorne and Tillich on theological 
epistemology to reassure that they are "in the same 
ballpark," as well as to suggest some real differences 
between the two. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
 
 TILLICH AS PANENTHEIST 
 
 "God Is Not a Being
 
" 
 In this chapter I will look at a number of 
(mostly) recurring expressions in the works of Tillich 
that are panentheistic, at least in a very important 
part of their meaning.  Some may emphasize the active 
aspect more and some the passive, though each aspect is 
implied in and usually at some point associated with 
all of them. 
 Probably no phrase is more distinctively 
Tillichian than this one:  God is not a being, but 
being itself; or alternatively, God is not a being 
beside others, but being-itself.  Actually, as far as I 
know, neither phrase appears exactly as above.  But 
those are the best composites based upon frequency of 
words in this type of statement and upon freedom from 
particular contexts.  There are countless variations on 
this basic theme.  (Though I have "counted" all of them 
that I have encountered, as the endnotes will attest!) 
 In addition to the most common preposition, "beside,"
xviii
i 
we have "besides,"ii "alongside,"iii "among,"iv and "side 
by side with."v  As the ultimate is not a beingvi 
(beside others),vii neither is God a "thing,"viii an 
"object,"ix a "natural object"x (Tillich in this 
context is using these words in a general sense, not in 
contrast to "subject"xi), a "person,"xii a "reality,"xiii 
a "meaning,"xiv "one level,"xv a "power,"xvi or a 
"cause,"xvii (beside others), nor "a part,"  nor 





thing or someone,"xix nor "somebody or 
something."xx  When the alternative to "a being beside 
others" and similar phrases is explicitly stated, which 
it is roughly half the time, "the power of being"xxi or 
"the ground of being"xxii (or "the ground of" some other 
appropriate term or phrase) are sometimes offered 
instead of the preferred being-itself.   Also, in 
many cases, "ground of being"xxiv or "power of being"xxv 
or bothxxvi are mentioned in addition to "being-itself" 
as alternates for it.  (The terms are also used 
synonymously in contexts other than denying that God is 
a being. )
 In addition, Tillich speaks of our awareness of 
ultimate reality in terms paralleling his distinctive 
phrase about the nature of ultimate reality.  Such 
awareness is not a"state of mind"xxviii
 
 or an "encoun-
ter"xxix "beside other" ones.  Instead it is "in, with, 
and under" other states of mind and "within" other 
encounters.xxx  Moreover, Tillich believes that if God 
is not a being beside others and if awareness of being-
itself is not a state beside others, then in some sense 
the "subjective" ultimate concern we have and the 
"objective" ultimate must be "one and the same."xxxi
 But what does Tillich mean by denying that God 
is a being (beside others)?  In approaching this, I 
will restrict myself to ramifying comments Tillich 
makes when using that type of phrase or key parts of 
it, which often are not too explicit, when present at 
all.  However, we will not be left without some very 
  
More will be said about this later in the chapter. 
 Tillich as Panentheist     43 
 
significant evidence.  And other panentheistic 
Tillichian formulations to be covered in the remainder 
of this chapter cast an aura providing additional 
support for my interpretation. 
 At first glance Tillich's distinctive phrase(s) 
may seem to be merely a catchy way of emphasizing God's 
radical superiority in relation to other individuals.  
For "beside(s)," "alongside," and "among" suggest being 
more or less on the same level, while "just a"xxxii 
 Along these lines, it is often indicated that 






"a" (as it is rendered a majority of times, though far 
from always, when not coupled with a phrase like 
"besides others") suggest understatement.  This inter-
pretation would seem to find support in the fact that 
almost every ramifying comment maintains that God would 
be a being if "subject to" the "structure of finitude" 
in general or to one or more of the ontological 
elements or categories of finitude, or to some other 
aspect of finitude. 
 and sometimes 
that God would be subject to the split between essence 
and existence,  that is, would fall short of what 
God should be.  Tillich appears to be saying the same 
thing when he indicates that God as a being becomes "a 
part of"xxxv or "a creature within the world"  or is 
"within the totality of beings,"  "within the uni-
verse of events"  or "of existing things,"  or 
"within the structural whole."xl  In all this seems to 
run a desire to preserve God's necessary existence and 
the perfection of the divine attributes, a refusal to 
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attribute to God the deficiencies of the finite crea- 
ture.  Is then the refusal to call God a being only a 
semantic device to highlight God's radical unsurpassi-
bility? 
 One amplification of this basic Tillichian theme 
hints that something more is going on here.  Sometimes 
Tillich adds that God is not "above" others to the 





xli  Or similarly, he writes that God is 
not a being, even the highest being.xlii  Or more 
simply, he just negatives God as a highest being.   
Nor is God the "most powerful being,"xliv the "most 
important part"xlv of reality, or the "greatest"xlvi or 
"most eminent" object.   Neither is God "an absolute 
being," which he considers a contradiction in 
terms.  
 Tillich explains why "above" is not good enough: 
...logically the "above" is one direction of the 
"alongside," except it means that which is the 
ground and abyss of all beings.  Then, however, 
it is hard to call it a being.xlix
Or more fully: 
 
What stands "beside," is by reason of this very 
position a single finite meaning, for which one 
would then have to seek a basis of meaning, a 
God over God, a religion over religion.  No 
superlative can protect such a God, no matter 
how high above the word [sic] He stands, from 
becoming a creature within the world; for in 
every "above" lies a "beside" and in every 
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"beside" a "conditioned."l
 These seem to say that it is inappropriate to 
call God a being, because God is the ultimate source of 
all (other) beings.
 
li  This receives backing from the 
suggestion that it is "unconditioned power which makes 
God God (and not a highest being only)."lii
 But Tillich does offer some more revealing 
explanations.  They suggest an answer to a key 
ques-tion--Why is "above" "one direction of the 
alongside," Why does in "every 'above'" lie a 
"beside"?  Tillich rather explicitly gives the 
answer on this occasion:  As the creative ground 
of everything that has being,...or, in the most 
radical abstraction,...being-itself....  God is 
neither alongside things nor even "above" them; 
he is nearer to them than they are to them-
selves.
  But none of 
this is obviously helpful in showing why God cannot be 
a being above others.  For, on the face of it, could 
not one maintain that God is the highest being, who 
self-exists and who created the world, who is the 
ultimate power of being? 
liii
That is to say, to be "alongside" or "above" others 
entails a relative separation or externality with 
respect to others that is not appropriate for the 
ultimate.   
 
 At this point we will take a slight excursus 
from phrases specifically denying that God is a being, 
a thing, etc., to explore further the logic of 
"alongside" for Tillich.  Significantly, he declares 
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that certain statements "can have the unfortunate 
implication that there is something alongside God in 
which he participates from the outside."
lviii
liv  (More will 
be written about the context of this remark later.)  He 
rejects the notion of "a being alongside the world" as 
"half-theistic, half-deistic."lv  Deism, of course, 
regards the world as largely independent of and 
external to God, though divinely created.  
"Supranaturalism," which is anathema to Tillich, 
localizes God in a supranatural world alongside the 
natural one,lvi giving God a "special place."lvii  In a 
revealing comment, he proffers this as the alternative 
to God as "beside the world" in supranaturalism:  "an 
interpretation of reality in which the infinite is 
within the finite and the finite is contained within 
the infinite."  
 Tillich's interpretation of "alongside" as 
meaning relative separation or externality gives an 
answer as to why God cannot be a being "alongside" or 
even "above" others.  But does the absence of 
separation, the inclusion of "the finite within the 
infinite," also provide the clue to why "it is hard to 
call" the ground of being "a being"lix in any sense, 
even the highest being?  Another criticism qua 
description of supranaturalism implies that it does:  
Supranaturalism "separates God as a being, the highest 
being, from all other beings, alongside and above which 
he has his existence."lx  I submit that understanding 
Tillich as panentheist answers why God cannot be a 
being in a way that goes beyond regarding this 
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distinctive phrase as merely a turn of a phrase to 
highlight God's radical superiority and beyond the 
seeming semantic arbitrariness of insisting that God 
cannot be called the highest being.  For if God is not 
separated at all from the creatures, if they are fully 
within God, then to posit God as a being who can be 
unambiguously contrasted to distinct other beings, as 
the creatures are with respect to each other, is 
untenable.lxi
 Now I am not arguing that every time Tillich 
says that God is not a being alongside or beside others 
that the panentheistic absence of externality and 
simple distinctness is in the forefront.  Indeed, there 
seem to be times when "beside others" does simply mean 
relative equality, operating as a rhetorical device to 
reinforce the divine unsurpassibility rather than 
indicating that God is not an unqualifiedly distinct or 
separate being from others.  Remember that almost every 
ramifying remark on God's not being a being (beside 
others) has to do with God's not being subject to 
"finitude" in some sense.  That God does not exist 
contingently, for example, is not related, at least not 
obviously, to lack of separation with regard to the 
creatures.  What I do want to argue is that the absence 
of externality and exclusivity is why Tillich "goes to 
the mat" on God's not being a being 
 
in any sense, even 
the highest, that this nonseparation and inclusivity is 
explicit on a number of occasions when the subjection 
to (the structure and categories of) finitude by God as 
a being is mentioned, and that it may be implicit on 
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many other occasions. 
 The initial plausibility of my premise that 
panentheistic nonseparation is crucial to understanding 
Tillich's insistence that God is not a being is, I 
believe, strong.  It makes sense of that insistence, 
saving it from total semantic arbitrariness.  For to 
say simply (that is, without qualification) that God is 
a being naturally suggests contrast to clearly distinct 
other beings, while it does not obviously suggest 
contingent existence, lack of ultimate power, or 
falling short of the divine essence. 
 It can be said that relative externality or 
separation with respect to others implies subjection to 
"finitude," including contingent existence and the 
"disruptions characteristic of the transition from 
essence to existence."
lxiii
lxii  For if there is externality 
of the world with respect to God, if God is "highest 
being" unambiguously contrasted to distinct other 
beings, then some more ultimate power, a "God over 
God"  as above, must establish the conditions that 
enable these more or less independent entities to 
interact.  In that case it would be the "God over God" 
which self-exists and is the very power of being in 
everything, including our alleged "God."  And this 
"God" would become a being within this larger universe 
of interaction, existing dependently and more or less 
subject to the weaknesses the other beings have.  This 
I submit is a plausible expansion of Tillich's avowal 
that "in every 'above' lies a 'beside' and in every 
'beside' a 'conditioned'"lxiv and an indisputable expan-
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sion of future remarks to the effect that if the rest 
of reality is not included by God or the infinite, if 
it is "alongside" or "besides," God is in fact finite. 
 We can approach the question of the relationship 
between relative externality and the deficiencies of 
"finitude" from a somewhat different angle that recalls 
our discussion about God's not having any ignorance or 
imperfect control of God's "body" (the universe God 
includes) and no "external" environment.  In brief, 
human deficiencies can all be perceived in terms of 
externality.  For externality entails relative 
ignorance and lack of possession and control.  And 
there is some externality not only in relation to 
others, but also with respect to ourselves--to our 
bodies, our past, our motivations.  This makes us 
liable to cognitive and moral imperfection (for if we 
knew others with utter immediacy and intimacy, we would 
love them as our-selves--they would be a part of us--
and we would be God!); to "losing our identity, through 
time and changelxv (but if we knew ourselves and others 
perfectly and thus the future so far as determinate, we 
would always act in terms of our essential nature, of 
what we should belxvi
 Tillich in fact does explicitly recognize 
relative externality or separation as a, and even as 
the, key aspect of finitude.  He regards the self-world 
correlation as "the basic ontological structure" of 
reality.lxvii
); and, finally, to death (for 
neither our cells nor our "external" environment are in 
our full possession and under our ultimate control). 
  It entails "being separated in some way 
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  There is "a tragic truth" here: 
 "the strangeness of all beings to each other.  We can 
approach other beings only in terms of analogy and, 
therefore, only indirectly and uncertainly."lxix  For-
mally, "the subject-object structure" is the self-world 
correlation with respect to reason.lxx  However, Tillich 
actually--and frequently--uses "subject-object" in a 
general way to refer to "the basic ontological struc-
ture," rarely uses the phrase "self-world correlation." 
 The subject-object structure is referred to as the 
"deepest and most universal" aspect of (the way we 
perceive) reality.lxxi  As we have seen in chapter 1, it 
is often rendered as the "subject-object" cleavage, 
thus connoting the relative externality of things to 
each other.   In volume 3 of the Systematic, Tillich 
devotes a large subsection to the subject-object 
cleavage or "separation"  in relation to cognition 
in general and to various facets of our lives, such as 
language, the arts, and education (and to how this 
alienation may be overcome--fragmentarily--by the 
Spiritual Presence).  
 Hopefully I have shown how externality is 
implicit in the contingency and imperfections of 
existence that are sometimes associated with God as a 
being (beside others).  Again I am not arguing that 
Tillich was intending the connection in such 
statements.  He just does not offer elaboration upon 
them so as to enable me to say that.  He may or may not 
be using "beside" and "a" here simply to emphasize 
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God's radical superiority rather than to also indicate 
the impropriety of the all-encompassing God being 
spoken of as a being unambiguously distinct from all 
other beings. 
 Now we shall examine the extent to which separa-
tion is explicitly involved in the subjection to 
finitude when God becomes a being (beside others).  A 
good place to start is with how a being is subject to 
the four categories of finitude:  time, space, causal-
ity, and substance.  (Tillich follows Kant here.)  In 
the following, Tillich expressly cites three of the 
categories: 
The God of theological theism...is supposed to 
be beyond the ontological elements and 
categories which constitute reality.  But every 
statement subjects him to them.  He is seen as a 
self which has a world, as an ego which is 
related to a thou, as a cause separated from its 
effect, as having a definite space and an 
endless time.lxxv
The comments on self-world and ego-thou should be seen 
as covering the category of substance.  In that case it 
should be clear that the first three categories covered 
all have to do with externality in relation to the 
creatures (remembering the relative separation involved 
in the self-world correlation).  The other category, 
that of time, will be commented upon shortly. 
 
 The category of cause received additional atten-
tion in relation to God as a being in supranaturalism: 
But the petty idea that God is a being who some-
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times works in terms of finite causality, 
producing finite effects within the structural 
whole, is contrary to everything I believe of 
God....  If he merely exists, of course he can 
participate in normal causalities.lxxvi 
Also, we have: 
The concept of a "Personal God," interfering 
with natural events, or being "an independent 
cause of natural events," makes God a natural 
object besides others, an object among objects, 
a being among beings, maybe the highest, but 
nevertheless a being.lxxvii 
Or more briefly, supranaturalism renders God finite "by 
making God a cause alongside other causes."lxxviii  All 
of these remarks on causality seem to have the 
following in common:  God as a being is "localized" 
with respect to causality, is made a particular or 
"independent" cause producing or interfering with 
certain events, rather than as the ultimate cause that 
is not separated from but acts through all other 
causality.  Thus God is not a cause that can be 
unqualifiedly contrasted to distinct other causes, any 
more than a being in simple distinction to other 
beings.  Interestingly, in one of the quotes, 
contingency of existence is associated with exclusivity 
and externality in regard to causality.  Conversely, by 
implication, aseity goes hand in hand with being the 
ultimate and all encompassing ground that expresses 
itself through, not in addition to, creaturely 
causality. 
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 Time was the one category in the above 
description of "theological theism" that is not 
directly related to separation with respect to others. 
 In another relevant passage, time is the only category 
explicitly  
considered: 
In popular parlance the concept "omnipotence" 
implies a highest being who is able to do what-
ever he wants.  This notion must be rejected.... 
 It makes God into a being alongside others, a 
being who asks himself which of innumerable 
possibilities he shall actualize.  It subjects 
God to the split between potentiality and 
actuality--a split which is actually the 
heritage of  
finitude.lxxix 
In this last quote, Tillich has used "alongside" in a 
way different than we saw earlier.  Rather than 
pertaining to spatial or quasi-spatial relationship--
and thus spatial distinctness and separation, here it 
seems to be used in the sense of relative qualitative 
equality.  What Tillich might mean by subjecting God to 
"an endless time" and to "the split between 
potentiality and actuality" must await chapter 5.  It 
was stated that externality with respect to ourselves 
and others makes us liable to "lose ourselves" through 
temporal change, with the implication that in God there 
must be an eminent temporality that guarantees against 
loss of essential perfection.  To the extent that 
Tillich views God's relationship to time in those 
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terms, externality could be said to be indirectly 
involved in the subjection to "finite" temporality of 
God as a being. 
 That three of the categories are explicitly 
associated with separation from and simple distinctness 
with regard to others, while time is not, parallels the 
findings of chapter 1 regarding why, beyond the general 
mystery and transcendence of the deity, language about 
God is symbolic.  There panentheistic eminence and 
transcendence of the distinction between potentiality 
and actuality were the two bases for symbolism. 
 Significantly Tillich does once give priority to 
two of the categories as rendering God finite:  "If God 
is a being, he is subject to the categories of 
finitude, especially to space and substance."lxxx
 In addition to explicit connection between 
externality and some "categories" of finitude, there 
  These 
can be seen as the two primary categories relative to 
making God one being in simple contrast to other ones; 
the first by localizing God in spatial separation from 
others, the second by attributing individual substance 
to God in unambiguous contrast to other individual 
substances.  Causality could then be understood as 
derivative of space and substance, as looking at a 
distinct, localized being from the perspective of 
acting and being acted upon.  However, Tillich does not 
there explicate the remark, so we are left to 
speculate, as I just have, based upon earlier 
statements on spatiality, substance, and causality and 
upon more general panentheistic observations. 
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are, in connection with God as a being, more general 
pronouncements on finitude that clearly have to do with 
separation with regard to the nondivine individuals. 
 The following declaration concerns the subject-
object structure, which we have seen is "the basic 
ontological structure" of finite reality:  "If God is 
brought into the subject-object structure of being, he 
ceases to be the ground of being and becomes one being 
among others (first of all, a being beside the subject 
who looks at him as an object)."lxxxi
lxxxii
lxxxiii
  There is also 
this indicative statement:  "Speaking to God and 
receiving an answer...transcends all ordinary 
structures of subjective and objective reason....  If 
it is brought down to a level of a conversation between 
two beings, it is blasphemous and ridiculous."  
(Emphasis mine.)  God's relationship with respect to 
the subject-object structure of reality is spoken of in 
many other places, but these do not refer to God as a 
being (among others).  Therefore, that issue will be 
explored more fully in a separate section later.  
Tillich does offer elaborating comments on the first 
quote, but these are rather stylized formulations that 
appear a number of times in his works and will also 
receive treatment in their own section.   
Nevertheless, without further explication the above 
assertions should clearly convey the separation of a 
quite distinct being (looked at or spoken to by another 
outside of it), especially in light of our earlier 
analysis of the nature of the subject-object structure-
-or cleavage--for Tillich. 
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 Unlike "alongside," "beside," "above," or even 
"among," "besides" can never directly refer to a 
spatial relationship, with the externality which that 
entails.  It means "in addition to" and is well suited 
to connoting either being on the same level 
qualitatively or distinctness of being in addition to 
others.  Significantly, Tillich does once explicitly 
consider the meaning of "besides": 
The infinite is always a radical breaking away 
from the finite, so radical that the 
relationship can never be imagined as besides 
each other.  It must always be understood as 
within.  Only then is the radical separation 
possible.  That seems to be very difficult.  I 
discussed it last night at Columbia in 
connection with Nicholaus Cusanus....  The 
infinite must embrace itself and the finite, 
otherwise it is not infinite.  If you (call) 
one-half of this blackboard...the finite and the 
other the infinite, then this infinite is not 
the infinite because it has something beside it, 
the finite...the infinite and the finite are not 
in different places, but they are different 
dimensions.lxxxiv 
As this reflection indicates, in panentheism the 
"infinite" and the "finite," God and the creatures, can 
be contrasted with and distinguished from each other--
and radically so, for God is much more than the world 
God includes taken in itself.  However, this radical 
contrast by its very nature precludes the type of 
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contrast or "separation" one has between creatures, who 
are in "different places" and distinct from or 
"besides" or in addition to each other, for God is the 
all-encompassing, embracing the finite within God's 
self.lxxxv  
 By the way, if it has not been obvious 
heretofore, it should be now, that "besides" or "a" as 
meaning a simply distinct being who thus is not being 
itself is not mutually exclusive with "besides" or "a" 
as meaning a being more or less qualitatively on the 
same level.  Rather, the former includes the latter, 
and goes beyond it, giving it further content, and 
making it other than simply a catchy way of indicating 
God's radical superiority, which nobody denies anyway 
(intentionally at least, though many do deny it by 
thinking of God as a separate and separated being, 
rather than as the all-inclusive). 
And if this were not so, God would be 
finite, the other half of the blackboard.  Of course, 
this does not mean that every time Tillich uses 
"besides" or the other prepositions in relation to 
God's subjection to finitude and elsewhere, that this 
meaning of separate beings in addition to each other is 
intended.  It does, though, definitely raise the 
possibility that it may be there in the background for 
Tillich.  And it is strong evidence that Tillich's 
adamant demand that God not be a being in any sense is 
based on this panentheistic understanding of God. 
 We come now to the four observations, one with a 
supplement, which are singly the most decisive in 
support of my thesis that Tillich will not give an inch 
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on the issue of God as a being (even to those who add 
"above others" or "the highest"), because to be a being 
for Tillich implies simple and unambiguous contrast to 
all other beings.  To begin, I will repeat Tillich's 
criticism of supranaturalism that I used to establish 
the initial plausibility of this contention:  It 
"separates God as a being, the highest being, from all 
other beings, alongside and above which he has his 
existence."lxxxvi  




...all the predicates which we attribute to God 
are incompatible with the assertation that he is 
a person.  The emphasis is on the "a," because 
this brings him side by side with other persons 
and makes him ontologically finite in relation 
to them.  It belongs to the characteristics of a 
hu-man person to be centered in himself and to 
ex-clude every other person from the center it-
self.  My ego is always my ego, and nobody el-
se's.  But God according to religious 
assertions--biblical, and mystical, and 
Reformation ones--is nearer to my ego than I 
myself am to it.  Similar consequences follow 
from symbols like omnipotence, omniscience, and 
omnipresence.  If they are taken seriously, they 
do not prevent one from calling God personal, 




Here we have quite clear entailments among being "a," 
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subjection to finitude, and externality or simple 
distinctness with regard to others.  Along with the 
recent quote on the relationship of the infinite and 
the finite, it gives support to my above interpretation 
of "beside" and "alongside" in connection with "condi-
tionedness," as entailing an externality or a separa-
tion (that implies a "God over God" setting the condi-
tions of interaction).lxxxviii  
 Peter Bertocci cites Tillich's above remarks, 
which were in answer to a question by Helmut Tielicke, 
and asks a further question: 
This is a fine 
panentheistic statement.  Rather than excluding others 
from the divine "center," God includes them.  My ego 
can be regarded as always my ego, and nobody else's--
except in relation to God.  For it is also God's--or 
better, a part of the divine "ego," lest there be any 
hint of exhaustive identification.  For God is more 
than the included nondivine individuals, and 
"infinitely transcends" them (which is why they are 
rightly called "nondivine individuals," even though 
they are expressions of and fully included in the 
divine life). 
Unless God's being and my being are to some 
extent and in some way ontologically distinct--
at least so that the center of my being and the 
center of God's being exclude each other 
ontologically (without denying interaction)--can 
there be real individuality for me and 
individual freedom in any degree?lxxxix 
Tillich responds: 
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Man is finite freedom....  But this does not 
make him ontologically independent.  God's 
sustaining creativity, as Martin Luther asserts, 
gives the arm of the murderer the power to stab 
his victim.xc  One cannot speak of a relation of 
the divine to the human center as if they were 
in the same ontological dimension.xci  If we 
speak of a divine center at all--symbolically--
we must say that the periphery of which one's 
center is the center is infinite and includes 
everything that is (cf. the symbols 
"omnipresence" and "omniscience").xcii
Bertocci had earlier parenthetically equated the divine 
"center" with the divine "essence," which he held must 
transcend us in some sense.xciii
 
  Tillich could agree 
with that opinion.  And panentheism should affirm 
Bertocci's desire that a person be "a limited but 
creative source of change."xciv  However, Bertocci's 
question posits a simple distinctness and exclusivity 
of two centered beings who "interact."  He also assumes 
that whether "persons are 'alongside' or 'within' God" 
is not the "ontological issue."xcv
 Thirdly, Tillich contrasts the concepts of 
being-itself and of "ground of being," which 
symbolically point "to the mother-quality of giving 
birth, carrying, embracing, and, at the same time, of 
  Tillich demurs on 
the basis of the divine inclusivity.  This adds further 
support, if anyone needs it, to a panentheistic under-
standing of Tillich's above denial that God is a 
person. 
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calling back, resisting independence of the created, 
and swallowing it," with the morally "demanding father-
image of the God who is conceived as a person among 
others."xcvi
 Finally, we have this important conclusion 
pertaining to the self-world correlation discussed 
earlier: 
  In this context "among others" is 
manifestly not directly concerned with relative 
equality, but with unqualified distinctness of being. 
   The basic ontological structure of self and 
world is transcended in the divine life without 
providing symbolic material.  God cannot be 
called a self, because the concept "self" 
implies separation from and contrast to 
everything which is not self.xcvii 
The same logic that applies here would likewise apply 
with respect to calling God a being, a person, a cause, 
etc.xcviii 
 With that we have ended our direct consideration 
of phrases of the form, God is not a being (beside 
others), (but being-itself).  While it could not be 
concluded that every instance of this type of phrase 
was intended to be panentheistic, panentheism was 
decisive in the use of it overall.  Subsequent terms, 
concepts, and phrases to be dealt with will for the 
most part be exclusively panentheistic, and will lend 
additional weight to my conclusion that a panentheistic 
understanding of God is determinative in the great 
significance which Tillich attaches to that distinctive 
formulation of his. 





Other Panentheistic Formulations 
 We have seen Tillich deny that God is a person. 
 And he repeats this gainsaying elsewhere.xcix  The idea 
that God is a person and belief in a "personal God" are 
very important in the theology as well as in the 
"popular piety" of this century.  This is why Tillich's 
denial that God is a person is perhaps the least well 
received aspect of his doctrine of God.  And this 
denial, as well as other statements, have brought 
accusations from a number of theologians that Tillich's 
God is impersonal.  Because of the importance of the 
concept of a personal God, Tillich has more to say on 
the subject than a simple veto of God as a person.  
First of all, he does give his reasons, a good taste of 
which we have already received in the quotations on the 
concepts "person" and "self."  Some other explications 
seem to allow that God is a person in a certain sense: 
 "God is called a person, but he is a person not in 
finite separation but in an absolute and unconditional 
participation in everything."c  Similarly he pens, "Is 
it meaningful to call him the 'absolute individ-
ual'?...only in the sense that he can be called the 
'absolute participant.'"ci  These pronouncements must 
be taken as somewhat rhetorical, as explanatory of why 
God should not be called a person or individual, for 
Tillich never simply refers to God as a person, self, 
or individual, and does specifically deny the first 
two.  He also in effect disallows the third by chiding 
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supranaturalism for attributing "individual substance" 
to God.cii
 Though denying that God is a person, his 
position on whether God is "personal" is not as 
straightforward.  Once he intones that as "the God who 
is a being is transcended by the God who is Being 
itself," so is "the God who is a person transcended by 
the Personal-Itself."
cviii).  The "per
  Obviously Tillich feels that all those terms 
are so strongly associated with separation and simple 
distinctness of being that it just is not safe to use 
them in reference to the deity. 
ciii  Or similarly, he opines that 
"God is completely personal in our encounter with him," 
in which "we first experience what person should 
mean."civ  Elsewhere, however, the "personal" vis-a-vis 
God is not spoken of in such unqualifiedly positive 
fashion.  Often he speaks in terms of a polarity in our 
understanding of or relationship with God, the elements 
being the "per-sonal" and the "mystical"cv or 
"transpersonal"cvi or "suprapersonal"cvii (or once the 
"ego-thou" and the "unconditional" -
sonal" aspect, along with the other, is necessary.  
Indeed, without the personal element, no relation to 
God would be possible.cix  Or similarly, "the symbol 
'personal God' is absolutely fundamental because an 
existential relation is a person-to-person relation."cx 
 Moreover, "in the I-Thou relationship of man and his 
God, God becomes a being, a person, a 'thou' for us."cxi 
 But since this aspect "is on the ground of his 
character as being-itself,"cxii the implication is that 
what might be proper in religious practice, that is, 
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referring to God as a person, is improper in theology. 
 But though a personal "element" may be clearly 
affirmed, that God 
cxiii
cxvii cxviii
is "personal" is not unambiguously 
upheld, despite the two comments at the beginning of 
the preceding paragraph.  The "absolutely fundamental" 
"personal God" is said to be "a confusing symbol" 
(because of the implication of separation).   A 
couple pages after twice explicitly distinguishing 
between calling God personal and calling God a person 
and permitting the formercxiv (one instance of which we 
have seen), he perhaps undermines the value of so doing 
with these words:  "If, however, Spirit is thought of 
as 'all-penetrating' and 'co-inhering,' it cannot be 
distinguished from the creative ground of everything, 
and the adjective 'personal' as a particular quality 
loses its meaning."cxv  Alternatively, it is said that 
God is "not less than personal"cxvi or "supra-per-
sonal"  or "more than personality."   Tillich 
would not at all want such talk to be taken to imply 
that God is "impersonal"cxix
The supra-personal is not an "It," or more 
exactly, it is a "He" as much as an "It," and it 
is above both of them.  But if the "He" element 
is left out, the "It" element transforms the 
alleged supra-personal into a sub-personal, as 
usually happens in monism and pantheism.
: 
cxx
 However, at least five critics find Tillich's 
doctrine of God impersonal.
cxxii
 
cxxi  Four of these even 
believe that Tillich's God is not "conscious,"  is 
without "self-consciousness and self-determina-




 "conscious knowledge and will,"  or 
"subjectivity,"cxxv or is "an unconscious reservoir of 
power."   
 One of these critics bases his conclusion on a 
misreading of Tillich's claim that God transcends the 
subject-object cleavage, which we have seen means that 
God is not subject to the separation from others that 
the creatures are.  Instead he interprets it to mean 
that God has a "neutral position between and prior to" 
the conscious "subject" and the unconscious "object" or 
thing.cxxvii
cxxviii
If this were true, I would regard it as a 
fatal compromising of panentheism, that "all is in 
God."  For we would be bereft of a reasonable sense in 
which God includes the creaturely experiences and, more 
fundamentally, without "God," as this term is normally 
understood. 
  (Whatever that could possibly mean.  "Con-
scious" in the very general sense of some kind of 
awareness or sentience, which would cover even 
dreaming, seems to be in exclusive contrast to 
"unconscious" as meaning a complete absence of same.)  
Perhaps he and others have been influenced by the 
following facet of Tillich's thought.  Tillich writes 
that, as Spirit, God "is as near to the creative 
darkness of the unconscious as he is to the critical 
light of conscious reason."   That just preceding 
this, Spirit is said to be the inclusive symbol for the 
divine life suggests that the "creative darkness of the 
unconscious" can be symbolically applied to God.  And 
Jacob Boehme, who influenced Tillich, is favorably 
cited for "his description in mythological terms of the 
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unconscious elements in the ground of the divine life 
and therefore all of life."cxxix  That there are 
unconscious elements in God, whatever Tillich might 
mean by that, does not support the notion that God is a 
tertiam quid between "conscious" and "unconscious" in 
the most general sense of these words, any more than 
the fact that there are unconscious aspects of humans 
supports the same notion in regard to us.  Moreover, 
given the contrast with critical reason in the first 
instance and the lining up of Boehme against the 
Cartesian "pure consciousness" in the second, I suspect 
that "conscious" in this context implies explicit and 
discursive reasoning and "unconscious," tacitness and 
intuition.  In those senses, God is as much or more 
"unconscious" than "conscious," for God surely knows 
and acts without verbalization, formalization, and 
reflection.  But such "unconsciousness" does not in the 
least contradict God as conscious or sentient in the 
most general sense of those words and, indeed, entails 
them.  Elsewhere, Tillich writes that God "is in it [an 
atom], not substantially only but also spiritually, 
therefore knowingly."cxxx
 In my experience, the question of whether God is 
"personal," apart from a more particular context, is in 
the first instance whether God is in some sense con-
scious, aware, or sentient, rather than merely a force 
or principle.  That Tillich never directly dealt with 
that issue when he specifically considered the word 
  This certainly contrasts God 
as conscious, with the ultimate as a nonconscious 
force. 
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"personal" in reference to God is perhaps due to the 
fact that he was not a native speaker and thus  may 
have missed this primary, general connotation.  (For 
him "personal" always has the more particular sense of 
a distinct being with whom one can enter into a 
reciprocal relationship.)  And this has contributed to 
misunderstanding.  However, I still find it hard to 
comprehend the charge that Tillich's God is not 
conscious.  For the most fundamental point of theism as 
usually understood  and of Christianity, in contrast to 
nontheistic options, is precisely that the ultimate 
reality is aware rather than a nonconscious principle 
or force.  And given that Tillich saw himself as a 
Christian and philosophical theologian, one should 
assume that his God is in some sense conscious, in the 
absence of compelling proof to the contrary. 
 To come back to the main track of this chapter, 
we can conclude that Tillich is not comfortable with 
God as "personal," because "personal" for him tends to 
connote distinctness and externality in relation to 
others (though not as straightforwardly as "being a 
person," which denotes it for Tillich). 
 We have already had a fair exposure to the 






 or "cleavage."   Substitutes for the 
former are "scheme,"  "correlation,"  
"relation,"  and "relationship,"  and for the 
latter, "split,"  "separation,"  
"division,"  and "opposition" ("Gegensatzes")cxl 
(usually rendered the split, etc., "between subject and 
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object"). 
 This might be taken to mean that since God is 
"beyond" the basic structure of creaturely reality, any 
knowledge of God or any relationship of God to the 
world is dubious or impossible.  Tillich's statements 
that God "precedes" reason and structure could bolster 
such a position, if they are strictly taken to mean 
that God absolutely precedes reason and structure in 
any sense at all.  That such talk recalls the earlier 
Schelling's Unvordenkliche, to which we have seen 
Tillich refer in this context, might be perceived to 
support such a radical interpretation.  For the 
Unvordenkliche was for Schelling God as 
undifferentiated unity, the Indifferenz, in the 
tradition of Plotinus' One (and as stated in chapter 1, 
Tillich has been regarded as Plotinian).  Such an 
interpretation would rule out any definite knowledge of 
God and any relationship to the world by God, save an 
undifferentiated or oceanic mystical participation in 
God in which one also wholly transcends any structure 
and environment.  (I rather think that some have 
derived their concept of God by projecting that type of 
mystical experience upon God.  Not that a mystical 
element in God and in our experience of God is invalid. 
 Only that mysticism as meaning utter undifferentiation 
and unawareness of anything particular should not be 
determinative.)  Tillich does not elaborate upon these 
statements, nor does he use them when referring to 
God's transcendence of the subject-object structure.  
Therefore, we had best look at his employment of that 
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formulation. 
 Tillich does write, "Absolute...means detached 
or freed from any limiting relation, from any 
particular relation, and even from the basis of all 
particular relations, the relation of subject and 
object."cxli
 The following quotation was offered previously: 
 "If God is brought into the subject-object structure 
of being, he ceases to be the ground of being and 
becomes one being among others (first of all a being 
beside the subject who looks at him as an object.)"cxlii
  This may sound as if God is unaware of 
anything particular, is indeed the undifferentiated or 
the formless.  However, the evidence is that God's 
transcendence of the subject-object structure is not 
intended to separate God from the world (save 
qualitatively), but rather to give God an absolute 
nearness to everything.  God is "freed from" the 
"limiting" and "particular" relations that we have for 
absolute participation in everything.  That relative 
externality of things to each other is such a central 
aspect of the subject-object structure for Tillich, and 
that this is repeatedly reinforced by use of terms like 
"cleavage," is itself very strong evidence that God's 
preceding of this structure and cleavage entails that 
the creatures are not external to, but included by, 
God.  But there is more explicit support. 
 
 While earlier it was used to corroborate the 
separation and exclusivity vis-a-vis others of a being 
for Tillich, insofar as there is other evidence for 
that, it can work conversely here.  Plus, the 
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parenthetical remark fairly clearly indicates relative 
separation.  Moreover, the criticism of "theological 
theism," which cited the externality of God as a being 
in relation to substance, space, and causality, makes a 
reference to the subject-object structure.  To pick up 
and continue the passage:  "He is a being, not being-
itself.  As such he is bound to the subject-object 
structure of reality, he is an object for us as 





  Tillich emphasizes the externality 
involved here by claiming that such a "tyrant" God 
"makes me into an object which is nothing but an 
object," since he is "all-powerful and all-
knowing."   (But only to the extent that a being 
among others can be so.cxlv)  The apparent alternative 
to this external God is suggested a little later:  "If 
the self participates in the power of being-itself it 
receives itself back.  For the power of being acts 
through the power of the individual selves"  (rather 
than in separation from or clear contrast to the 
individual selves).  Also Tillich asserts that God 
should not be treated as "a partner with whom one 
collaborates," as "it is impossible to draw him into 
the context of the ego-world and the subject-object 
correlation."   
 What has preceded is in a somewhat indirect or 
negative form:  God is not subject to the subject-
object structure and as such is opposite to the 
This is very indicative, for being a 
partner suggests an unambiguously distinct being with 
simply distinct powers and duties. 
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separation involved in that.  Tillich is sometimes more 
direct and positive.  These positive comments view 
God's transcending the subject-object structure in 
terms of perfect knowledge and truth with respect to 
the world.  Avers Tillich, the power of being "is the 




of subject and object,"  or is the principle of 
knowledge, because "he is the identity of subject and 
object."   As Tillich also puts it, God "is the 
prius of the separation and interaction of subject and 
object."cl  Or more fully, the power of being "precedes 
every separation and makes every interaction possible, 
because it is the point of identity without which 
neither separation nor interaction can be thought.  
This refers basically to the separation and interaction 
of subject and object, in knowing as well as in 
acting."cli
Therefore we have always had to have a theology 
that combats the idea of a god who simply knows 
more than men.  Instead, theology insists on a 
God who knows everything.  And that is something 
entirely different, qualitatively different, 
because this is not a knowledge in terms of 
subject-object.  It is the knowledge of being 
the "creative ground" of everything.  And 
  God is the "glue" which holds together the 
"subjects" and "objects," which are more or less 
external to each other, because God is not.  Finally, 
this passage on divine knowledge makes the connection 
between transcending the subject-object structure and 
panentheistic eminence very clear: 
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therefore everything participates in him, and he 
in it.clii
 Tillich writes in terms of a transcendence of 
the subject-object structure in our awareness of God, 
and indeed of some kind of identity of this awareness 
with the ultimate of which we are aware.  It has been 
noted that Tillich believes in an immediate awareness 
of God by all persons, a "mystical a priori."  To the 
extent we have an immediate awareness of the divine 
consciousness, this would mean that we transcend a 
subject-object relationship in the sense of God's being 
a person external to us in the way other finite beings 
are.  And if this awareness is in some sense a totally 
immediate one, this itself implies some kind of 
identity of this awareness with the ultimate of which 
we are aware.  Looking at it from the angle of the 
divine experience, since God's transcending the 
subject-object structure entails the knowing and 
empowering of creaturely experiences with total 
immediacy, our immediate awareness of God must also be 
God's experience of knowing and empowering--or more 
precisely part of the divine experience.  God's 
awareness of us and our immediate awareness of God 
coinhere or "merge."  (This word and perhaps "coinhere" 
could have the unfortunate implication that two 
independent entities have come together--thus the 
quotation marks.)  But they merge only in certain 
aspects.  Human immediate awareness of God does not 
intuit the concrete contents of God's experience by any 
means.  (The most we might thereby know concretely 
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about the divine experience is that our total concrete 
experience is immediately embraced by it.) 
 The  key  passages  in  this  connection   
follow:  1) "In terms like ultimate, unconditional, 
infinite, absolute, the difference between subjectivity 
and objectivity is overcome.  The ultimate of the act 
of faith and the ultimate that is meant in the act of 
faith are one and the same."cliii  2) In faith, "the 
source of this act is present beyond the cleavage of 
subject and object."cliv  3) "Prayer is a possibility 
only insofar as the subject-object structure is 
overcome; hence, it is an ecstatic possibility."clv
 There is a conceivable interpretation of the 
above union of God and humankind that would undermine a 
viable panentheism.  It is the extreme mysticism in 
which the subject-object structure, and all structure, 
is completely dissolved for God--and for us insofar as 
we ecstatically are one with God.  In this case God's 
transcendence of the externality of the subject-object 
structure would only be with respect to an aspect of 
ourselves.  God would be quite separated from us as 
embodied, as having an environment, and as enjoying 
particular values--in short, from the whole world as 
concrete.  God would be more subject to the subject-
object cleavage as far as the world in its 
particularity is concerned than we are!  This would be 
God as wholly undifferentiated.  This is hardly the 
type of nonseparation, inclusion, or perfect knowledge 
that has been evident heretofore concerning God's 
relation to the world.  
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 And one cannot find much more support for it 
coming from the angle of our awareness of God.  Tillich 
does speak of "the disappearance of the ordinary 




clvi  But this does not mean that the concrete is 
lost.  Tillich seems to hold that there must be a 
concrete element in every experience of God.   
Remember that awareness of God is not a "state of mind" 
or "encounter" besides others, but that it is in, with, 
and through every state of mind or encounter.  (For 
there is always immediate awareness of God for Tillich. 
 But this does not entail that every experience is 
equally revelatory.)  Thus, the concrete, that is, 
ourselves and other things, are experienced as 
immediate parts of the divine life to the extent we are 
aware of God, rather than as simply independent 
entities, as they tend to be in "the ordinary subject-
object scheme."  This "transcendent unity"  
He who prays earnestly is aware of his own 
situation and his "neighbor's," but he sees it 
under the Spiritual Presence's influence and in 
light of the divine direction of life's 
processes.  In these experiences, nothing of the 
objective world is dissolved into mere 
subjectivity.  Rather, it is all preserved and 
even increased.  But it is not preserved under 
the dimension of self-awareness and in the 
one has 
with others is not a unity in which everything is more 
or less absorbed into everything else, and 
individuality and particularity are lost: 
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subject-object scheme.  A union of subject and 
object has taken place in which the independent 
existence of each is overcome; new unity is 
created.clix
Of course, Tillich is not suggesting that we 
immediately intuit the contents of God's perfect 




 Before we leave this section on immediate aware-
ness of the divine "beyond the subject-object struc-
ture," I should mention that such awareness is optional 
as regards the essential requirements of panentheism.  
That we are included in the divine experience without 
mediation or loss, that we are expressions of God as 
the ultimate cause which is not separated from but acts 
through us, does not necessarily imply that we are 
 but rather our attitude is affected.  The 
subject-object scheme in the sense that we remain 
relatively separated from or ignorant of others is 
"preserved," though transformed.  More could be said 
about the strong mystical element in Tillich's doctrine 
of God and its relation to the concrete and particular. 
 But I believe enough has been offered here to uphold 
adequately the panentheistic eminence involved for 
Tillich in the divine transcendence of the subject-
object structure against any counter argument based on 
that mystical element. 
aware of being included in or being expressions of the 
divine life.  That there is no resistance as it were to 
our being known by God, that God is not a clearly 
distinct being or cause from us, that there is an utter 
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coinherence in one sense, could just as easily imply 
especial difficulty in grasping God as imply an 
immediate awareness of God.  It would be interesting to 
know if Tillich believed animals to have an immediate 
awareness of God, for they are certainly included 
within the divine awareness with perfect intimacy.  
Hartshorne is consistent on this score, holding that 
all concrete individuals (which include subatomic 
particles for this panpsychist) have some immediate, 
albeit dim or vague, prehension of God. 
 In connection with God's transcendence of the 
subject-object cleavage, we have seen Tillich declare 
that God cannot be an object for us as subjects.
clxii
clxiii).  He 
writes that God remains a subject even if God becomes 
an object.clxiv
clxi  
Sometimes Tillich uses a related formula (that appears 
to recognize that "in the logical sense of the word" 
one cannot speak of God without making God an 
object  and that in relating to God there is 
inescapably that "personal" element in which in some 
sense God is something other than oneself
  This points to the fact that, 
panentheistically understood, our very relating to God, 
our "looking at" God, is completely within God, that 
God knows this with perfect immediacy and that even 
this is ultimately God working through us (to view it 
from both the passive and active angles).  (That 
Tillich is willing to speak of God as "subject," which 
has meant for him a conscious or sentient being knowing 
something, is further evidence that he is not wanting 
to deny that God is conscious, in the general sense of 
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that word.) 
 Tillich also expresses the idea that our 
relating to God is within God with this type of 
formulation:  Our "knowledge of God is the knowledge 




clxv Likewise "man's love of God is 
the love with which God loves himself."   Prayer 
receives similar treatment:  "We can only pray to the 
God who prays to himself through us."   Even our 
searching for God must be within the divine life:  "In 
every serious question about God, God asks the question 
of himself through man;..."   
In every true prayer God is both he to whom we 
pray and he who prays through us.  For it is the 
divine Spirit who creates the right prayer.  At 
this point the ontological structure which makes 
God an object of us as subjects is infinitely 
transcended.  God stands in the divine-human 
reciprocity, but only as he who transcends it 
and comprises both sides of the reciprocity.  He 
reacts, but he reacts to that which is his own 
act working through our finite freedom.clxix
Finally, this reflec-
tion, also on prayer, describes more fully the 
paradoxical character of a relationship with God: 
 
 Other times our deliberate relating to God is 
not singled out.  Rather all of human or creaturely 
life seems to be the target.  It is said that God 




clxx "loves,"  "recognizes,"  "wills,"  
or "expresses"  God's self through "man,"  "the 
creature,"  the "finite,"  "the finite beings, 
"  or the "finite mind."  
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 A cursory reading of this type of expression 
might be that God is narcissistic.  However, the real 
message of such formulations is that the creatures are 
 so utterly and immediately present to God as ultimate 
ground that divine knowing and loving of them are 
knowing and loving of (parts of) God's self, that in 
the divine case there is no conflict between loving 
oneself and loving others, as the latter is within or 
"simultaneous" with the former.clxxx
clxxxi
  That God does love 
the creatures is spelled out in one instance:  "Agape 
is first of all the love God has toward the creature 
and through the creature toward himself."  
 In expressions such as God knows God's self 
through the creatures, God is grammatically or expli-
citly the only actor.  In addition, in some of the 
observations on our relating to God, the emphasis was 
on God as actor.  If these are interpreted to allow 
that God is active in absolutely every sense in the 
divine-human interrelationship or coinherence, 
Tillich's panentheism would be pushed towards 
pantheism.  In the longer quotation on prayer and on 
the divine-human interaction in general, Tillich does 
say that it is our "finite freedom" through which God 
works.  Just how well Tillich safeguards real human 
freedom will be pursued in chapter 5. 
 In a very important section, Tillich talks of 
divine-human relations in a more formal way than in 
most of the preceding remarks: 
But they are not the relations of God with some-
thing else.  They are the inner relations of the 
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divine life....the question is whether there are 
external relations between God and the creature. 
 The doctrine of creation affirms that God is 
the creative ground of everything in every 
moment.  In this sense there is no creaturely 
independence from which an external relation 
between God and the creature could be derived.  
If God is said to be in relation, this statement 
is as symbolic as the statement God is a living 
God.clxxxii 
(In this last sentence we have encapsulated the two 
specific factors that make attributions to God symbolic 
for Tillich:  panentheistic eminence and transcendence 
of the split between potentiality and actuality.)  I 
take this to be a clearly and clear panentheistic 
statement that does not need further interpretation. 
 Tillich goes on to formally define holiness in 
terms of this internality of all things to God: 
 The unapproachable character of God, or the 
impossibility of having a relation with him in 
the proper sense of the word, is expressed in 
the word "holiness."  God is essentially holy, 
and every relation with him involves the 
consciousness that it is paradoxical to be 
related to that which is holy.clxxxiii 




 a "partner with whom one collabo-
rates,"  cannot be drawn "into the context of the 
ego-world and the subject-object correlation."   
For God "embraces" and is absolutely near to any 





  Thus, as indicated earlier, God is not a 
partner for Tillich because this implies a clearly 
separate or distinct being with unambiguously distinct 
powers and duties, rather than God as embracing and 
acting through the creatures.  Since holiness is 
correlative with divinity for Tillich,  being the 
general quality that "qualifies all other qualities as 
divine,"  
 "Participation" by God is used panentheistically 
by Tillich.  It is a term basically relating to knowl-
edge and emphasizes the passive aspect.  We have 
already encountered it in the earlier remark on God's 
perfect knowledge (as not being in terms of subject-
object) and in the claim that God is not a person or 
individual because of absolute participation.  It is 
also used in respect to Jesus' comment on God's knowing 
the number of hairs on our heads and when a bird 
falls.
it is significant that it has been 
defined and described panentheistically by Tillich. 
cxc  If perfect knowledge involves complete 
participation in or nonseparation from everything, 
conversely, "doubt is based on man's separation from 
the whole of reality, on his lack of universal 
participation, on the isolation of his individual 
self."cxci
 Tillich also has this to say about divine 
participation: "God participates in everything that is; 
he has community with it; he shares in its destiny.  
Certainly such statements are highly symbolic."cxcii
 
  
Lest anyone think that by the mention of "symbolic" 
here Tillich is backing away from absolute 
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participation in the name of transcendence, these are 
the words that immediately follow:  "They can have the 
unfortunate logical implication that there is something 
alongside God in which he participates from the 
outside."cxciii
cxciv
  Thus, "participation" is not "positive" 
or strong enough, unless it carries the connotation of 
panentheistic eminence when it is applied to God!  
Tillich then notes the active aspect, God as ultimate 
source, implicit in the passive aspect of 
participation:  "But the divine participation creates 
that in which it participates."  
 Another formulation that suggests the passive 
aspect of presence and knowledge is one we have already 




cxcv "my ego,"  or "the 
ego,"  than the ego is to itself, or nearer to "the 
creatures"  or "things"  than they are to them-
selves."  It is used panentheistically to counter the 
notion of a (simply distinct) person or being "along-
side" or separated from others.  Two such instances 
have already been related in which the wording is 
similar to that of the preceding sentence.cc  Elsewhere 
the same theme is played as the phrase counteracts 
"personalism"cci and the idea that an "ego-thou" 
relationship is strictly or nonparadoxically applicable 
to God.ccii
 We come now to the last category of words and 
phrases, those that are the most explicitly panenthe-
istic, recalling the literal rendering of panentheism 
("all in God"):  "in" or "within" God, and God "em-
braces" or "includes," or the like.  In a general vein, 
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 or "everything particular,"cciv that God 
"includes the finite, and with it, nonbeing,"ccv that 
the divine "center is infinite and includes everything 
that is,"ccvi and that God is "that in which everything 
has its being."   In one of the two instances in 
which he uses the term "panentheism," Tillich agrees 
that if you call an idea of Calvin's "panentheism, that 
could be all right, because this means that everything 
is in God" (though to call it "pantheism" would be 
misguided).   This idea is that all things "are 
instruments through which God works in every mo-
ment."ccix
 Sometimes a more specific aspect of God or the 





  As we have seen Tillich subscribes to this 
type of idea. 
ccx  Or, "spatiality"ccxi  or 
"extension"  is in God as creative ground.  
Regarding the divine-human relationship, he writes, "If 
we speak, as we must, of the ego-thou relation between 
God and man, the thou embraces the ego and consequently 
the entire relationship."   In the only other pas-
sage in which Tillich actually uses the term 
panentheism (specifically, "eschatological pan-en-
theism"), everything is "in" God as potential, as 
actual and thus as dependent on the divine creative 
power, and as ultimately fulfilled.   In an 
expression related to God's inclusion, Tillich speaks 
in terms of a realization of being "a part of that 
which...is the ground of the whole."ccxv 
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 We have twice seen Tillich characterize the 









  Tillich talks in that manner in at 
least six places  (specifically using "within" in 
four of them).  The infinite has the finite ("con-
tained"  is "embracing the 
finite,"ccxx "embraces itself and the finite,"  or 
"comprises his infinity and finitude."   If this 
were not so, if the finite were "besides,"  "along-
side,"  "outside,"  or "in addition to"  the 
infinite, the infinite becomes finite.  
 As has been noted, some perceive Tillich's God 
as the undifferentiated.  That Tillich speaks of "the 




 may seem to support this.  But when Tillich 
expounds upon this type of declaration in connection 
with inclusion by being-itself, formlessness is not the 
kind of nonparticularity that emerges:  "This 'being' 
transcends everything particular without becoming 
empty, for it embraces everything particular."   Or 
more elaborately:  "The nonbeing of negative theology 
means 'not being anything special,' being beyond every 
concrete predicate.  This nonbeing embraces everything; 
it means being everything; it is being-itself."   
Where we use symbolic terms like "ground of 
being" we mean that we experience something 
which is an object of our ultimate concern, 
which underlies everything that is, is its 
The "tension" between the "beyondness" and the "embrac-
ing" is highlighted in this passage: 
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creative ground or formative unity, and cannot 
be defined beyond these negative terms....  And 
on the other hand these negative statements 
imply, always in relation to a positive 
statement, that this same ground of being is not 
this or that, yet is at the same time all this 
finite world in so far as it is its 
"ground."ccxxxi 
 The general picture is this:  God transcends 
each concrete thing and all specific predicates (at 
least as applied to finite realities).  But this does 
not mean that things in their particularity are 
external to God.  Certainly, there is evidenced here a 
very great concern by Tillich that God not be too 
limited, "finitized," domesticated, by our conceptions, 
that God not be concrete in such a way that ultimacy is 
compromised.  Elsewhere, this is evidenced in his 
"Protestant principle" and in his belief that "an 




 even to the point of preferring atheism 
over a too limited understanding of the ultimate,  
as in supranaturalism.   But this does not 
translate into God as the simply undifferentiated.  
Divine inclusion of everything cannot be comprehended 
in terms of formlessness, for then God could embrace 
things only to whatever extent they lacked plurality, 
complexity, and particularity.  (Being-itself would be 
rather "empty.")  For to say that God "embraces 
everything particular," is "everything," "is...all this 
finite world" (emphases mine), forcefully shows Til-
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lich's desire to affirm full inclusion by God, 
inclusion of the world in its concreteness.  That 
desire is also apparent in this phrase:  "the concrete 
is present in the depth of the ultimate."ccxxxv 
 Thus, as transcendence of the subject-object 
structure permits God to be infinitely close to things, 
not being any one particular thing (a particular thing 
among others) frees God to embrace all particularity.  
(In a related vein, Tillich avows that "the character 
of a time which is not related to any of the dimensions 
of life but to all of them, thus transcending all of 
them, belongs to the mystery of being-itself."ccxxxvi
ccxxxvii
)  
God's radical transcendence entails perfect immanence 
or coinherence, God's infinity entails embracing of the 
finite:  "...the infinite transcendence of the infinite 
over the finite...does not contradict but rather con-
firms the coincidence of opposites."   
 While total nondifferentiation or formlessness 
is ruled out by, and a desire to affirm God's all-
inclusiveness is patent in, the material on God's 
nonparticularity above, the "negative theology" 
tendency of saying nothing "special" about God beyond 
God's including or being the ground of everything--
which is a manifestation of the Tillichian strain of 
emphasizing or over-emphasizing the divine mystery and 
infinite transcendence delineated in the first chapter-
-could conflict with that very inclusion of everything. 
And I might 
add, if the finite insofar as it is concrete were 
external to God, it would be "alongside" or "besides" 
God, and God would be "finite." 
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 For this inclusion may entail certain "concrete" 
predicates like omniscience, perfect temporality, and 
divine suffering.  Practically speaking, though, 
Tillich does not take the road of agnosticism regarding 
such predicates (and tra-ditional "negative theology" 
generally did not either).  He avers omniscience, as we 
have seen.  And, as will be developed in chapter 5, 
while there is an element of agnosticism concerning 
temporality and suffering as divine attributes, what 
most characterizes Tillich's handling of these is an 
attempt to hold on to both the affirmations of timeless 
eternity (or at least to its language) and 
impassibility by classical theology and the 
affirmations of divine temporality and suffering by 
panentheism, with resulting ambiguity (on temporality) 
and incoherence (on suffering). 
 Finally, I will consider Tillich's three 
favorite terms for God, "being-itself," "power of 
being," and "ground of being."  Our initial concern 
will be whether they are in themselves panentheistic 
(at least for Tillich).  Of course, insofar as Tillich 
has developed his doctrine of God panentheistically and 
used these as stand-ins for "God," they acquire 
panentheistic associations.  But my question concerns 
the extent to which these terms have more inherent 
panentheistic connotations.  Of course, how a word or 
phrase strikes one depends upon one's culture and 
personal experience.  I will speak for myself and for 
Tillich insofar as I judge him to have revealed 
himself. 




ccxxxix)  And as recently mentioned, God's 
nonparticularity "means being everything; it is being
ccxli)  And that he pens this sentence 
without further explanation suggests the same 
possibility:  "But the ego
ccxlii
If being-itself is not taken as the abstract 
common denominator of everything that has being (as it 
could well be in our present culture), then the follow-
ing meanings fairly immediately and naturally suggest 
themselves:  Being-itself cannot but be.  Being-itself 
is or includes all being.  Now Tillich never out-and-
out announces that he is telling us the intrinsic 
connotations of "being-itself."  Thus, one cannot 
usually be sure whether he is intending to invest it 
with definition and meaning or just making explicit 
what the term in itself suggests.  Whatever his 
intentions, he does indicate, as suggested before, that 
God is not a being who  may  or  may  not  exist,  but 
 being-itself.   ("Power of being" is once 
mentioned along with being-itself in this 
connection.
-
itself."ccxl  That Tillich does use phrases like "God is 
not a being, but being-itself" in panentheistic ways, 
but often without being terribly explicit, suggests the 
possibility that he expects the term in itself to 
clarify or reinforce his meaning by pointing to the 
all-inclusive whole of reality (that as such  cannot be 
unambiguously contrasted to distinct other beings).  
(The same thing can be said for "ground of being" and 
"power of being."
-thou relation, although it 
is the central and most dynamic relation, is not the 
only one, for God is being-itself."   In the follow-
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ing, Tillich may be pointing out ultimate causality as 
a more or less intrinsic or immediate meaning of 
"being-itself," though it is not totally clear how much 
it is a matter of immediate meaning rather than of 
further implication or deduction: 
Ever since the time of Plato it has been 
known...that the concept of being as being, or 
being itself, points to the power inherent in 
everything, the power of resisting nonbeing.  
Therefore, instead of saying that God is first 
of all being-itself, it is possible to say that 
he is the power of being in everything and above 
everything, the infinite power of being.ccxliii 
"Power of being" as a connotation of being-itself, or 
on its own, certainly suggests God's necessary 
existence and most immediately God's giving the power 
of being to everything else.  But panentheistic 
inclusion is not obvious here in my opinion.  Tillich, 
though, as sug-gested in a parenthetical remark above, 
may be intending "power of being" in itself to clarify 
or reinforce the panentheistic meaning of certain 
passages by pointing to the coinhering ultimate power 
in everything.  This ends my consideration of the 
intrinsic meanings of "being-itself" and "power of 
being," save for an upcoming pas-sage primarily on 
"ground of being," that also involves them. 
 Unlike with "being-itself" and "power of being," 
Tillich is very explicit on the connotations of "ground 
of being," which are panentheistic for him: 
"Ground" is such a symbolic term.  It oscillates 
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between cause and substance and transcends both 
of them.  It indicates that the ground of 
revelation is neither a cause which keeps itself 
at a distance from the revelatory effect nor a 
substance which effuses itself into the ef-
fect.ccxliv  
He also offers this on "ground of being," part of which 
was rendered previously: 
[Here are contrasts with both tradi-
tional theism and pantheism.] 
In so far as it is symbolical, it points to the 
mother-quality of giving birth, carrying, 
embracing, and, at the same time, of calling 
back, resisting independence of the created, and 
swallowing it.  The uneasy feeling of many 
Protestants about the first (not the last!) 
statement about God, that he is being-itself or 
the ground of being, is partly rooted in the 
fact that their religious consciousness and, 
even more, their moral conscience are shaped by 
the demanding father-image of the God who is 
conceived as a person among others.  The attempt 
to show that nothing can be said about God 
theologically before the statement is made that 
he is the power of being in all being is, at the 
same time, a way of reducing the predominance of 
the male element in the symbolization of the 
divine.ccxlv 
That according to Tillich "many Protestants" react 
against the declaration that God is being-itself or the 
ground of being (and apparently also that God is the 
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power of being), because they sense its denial of God 
as a clearly separate "person among others," is 
certainly very strong evidence that Tillich believes 
"being-itself" and "power of being," as well as "ground 
of being" on which he is totally explicit, to be 
intrinsically panentheistic in their connotations.  
Personally, apart from further definition or context, I 
take "ground of being" and "power of being" to be 
general expressions meaning only the ultimate source of 
everything, which can and has been understood in many 
different and, indeed, incompatible ways.  But that 
Tillich has taken them in themselves to entail the 
nonseparation of the God who immediately works through 
and embraces all is another indication of his 
panentheism. 
 Of course, there is a further question of what 
are the reasonable implications and entailments of 
being the ultimate source of everything.  My above 
disagreement with Tillich may simply be a matter of 
just how immediate and obvious these implications are. 
 In any case, Tillich definitely feels that as the 
ultimate source of being, God cannot but be utterly 
near to things, coinhering with (though transcending), 
acting through, and fully including them.  The 
subsequent comments, which we have seen before, though 
not with this particular focus, illustrate this: 
1) Certain statements have the unfortunate logi-
cal implication that there is something 
alongside God in which he participates from the 
outside.  But the divine participation creates 
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that in which it participates.ccxlvi 
2) The doctrine of creation affirms that God is 
the creative ground of everything in every mo-
ment. In this sense there is no creaturely inde-
pendence from which an external relation between 
God and the creature could be derived.ccxlvii 
3) ...theology insists on a God who knows every-
thing.  And that is something entirely 
different, qualitatively different, because this 
is not a knowledge in terms of subject-object.  
It is the knowledge of being the "creative 
ground" of everything.  And therefore everything 
participates in him and he in it.ccxlviii 
The following stipulation, of which we have heretofore 
only seen a small part, is also relevant: 
I could agree with Gustave Weigel's statement 
that God, for my thought, is the "matrix of 
reality," if matrix means that in which every-
thing has its being.  The term "Ground of Being" 
points to the same truth (which is also implied 
in the symbol ccxlixcreation continua).  
 While God's being the ultimate source of all 
being, dependent on nothing else for existence, guaran-
tees that nothing will be external to God, conversely 
if anything is external to or "alongside" God, God is 
rendered finite, and "the real power of being must lie 
beyond"ccl the supposed "God" and what is alongside it. 
 Obviously the active aspect of the deity, God as 
ultimate causality and power, is very important to 
Tillich's doctrine of God.ccli  Two of his three favor-
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ite terms for God, "ground of being" and "power of 
being," in themselves emphasize this facet.  The active 
aspect of ultimate power is quite necessary for a 
reasonable panentheism (and for any competing doctrine 
of "God" worthy of the name), being the ultimate basis 
of the passive aspect of perfect presence to and 
knowledge of the creatures and their actions.  
Hopefully the active aspect will include the passive 
one without swallowing it.  Whether Tillich has given 
the divine passivity its due will be discussed in 
chapter 5.  Whether the active and the passive can be 
held together without final contradiction, which has 
implications for the coherence of any theism, will be 
considered in chapter 6. 
 In this chapter, in expounding numerous 
Tillichian expressions, showing how Tillich has used 
and explained them, and drawing out their 
interconnections, I believe I have made a compelling 
case that God for Tillich is panentheistic and that 
this is crucial for comprehending Tillich's 
understanding of God. 
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 xxxi. Dynamics of Faith, p. 11. 
 xxxii. Theology of Culture, p. 25. 
 xxxiii. Systematic Theology, 1: 189, 205; Theology 
of Culture, pp. 4-5; Protestant Era, p. 32, n. 1, p. 
119; Philosophical Interrogations, p. 369; 
"Appreciation and Reply," p. 307.  Cf. Systematic 
Theology, 1: 237. 
 xxxiv. Systematic Theology, 1: 205, 2: 23.  Cf. 
1: 212.  "Tillich Replies," p. 23, affirms "no 
difference between essence and existence" in God.  
Traditionally this means both that it is God's "essence 
to exist," that is, necessary existence, and that 
divine existence lives up to the qualitative divine 
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"essence."  It is not clear whether Tillich intends one 
or the other or both here.  In Systematic Theology, 1: 
205, he refers to both facets of the divine essence-
existence relationship, without explicitly noting the 
two distinct aspects.  A Hartshornean version is that 
God's abstract perfect nature necessarily finds 
instantiation in some concrete divine state or other.   
 xxxv. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 119. 
 xxxvi. Interpretation of History, p. 223. 
 xxxvii. Systematic Theology, 1: 205. 
 xxxviii. "Tillich Replies," p. 23. 
 xxxix. Theology of Culture, pp. 4-5. 
 xl. Ultimate Concern, p. 166.  See also Courage To 
Be, p. 184. 
 xli. Systematic Theology, 1: 235, 2:6, 7; Interpreta-
tion of History, p. 223; "Reply to Interpretation," p. 
341; "Theologie der Kultur," pp. 43-44.  Cf. Protestant 
Era, p. 79. 
 xlii. Systematic Theology, 1: 235; Theology of 
Culture, pp. 11, 24, 130; Protestant Era, p. 163; 
"Religiose Verwirklichung," p. 102, quoted in Adams, p. 
46.  Cf. Systematic Theology, 1: 14-15. 
 xliii. Systematic Theology, 1: 245, 273, 278; 
Protestant Era, p. 79.  Cf. Systematic Theology, 1: 12, 
208; Love, Power and Justice, p. 110.  On the need to 
speak of God as if a highest being, see Systematic 
Theology, 1: 155-56; Theology of Culture, p. 61. 
 xliv. Theology of Culture, pp. 25-26.  Cf. pp. 11, 19; 
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Systematic Theology, 1: 273. 
 xlv. Courage To Be, p. 184. 
 xlvi. Protestant Era, p. 163. 
 xlvii. "Appreciation and Reply," p. 307. 
 xlviii. My Search for Absolutes, p. 127. 
 xlix. "Reply to Interpretation," p. 341. 
 l. Interpretation of History, pp. 222-23. 
 li. See also Theology of Culture, p. 59; "Tillich 
Replies," p. 23; "Religionsphilosophie," p. 319. 
 lii. Protestant Era, p. 79.  See also Systematic 
Theology, 1: 235. 
 liii. Systematic Theology, 2: 7. 
 liv. Systematic Theology, 1: 245. 
 lv. Systematic Theology, 1:262.  See also History of 
Christian Thought, pp. 264-65.  Cf. Systematic 
Theology, 2: 8. 
 lvi. Systematic Theology, 2: 6; Protestant Era, p. 
82; "Systematic Theology 383," p. 139; Dynamics of 
Faith, p. 52.  Cf. "Reply to Interpretation," p. 341. 
 lvii. "Systematic Theology 383," p. 139; Dynamics of 
Faith, p. 52. 
 lviii. "Systematic Theology 383," p. 139. 
 lix. "Reply to Interpretation," p. 341. 
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 lx. Systematic Theology, 2: 6. 
 lxi. Of course, one could attempt a unique sense of 
"a being" appropriate to God, in which this being is 
not unambiguously contrasted to distinct other beings. 
 Hartshorne does make such an attempt, as we shall see 
in chapter 3. 
 lxii. Systematic Theology, 1: 205. 
 lxiii. Interpretation of History, p. 222.  
Compare this use of "God above God" to that in Courage 
To Be.  Primarily, this latter has to do with a 
certainty despite a state of radical doubt about 
concrete formulations concerning God, as he notes in 
Philosophical Interrogations, p. 379, and Systematic 
Theology, 2: 12.  Or somewhat similarly, with God's 
transcendence of "finite symbols" expressing God, as in 
Christianity and World Religions, p. 90.  But as stated 
earlier, the God above God is identified with the 
ultimate ground of being and is pictured 
panentheistically (cf. "Tillich Replies," p. 23).  
Thus, a tension exists between "God above God" as 
positive, as summing up his doctrine of God, which the 
"God over God" of Interpretation of History can be seen 
as doing, and as negative, as questioning any and all 
formulations about God insofar as God is the God above 
God (though formulations may have their place insofar 
as one is not radically doubting all particular 
formulations and insofar as God does not utterly 
transcend all language about God).  The two aspects can 
find a point of unity, though, insofar as normal 
concrete formulations tend to make God a being, 
separate and separated from others, and thus less than 
ultimate. 
 lxiv. Interpretation of History, p. 223.  Or at least 
it is a part of Tillich's meaning in this phrase 
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translated from the German.  As to why the 
unconditioned meaning that is not beside the finite 
meanings cannot be identified with them, Tillich 
mentions the "inexhaustibility" of unconditioned 
meaning, without which it would "become a single finite 
meaning," needing "a new basis of meaning."  This might 
suggest that God cannot be a meaning (beside others) 
because of inexhaustibility.  In his English works, 
Tillich is not given to speaking of God in terms of 
meaning, nor does inexhaustibility figure into comments 
that God is not a being, thing, etc. (beside others).  
Actually inexhaustibility would not be a good basis for 
holding that, in contradistinction to finite things, 
God is not a meaning (or being), for finite things have 
some inexhaustibility also, as the German Tillich often 
indicates. 
 Externality may also be a connotation of the 
"alongside" in this remark from Systematic Theology, 1: 
242:  The Old Testament prophets "never make God a 
being alongside others, into something conditioned by 
something else which is also conditioned." 
 lxv. This is a central "anxiety of finitude" for 
Tillich.  It was "this anxiety which drove the Greeks 
to ask insistently and ceaselessly the question of the 
unchangeable" (Systematic Theology, 1: 197).  Formally, 
this anxiety concerns the "category" of "substance" 
(Systematic Theology, 1: 197-98) and the ontological 
polarities of dynamics-form and freedom-destiny 
(Systematic Theology, 1: 199-201). 
 lxvi. This does not necessarily mean we would--or 
rather that God does--have only one choice.  It does 
mean that the only options that would be possible would 
be ones compatible with essential perfection.  That 
there could be only one such choice is at least not 
obvious. 
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 lxvii. Systematic Theology, 1: 164, 168-71.  
However, within this basic structure, he does regard 
temporality as the "central category of finitude."  
(Systematic Theology, 1: 193.  Emphasis mine.) 
 lxviii. Systematic Theology, 1: 170. 
 lxix. Systematic Theology, 1: 168. 
 lxx. Systematic Theology, 1: 171. 
 lxxi. Dynamics of Faith, p. 61.  Cf. My Search for 
Absolutes, p. 66. 
 lxxii. The "relative" should be emphasized here. 
 Tillich cannot fairly be accused of Cartesian subject-
object dualism.  There is always union as well as 
separation in our encounters for Tillich.  The self-
world correlation is basic (Systematic Theology, 1: 
164), or to put it another way, he views someone 
perceiving something as the basic unit of reality.  He 
specifically inveighs against Cartesian dualism 
(Systematic Theology, 1: 168, 171, 174; Theology of 
Culture, p. 107; Shaking of the Foundations, pp. 85-86) 
and Cartesian "pure consciousness" (Systematic 
Theology, 1: 171, 173-74; Theology of Culture, pp. 107, 
115; Protestant Era, p. 134). 
 lxxiii. Systematic Theology, 3: 256. 
 lxxiv. Systematic Theology, 3: 252-65. 
 lxxv. Courage To Be, p. 184.  Cf. Systematic Theology, 
2: 6.  There Tillich details how supranaturalism 
renders God finite in terms of each of the four 
categories.  However, it is not directly concerned with 
the issue of God as not a being.  Regarding 
"theological theism" in comparison with 
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"supranaturalism," one could say the latter is cruder 
in explicitly placing God in a heavenly world and in 
limiting divine creativity to a definite temporal 
period. 
 lxxvi. Ultimate Concern, p. 166. 
 lxxvii. Theology of Culture, p. 130. 
 lxxviii. Systematic Theology, 2: 6. 
 lxxix. Systematic Theology, 1: 273. 
 lxxx. Systematic Theology, 1: 235. 
 lxxxi. Systematic Theology, 1: 172. 
 lxxxii. Systematic Theology, 1: 127. 
 lxxxiii. They are:  "If there is a knowledge about 
God, it is God who knows himself through man.  God 
remains the subject, even if he becomes a logical 
object (cf. I Cor. 13:12)."  (Systematic Theology, 1: 
172.) 
 lxxxiv. "Systematic Theology 383," pp. 89-90.  The 
parentheses (around "call") mean the transcriber was 
not sure of Tillich's exact word(s).  The second 
ellipsis is also the transcriber's. 
 lxxxv. As Tillich says in Systematic Theology, 1: 
251, the finite "is distinguished from the infinite, 
but it is not separated from it." 
 lxxxvi. Systematic Theology, 2: 6. 
 lxxxvii. Philosophical Interrogations, pp. 380-81. 
 Carl Gray Vaught, in "Contemporary Conceptions of the 
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Nature and Existence of God:  A Study of Tillich and 
Hartshorne" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 
1966), pp. 169-70, notices from this passage that 
Tillich considers the concept of a "person" as too 
transcendent for God.  However, he does not draw any 
panentheistic implications from it.  Moreover, he does 
not see the (rather obviously intended) connection 
between God as finite and as exclusive here.  He sees 
them as in tension, rather than as complementary, 
claiming that "person" is too "determinate" to be 
applied to God for Tillich and that inclusive immanence 
tends to make God determinate.  As I will argue in 
chapter 5, Tillich does compromise God's inclusion of 
all, God's total immanence--but not with his denial 
that God is a person, which is not made on the grounds 
of purely general mystery or of "indeterminateness," 
but of nonseparation and inclusivity.   
 lxxxviii. See pp. 44 and 48 above, including endnote 
63 with respect to the latter. 
 lxxxix. Peter Bertocci, Questions to Paul Tillich, 
in Philosophical Interrogations, p. 384. 
 xc. This assertion by Luther is also mentioned in 
Biblical Religion, p. 84.  It is another example of 
Tillich's seeing panentheism as represented in tradi-
tional theology.  See also "Systematic Theology 383," 
pp. 89-90, on this. 
 xci. Cf.:  "...the infinite and the finite are not in 
different places, but they are different dimensions."  
("Systematic Theology 383," p. 90.) 
 xcii. Tillich, Philosophical Interrogations, p. 384. 
 xciii. Bertocci, p. 384. 
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 xciv. Ibid. 
 xcv. Ibid. 
 xcvi. Systematic Theology, 3:294. 
 xcvii. Systematic Theology, 1:244.  Lest anyone 
think that Tillich has in effect ruled out the 
possibility of any symbolism by the first sentence, he 
does add later in the paragraph that "the elements 
which constitute the basic ontological structure can 
become symbols because they do not speak of kinds of 
being (self and world) but of qualities of 
being...which are valid in their symbolic sense when 
applied to being-itself."  In other words, God cannot 
directly or simply be called "a self" or "the world," 
but attributes normally applied to them can be 
utilized. 
 xcviii. Again, however, this does not necessarily 
preclude modifying the normal meanings of the concepts 
"self," "being," etc., so as to render them suitable to 
the extraordinary divine case. 
 xcix. Systematic Theology, 1:245; Biblical Religion, 
pp. 82-83; "Reply to Interpretation," p. 334.  Cf. 
Courage To Be, p. 184. 
c. Systematic Theology, 1:243-44.  That God is a 
person simply cannot stand by itself for Tillich:  "He 
is a person and the negation of himself as a person."  
(Biblical Religion, p. 85.) 
ci. Systematic Theology, 1:244.  In this and the 
preceding remark, Tillich is explicitly stating how the 
polar elements of individualization and participation 
are transcended or perfectly united in God.  In "Reply 
to Interpretation," p. 334, he writes that the polar 
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categories are negated as "qualitatively distinct," 
which apparently serves to explain a later assertion 
that God is not a person.  While it is not explicit, it 
could be that the polarity of individualization and 
participation is decisive here, in keeping with Til-
lich's general position that it is externality and 
exclusivity that makes being a person inappropriate for 
God.  
cii. Systematic Theology, 2:6.  Cf. Ultimate Concern, 
p. 48. 
ciii. Biblical Religion, pp. 82-83. 
civ. Biblical Religion, p. 27.  This is strikingly 
analogous to Hartshorne's idea that our knowledge of 
various attributes is based (in part) on an immediate 
awareness of these as perfectly instantiated in God.  
Tillich, however, criticizes Hartshorne on this score 
as having a via eminentiae that needs to be balanced by 
a via negationis, specifically by the negation of the 
distinctness of the polar elements ("Reply to Interpre-
tation," p. 334).  As will be developed in the next 
chapter (see pp. 137-39 below), Hartshorne actually has 
his own version of the negation of the distinctness of 
(or, better, the tension between) the polarities of 
individualization and participation (such negation is 
itself a panentheistic formulation and is a necessary 
implication of any panentheism), though he does not 
share Tillich's view that such distinctness negates 
God's being "a person."  What Tillich might mean by 
such negating in relation to dynamics-form and freedom-
destiny and by implication whether Hartshorne is 
criticized fairly will be handled in chapter 5. 
cv. Courage To Be, pp. 156-57, 169. 
cvi. Courage To Be, p. 187; Christianity and World 
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Religions, pp. 67, 88; "Systematic Theology 383," p. 
277; Theology of Culture, p. 61.  
cvii. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 381.  Cf. 
Theology of Culture, p. 132. 
cviii. Theology of Culture, p. 62. 
cix. Theology of Culture, p. 62.  Cf. pp. 25, 61;  
Systematic Theology, 1:223. 
cx. Systematic Theology, 1:244. 
cxi. "Reply to Interpretation," p. 341.  See also 
Theology of Culture, p. 61. 
cxii. "Reply to Interpretation," p. 341. 
cxiii. Systematic Theology, 1:245.  Cf. Theology 
of Culture, p. 131; Biblical Religion, p. 84. 
cxiv. Philosophical Interrogations, pp. 380, 381. 
cxv. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 383. 
cxvi. Systematic Theology, 1:244, 245. 
cxvii. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 383. 
cxviii. Systematic Theology, 1:156. 
cxix. Systematic Theology, 1:223, 2:12. 
cxx. Theology of Culture, p. 131-32. 
cxxi. Streiker, p. 275; Ferre, Searchlights on 
Theology, p. 127; Killen, pp. 113, 124; McLean, p. 54; 
Martin Luther King, Jr., "A Comparison of the 
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Conceptions of God in the Thinking of Paul Tillich and 
Henry Nelson Wieman" (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston 
University, 1955), pp. 155-59, 269. 
cxxii. Killen, p. 124; Ferre, Searchlights on 
Theology, p. 127; McLean, p. 54; King, p. 155..   
cxxiii. Killen, p. 124. 
cxxiv. Ferre, Searchlights on Theology, p. 127 
cxxv. McLean, p. 54. 
cxxvi. King, p. 155.  On this page, King 
technically only asks the question of "whether...God is 
an unconscious reservoir of power or whether he is a 
conscious person."  But it would be fair to conclude 
that his answer in the remainder of the section is that 
Tillich's God is the former.  (See esp. p. 158.) 
cxxvii. McLean, p. 54.  See also Guyton B. 
Hammond, The Power of Self-Transcendence:  An 
Introduction to the Philosophical Theology of Paul 
Tillich (St. Louis:  Bethany Press, 1966), pp. 65, 111. 
cxxviii. Systematic Theology, 1:250. 
cxxix. Theology of Culture, p. 115.  Cf. 
Systematic Theology, 1:279. 
cxxx. Ultimate Concern, p. 173. 
cxxxi. Systematic Theology, 1:172, 272, 278, 
3:254; Courage To Be, p. 185; Ultimate Concern, p. 173; 
"Reply to Interpretation," p. 334. 
cxxxii. Systematic Theology, 1:9, 3:252-65 passim; 
Dynamics of Faith, p. 12. 
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cxxxiii. Systematic Theology, 1:278, 3:422; 
Philosophical Interrogations, p. 388.  Cf. Courage To 
Be, p. 187. 
cxxxiv. Systematic Theology, 1:272.  
cxxxv. My Search for Absolutes, p. 66. 
cxxxvi. Systematic Theology, 1:108. 
cxxxvii. Systematic Theology, 3:160; My Search for 
Absolutes, p. 125. 
cxxxviii. Systematic Theology, 3:256. 
cxxxix. Dynamics of Faith, p. 61; Theology of 
Culture, p. 25. 
cxl. "Uberwindung des Religionsbegriffs," p. 367.  
The preceding ten endnotes inclusive do not claim to be 
a complete list of the appearances of these terms in 
this context. 
cxli. My Search for Absolutes, p. 66. 
cxlii. Systematic Theology, 1:172. 
cxliii. Courage To Be, p. 185. 
cxliv. Courage To Be, p. 185.  Cf. Ultimate 
Concern, p. 48. 
cxlv. See Ultimate Concern, p. 173, which also speaks 
of a "heavenly tyrant," and see endnote 152 below. 
cxlvi. Courage To Be, p. 187. 
cxlvii. Systematic Theology, 1:272. 
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cxlviii. My Search for Absolutes, p. 82. 
cxlix. Theology of Culture, p. 16. 
cl. Theology of Culture, p. 22. 
cli. Theology of Culture, p. 25. 
clii. Ultimate Concern, p. 173.  See also 
Philosophical Interrogations, pp. 381, 384, where 
Tillich associates omniscience and a lack of 
exclusivity or externality in relation to the 
creatures. 
 Compare Tillich's declaration that "omniscience 
is not the faculty of a highest being who is supposed 
to know all objects" (Systematic Theology, 1:278) and 
the earlier reference to an external God as an "all-
knowing" tyrant (Courage To Be, p. 185) to the 
insistence here on "a God who knows everything."  
Though knowing all may appear to be common to all three 
passages, in the first two, it should be understood as 
more or less external knowledge.  (The buzz-word 
"highest being," the word "objects," and a subsequent 
reference to subsuming God under the subject-object 
scheme support this for the first).  In that case, God 
might know something about everything, but not 
everything about everything.  God would be "a god who 
simply knows more than" us.  In our passage, Tillich 
goes on to speak of "a heavenly tyrant who has a better 
knowledge of physics than we have" (in contrast to God 
as "in every atom").  This suggests that the tyrant God 
just knows more than humans, but is not truly "all-
knowing." 
 In our passage and in Systematic Theology, 
1:278, Tillich talks of God within the subject-object 
structure as knowing what might or would have happened 
if what did happen had not happened.  This could mean 
that God as perfectly intimate with the world has 
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deterministic knowledge--that is, that only one thing 
in each case could have happened, apparently determined 
by God.  Or it could mean merely that God has knowledge 
of things insofar as they are not indeterminate--or 
were not indeterminate (as this remark pertains to the 
past).  That is, God knows the range of the possible, 
and unlike we who are relatively (indeed, mostly) 
separated from things, does not speculate about the 
issuance of hypothetical possibilities that never were 
real possibilities.  Or, I grant, it could mean 
something else. 
cliii. Dynamics of Faith, p. 11. 
cliv. Ibid. 
clv. Systematic Theology, 3:120.  See also 1:127.  
Cf. 1:111-12. 
clvi. Dynamics of Faith, p. 11. 
clvii. Systematic Theology, 1:107, 211, 216.  See 
also Systematic Theology, 3:255; Christianity and World 
Religions, p. 93.  On the other hand, he does recognize 
that many mystics attempt to reach a union with God 
apart from any medium of revelation.  (E.g., Systematic 
Theology, 1:140; Dynamics of Faith, p. 60.)  We are 
left to speculate whether he believes mystics actually 
can (temporarily) lose awareness of anything concrete. 
clviii. Systematic Theology, 3:256. 
clix. Systematic Theology, 3:119.  See also Systematic 
Theology, 1:282, 2:8, 3:320.  And also see Tillich's 
section on how the subject-object cleavage affects many 
facets of life and how the Spiritual Presence fragmen-
tarily overcomes this:  Systematic Theology, 3:252-65. 
 There is certainly no absorption of individuality and 
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particularity indicated here.  Though in any case we 
can participate in it only "fragmentarily," even in 
"Eternal Life"--the transtemporal fulfillment of each 
moment of time in which all negativities and 
ambiguities are entirely overcome (including "the 
ambiguities of objectivation" [Systematic Theology, 
3:414]), "the universal centeredness does not dissolve 
the individual centers" (Systematic Theology, 3:401; 
cf. 3:402). 
clx. Systematic Theology, 1:109, 110. 
clxi. Theology of Culture, p. 25.  See also Systematic 
Theology, 1:271; Biblical Religion, p. 81. 
clxii. Systematic Theology, 1:271. 
clxiii. Ibid.; Systematic Theology, 3:119-20. 
clxiv. Systematic Theology, 1:172, 271, 282, 
3:120; Dynamics of Faith, p. 11. 
clxv. Dynamics of Faith, p. 11.  See also Systematic 
Theology, 1:271. 
clxvi. Systematic Theology, 1:282. 
clxvii. Systematic Theology, 3:120.  Cf. Courage 
To Be, p. 187 
clxviii. "Appreciation and Reply," p. 307. 
clxix. Biblical Religion, p. 81. 
clxx. Courage To Be, p. 180.  In this passage Tillich 
is paraphrasing Spinoza to express his own thought. 
clxxi. Systematic Theology, 1:271, 3:138; Courage 
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To Be, p. 180. 
clxxii. Systematic Theology, 1:271; Biblical 
Religion, p. 36. 
clxxiii. Biblical Religion, p. 36. 
clxxiv. Systematic Theology, 1:218; "Systematic 
Theology 383," p. 219.  In this last reference Tillich 
quotes Spinoza, apparently approvingly:  "the eternal 
substance expresses itself in the attributes and modes 
of being."  He once said that "he came closer to 
Spinoza for the total 'feel' of his presuppositions" 
than to any other thinker.  (Nels F. S. Ferre, "On 
Tillich and the Nature of Transcendence," Religion in 
Life 35 [Winter 1966]:666.) 
clxxv. Systematic Theology, 1:271. 
clxxvi. Systematic Theology, 3:138. 
clxxvii. Systematic Theology, 1:218. 
clxxviii. Courage To Be, p. 180. 
clxxix. Biblical Religion, p. 36.  Tillich is here 
speaking in the voice of "ontology" (in comparison with 
biblical religion), but would not disagree with the 
basic intent of the sentence, though "Absolute Mind" 
and "finite Mind" might not be his own choice of words. 
clxxx. Hartshorne, as we shall see, notes this 
coincidence of self- and other-love in God. 
 Tillich writes in Systematic Theology, 1:282, 
that there must be "separation from one's self" for 
self-love to be possible.  In this connection he cites 
"creaturely freedom" and estrangement or sin.  This 
kind of "separation" is not denied by panentheism; 
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indeed, it must be affirmed by a panentheism that is 
true to experience and keeps a healthy distance from 
pantheism.  But this in no way compromises the idea 
that God includes, knows, or loves the creatures with 
perfect immediacy and intimacy.  Though "separation 
within himself" a la the trinitarian personae is 
contrasted with "separation from himself" with regard 
to the creatures, this must be understood in light of 
the above:  being "separated from" does not preclude 
being "within" in another sense.  In fact, in this 
passage he indicates "the distinction within God 
includes the infinity of finite forms."  Cf. Systematic 
Theology, 1:255-56.  Also see p. 5 above. 
clxxxi. Systematic Theology, 3:138.  In this case 
it is God's love for the creature, rather than the 
creature's love for God (as in the section on our 
relating to God as being within God) that is focused 
upon.  In the following phrase from Courage To Be, p. 
180, it is not entirely clear which of the focuses 
Tillich intends:  "the love and knowledge with which 
God loves and knows himself through the love and 
knowledge of finite beings."  Is this "love and 
knowledge" that which the finite beings have for God or 
which God has for the finite beings?  Probably the 
latter, for the love and knowledge of God by certain 
"finite beings," such as animals, is either absent or 
extremely attenuated. 
clxxxii. Systematic Theology, 1:271. 
clxxxiii. Ibid. 
clxxxiv. Ibid. 
clxxxv. Systematic Theology, 1:272. 
clxxxvi. Ibid.  Also in Systematic Theology, 1:216, 
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and Dynamics of Faith, p. 14, holiness is directly 
associated with transcending the subject-object 
structure or cleavage. 
clxxxvii. Systematic Theology, 1:271. 
clxxxviii. Systematic Theology, 1:215, 272. 
clxxxix. Systematic Theology, 1:272. 
cxc. Biblical Religion, p. 84. 
cxci. Courage To Be, p. 49. 
cxcii. Systematic Theology, 1:245. 
cxciii. Ibid. 
cxciv. Ibid. 
cxcv. Courage To Be, p. 187. 
cxcvi. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 381. 
cxcvii. Systematic Theology, 1:271. 
cxcviii. Biblical Religion, p. 84. 
cxcix. Systematic Theology, 2:7. 
cc. Ibid.; Philosophical Interrogations, p. 381. 
cci. Biblical Religion, p. 84; Courage To Be, p. 187. 
ccii. Systematic Theology, 1:271; Courage To Be, p. 
187. 
cciii. Systematic Theology, 1:18. 
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cciv. My Search for Absolutes, p. 82. 
ccv. Systematic Theology, 1:252. 
ccvi. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 384.  "Center" 
is said to be symbolic with regard to God, perhaps 
because it normally entails distinctness and (spatial) 
separation from others. 
ccvii. "Appreciation and Reply," p. 306.  
ccviii. History of Christian Thought, p. 265. 
ccix. Ibid. 
ccx. Systematic Theology, 1:282. 
ccxi. Theology of Culture, p. 62 
ccxii. Systematic Theology, 1:277. 
ccxiii. Systematic Theology, 1:271. 
ccxiv. Systematic Theology, 3:421.  This movement 
from "essence" through "existence" to 
"essentialization" does not primarily refer to pre-
birth, life, and afterlife.  Rather it applies to each 
moment.  Moreover, its application to every moment is 
not essentially one of temporal progression.  The three 
concepts are better seen as factors within each moment. 
 (Systematic Theology, 3:419-22.) 
ccxv. Courage To Be, p. 187. 
ccxvi. "Systematic Theology 383," pp. 89, 139.  
See pp. 55 and 46 above, respectively. 
ccxvii. "Systematic Theology 383," pp. 87, 139; 
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Systematic Theology, 1:252; Philosophical 
Interrogations, pp. 370, 376. 
ccxviii. "Systematic Theology 383," p. 139. 
ccxix. "Systematic Theology 383," pp. 89, 139; 
Systematic Theology, 1:252; Philosophical 
Interrogations, p. 376. 
ccxx. "Systematic Theology 383," p. 87. 
ccxxi. "Systematic Theology 383," p. 89. 
ccxxii. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 376. 
ccxxiii. "Systematic Theology 383," p. 89. 
ccxxiv. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 376. 
ccxxv. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 370. 
ccxxvi. "Systematic Theology 383," p. 87.  The 
phrase "in addition" is in parentheses here, indicating 
that the transcriber was not sure of Tillich's exact 
words. 
ccxxvii. In addition to the references of the 
preceding three footnotes, see Systematic Theology, 
1:252. 
ccxxviii. Christianity and World Religions, p. 67. 
ccxxix. My Search for Absolutes, p. 28. 
ccxxx. Systematic Theology, 1:188. 
ccxxxi. Ultimate Concern, pp. 43-44.  The "is" 
here rather than "includes" is in a context that should 
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not invite accusations that God is exhaustively 
identical with the world for Tillich.  He did receive 
some criticism for writing that "God is the structure 
of being," in Systematic Theology, 1:238, 239.  Compare 
the following, from Theology of Culture, p. 10, as a 
remark that very explicitly notes both identity and 
transcendence:  In overcoming estrangement a person 
"discovers something that is identical with himself, 
although it transcends him infinitely,...from which he 
never has been and never can be separated." 
ccxxxii. Theology of Culture, pp. 25, 131. 
ccxxxiii. Theology of Culture, pp. 4-5, 25. 
ccxxxiv. Systematic Theology, 1:245; Protestant 
Era, p. 82. 
ccxxxv. Systematic Theology, 1:235.  Here Tillich 
is speaking of what "dialectical realism" "tries to 
show."  Dialectical realism is the philosophical analog 
of "trinitarian monotheism" (Systematic Theology, 
1:234) and recalls terms Tillich has employed to 
describe his conception of the relationship between God 
and the world, "ecstatic" and "transcendent realism" 
(See, e.g., Systematic Theology, 2:5-10).  That "the 
concrete is present in the depth of the ultimate" is 
certainly Tillich's own phrase and owned by him. 
ccxxxvi. Systematic Theology, 3:314.  Not all of 
Tillich's statements on God's relation to time are as 
affirmative of a divine temporality. 
ccxxxvii. Systematic Theology, 1:263.  The 
opposites, of course, being the finite and the 
infinite.  The phrase "coincidence of opposites," 
coined by Nicholas Cusanus, is used more than once by 
Tillich (also, e.g., Systematic Theology, 1:81, 277; 
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Philosophical Interrogations, p. 370) and without too 
much explanation.  Ironically, his fullest explanation 
of the relationship between the infinite and the 
finite, in "Systematic Theology 383," pp. 89-90, which 
we have already encountered, mentions Cusanus but not 
his term. 
ccxxxviii. Systematic Theology, 1:189, 205; 
Philosophical Interrogations, p. 369.  Cf. Systematic 
Theology, 1:237. 
ccxxxix. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 369. 
ccxl. Systematic Theology, 1:188. 
ccxli. This response, in "Reply to 
Interpretation," p. 341, cited earlier in part, is a 
prime example:  "To Mr. Thomas's request to think of 
God as a being, not alongside but above the other 
beings, I answer that logically the 'above' is one 
direction of the 'alongside,' except it means that 
which is the ground and abyss of all beings.  Then, 
however it is hard to call it a being."  Unless "ground 
of being" has that panentheistic implication for the 
reader, one is not helped by Tillich's answer to 
comprehend his resistance to calling God a being (above 
others). 
ccxlii. Systematic Theology, 1:289. 
ccxliii. Systematic Theology, 1:236. 
ccxliv. Systematic Theology, 1:156. 
ccxlv. Systematic Theology, 3:293-94. 
ccxlvi. Systematic Theology, 1:245. 
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ccxlvii. Systematic Theology, 1:271. 
ccxlviii. Ultimate Concern, p. 173. 
ccxlix. "Appreciation and Reply," p. 306. 
ccl. Systematic Theology, 1:237.  Externality is not 
mentioned in the (somewhat obscure) passage in which 
this phrase is found, but the phrase is certainly 
suitable to the context in which I have used it. 
ccli. A good case could be made that power is more 
important in Tillich's doctrine of God than any other 
more or less particular quality:  "The 'almighty God' 
is the first subject of the Christian credo.  It 
separates exclusive monotheism from all religion in 
which God is less than being-itself or the power of 
being....  Faith in the almighty God is the answer to 
the quest for a courage which is sufficient to conquer 
the anxiety of finitude" (Systematic Theology, 1:273). 
 At one point, other attributes are spoken of in terms 
of omnipotence:  eternity, omnipresence, and 
omniscience are omnipotence with respect to time, 
space, and the subject-object structure of being 
respectively (Systematic Theology, 1:274).  (Ultimate 
power ensures that there will be no externality in 
regard to others due to localization and ignorance.)  
On the other hand, eternity is once accorded the honor 
of being the "decisive characteristic of those 
qualities which make him God" (Systematic Theology, 
3:420).  Here, as with symbolism, there is a contrast 
between God's transcending potentiality and actuality, 
and some other candidate, as most characteristic of 
deity. 
 CHAPTER 3 
 
 HARTSHORNE AS PANENTHEIST 
 
 Since no one doubts that Charles Hartshorne is a 
panentheist, there is no need to document each time he 
writes in terms of God's inclusion of the nondivine 
individuals.  Instead I will present his elaborations 
upon that basic theme and his more or less distinctive 
panentheistic formulations.  In many cases, the meaning 
of particular Hartshornean ideas and expressions will 
be seen to be similar to particular Tillichian ones, 
and, in some cases, the wording of Hartshorne will be 
similar to Tillich's.  Such congruities are not to be 
explained by dependence of one on the other.  
Hartshorne developed most of his major panentheistic 
ideas and formulas before Tillich had written the 
overwhelming majority of the material presented in the 
previous chapter.  And though Hartshorne did read some 
of Tillich's works and has demonstrated some knowledge 
of some of Tillich's major ideas, he could not be said 
to have a detailed knowledge of Tillich's writings.  
Tillich, on the other hand, never read any of 
Hartshorne's works (other than Hartshorne's critique, 
in The Theology of Paul Tillich, of his doctrine of God 
as rendered in volume 1 of the Systematici), as far as 
I know.  They did have some conversations with each 
other, but these were after their basic ideas and most 
panentheistic formulas had been established.  Thus, my 
explanation is that two people sharing a basic idea or 
intuition have expressed and developed this conception 
in ways that are sometimes very similar.  The fact that 
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Tillichian expressions are paralleled by ones of 
Hartshorne, an undisputed panentheist, lends some 
further support to a panentheistic interpretation of 
these expressions, such as I offered in chapter 2.  
Finally, some of Hartshorne's panentheistic 
formulations involve a response (partly negative, 
partly positive) to some of Tillich's declarations, 
which is one reason why this chapter on Hartshorne 
appears after the one on Tillich. 
 Hartshorne labels one of his themes "modal 
coincidence."ii  This means that God "coincides" with 
reality in both the "mode" of actuality and of potenti-
ality.  That is, there is a "coincidence or 
coextensiveness of the [divine] individual's actuality 
with all actuality, and of its possibility with all 
possibility."iii  Or similarly:  "All actual things must 
be actual in God, they must be constituents of his 
actuality, and all possible things must be potentially 
his constituents."iv  This type of formulation of God's 
all-inclusiveness indicates God's temporality, that 
there is in some sense a distinction between 
potentiality and actuality for God, which Hartshorne 
believes is requisite if God is truly to embrace the 
temporal world.  Related "modalities" or "polarities" 
are necessity-contingency and abstract-concrete, in 
that God's necessary and abstract essence is bound to 
be actualized in some contingent and concrete state, 
the precise issue of which depends upon divine and 
creaturely choices.v  Such polarities give rise to one 
of Hartshorne's terms for his perception of God, 
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"dipolar theism."  The theme of God as inclusive with 
regard to both potentiality and actuality appears in 
many variations, sometimes without modal "coincidence" 
or "coextensiveness" being specifically mentioned.  The 
following evokes the value of the creatures for God: 
"Being" is God as enjoying creatures:  the crea-
tures he does enjoy are the actual beings, along 
with the enjoyment itself as the inclusive 
being; the creatures he might enjoy, along with 
the possible ways he might enjoy them, are the 
possible forms of being.vi
 That full inclusion is only proper to God and 
proper only to God is often suggested by Hartshorne.  
One way this is done is by directly or indirectly 
comparing God with the creatures in that respect:  
"That we 'have things outside us' is because we have 
without having," that is, "abstractly," "only with 
inefficient, faint awareness."
 
vii  (If God "'has' them, 
he has them, and that is the clear meaning of 
containing."viii)  Or similarly, contra the idea that 
since "we as knowers do not literally include the 
known; therefore, God does not," Hartshorne writes:  
"In the highest sense of knowledge, namely, direct, 
infallible, concrete, clearly conscious apprehension, 
we human subjects can scarcely be said to have any 
knowledge."ix  As stated in chapter 1, Hartshorne often 
associates inclusion and knowledge,x as in the previous 
quotation and as in the following:  "The vaunted 
transcendence [of knowing getting "'outside' itself to 
know an independent and larger world"xi], taken as 
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externality of known to knower, is thus really a defect 
of our human knowledge."xii  The above remarks, and 
others,xiii
finite things with respect to each other, usually 
spoken of in terms of "the subject-object cleavage." 
 parallel ones by Tillich on the externality 
or separation of  
 God, on the other hand, includes perfectly, both 
in scope and adequacy, and does so infallibly or 
necessarily.  "Scope" points to God's inclusion of 
everything, while "adequacy" indicates that each thing 
is embraced utterly.  Sometimes Hartshorne speaks of 
"adequacy" without modifying it with "perfect," as in, 
"the infallible adequacy of his awareness to its 
objects,"xiv and as in, "only God reflects adequately, 
infallibly, all that conditions him."xv  "Adequate" in 
such contexts must not be understood in the colloquial 
sense of "average," but in the more literal one of 
functioning in correspondence to the reality of some-
thing, which only God does fully.  Perfect scope and 
adequacy go hand in hand:  "Only where nothing is 
external can anything be absolutely internal."xvi  
(Conversely, that humans do not fully possess their 
"members" is one with their having an external environ-
ment.xvii
 As quoted above, God "infallibly" includes or 
knows with perfect adequacy.  In a similar vein, 




sarily all-inclusive, incapable of a genuinely 'ex-
ternal' environment."   This is part of divine "un-
surpassability,"xix of God's radical superiority, a 




xx  Divine unsurpassability in 
general and necessary all-inclusiveness both involve 
necessary existence.xxi  (Conversely, to have an "exter-
nal environment" makes one vulnerable to "factors not 
under immediate control," which "may happen to conflict 
fatally with one's internal needs."xxii)  God's ultimacy 
or radical superiority vis-a-vis humankind is the basis 
for and necessitates divine inclusiveness:  "In spite 
of, indeed because of, his infinite difference from 
man, God repeats in himself all positive qualities and 
qualitative contrasts that are present in man..."   
This recalls Tillich's remarks that "the infinite 
transcendence of the infinite over the finite...does 
not contradict but rather confirms the coincidence of 
opposites"xxiv and that "the infinite is always a radi-
cal breaking away from the finite, so radical that the 
relationship...must always be understood as within.  
Only then is the radical separation possible."xxv
 And if God is not all encompassing, if the 
creation is external to or simply distinct from God, 
unacceptable consequences ensue:  "For if God is 
distinct from nature, then the total universe includes 
God as one part and nature as another, and this seems 
to make God less than the universe and in so far finite 
rather than infinite."
 
xxvi  This recalls Tillich's 
contention that if God has other realities "alongside," 
if the infinite does not embrace the finite, then God 
becomes finite.  As Hartshorne uses "finite" here, it 
seems to be "quantitative" only, at least explicitly--
it seems to mean that God includes less than exists.  
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Hartshorne is aware, though, as suggested in connection 
with his employment of the body analogy,xxvii
xxviii
 that if 
things are external to God, if God has any external 
environment, then God does not have immediate and 
perfectly adequate knowledge and control of everything. 
 Also, that any externality implies lack of omniscience 
is, of course, true more or less by definition for 
Hartshorne, with his equation of inclusion and knowl-
edge. And asserts Hartshorne, "omnipotence could only 
be direct control of every part of the universe, since 
indirect control is subject to the imperfections 
inhering in all instruments."   "Surely God controls 
the world not by hands, but by direct power of his 
will, feeling, and knowledge."xxix
 Furthermore, the externality of the world to 
God, which makes God a "mere constituent" of the 
whole,
  Finally, 
externality, as indicated in the parenthetical comment 
of the preceding paragraph, makes one liable to death. 
 Thus, Hartshorne definitely sees the externality of 
the world to God as making God "qualitatively" finite, 
deficient in essentially the ways the creatures are. 
xxx
...if we deny the inclusiveness of the divine 
unity, we will either have to admit that rela-
tions between God and the lesser minds belong to 
no real individual, no real substance, or have 
to admit a superdivine individual to which they 
belong.
 implies the need for a "God over "God," which 
is implied for Tillich if God is "beside" or "above" 
the world: 
xxxi 
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If the relation of the absolute to the world 
really fell wholly outside the absolute, then 
this relation would necessarily fall within some 
further and genuinely single entity which em-
braced both the absolute and the world and the 
relations between them--in other words, within 
an entity greater than the absolute.xxxii 
 Obviously Hartshorne senses that unless all 
relations are fully internal to God, including our 
relating to God, then there are loose threads, then 
something is left unexplained.  Though the following 
comment is general, it is very appropriate to the 
status of our relating to God, for it is there that a 
distinction between God and what is other than God is 
most strongly implied and felt:  "...the distinction 
between God and anything else must fall within 
God."xxxiii  (Note, of course, that Hartshorne is not 
disbarring, and is, indeed, affirming, that 
distinctions between the lesser individuals and God can 
be made--there is no simple or exhaustive equivalence. 
 Instead he is insisting that any such distinction, 
that all things, must ultimately be embraced within the 
divine life.)  By the preceding quotations, I am 
reminded of Tillichian statements on our relations with 
God as being within God, especially two of his remarks 
on relations between God and the creatures of a general 
nature, as are the Hartshornean comments:  1) "God 
stands in the divine-human reciprocity, but only as he 
who transcends it and comprises both sides of the 
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reciprocity."xxxiv  2) God does not have "external rela-
tions," but only "internal" ones, "inner relations of 
the divine life."xxxv
 Tillich also spoke of a specific aspect of our 
relating to God, our love of God, as being within God 





  Hartshorne mentions this type of 
formula in relation to Spinoza, saying it has a truth 
"he did not intend" (apparently because the creatures 
"lose their value" or disappear "as distinct 
individuals" and only God is left loving for Spinoza 
according to Hartshorne).   Since we are "by direct 
sympathetic union...parts of his internal life," since 
"God through loving all individuals...makes them one 
with himself,...when we for our part love God this love 
is a factor in God's enjoyment of himself, that is, in 
his self-love."  
 Hartshorne uses "participation" 
panentheistically to connote a lack of separation or 
externality, to point to coinherence in some sense.  As 
with inclusion or knowledge, a contrast between 
attenuated and full participation in the creaturely and 
the divine cases, respectively, is drawn.  In relation 
to participating in the feelings of others, 
particularly the negative ones, Hartshorne pens, 
"...the human attention span will not permit more than 
minute doses of participation in the joys and sorrows 
of others, and even this much involves the risk that we 
shall at times be merely and ignobly wretched."  God on 
the other hand has an "attention span positively 
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inclusive of all feelings, while preserving its own 
integrity."xxxix  This observation implies more directly 
than most comments on God's perfect passivity an active 
aspect entailed in this.  Divine passivity to the 
feelings of the creatures is itself an activity (as 
"participation" suggests) and is enabled by God's 
ultimate power or aseity
the feelings of suffering involved are somehow 
within the divine experience, as analogously the 
sympathetic spectator of a thirsty man imagina-
tively shares in his sufferings.  In the divine 
case, however, there is not mere imagination, 
but sheer, intuitive participation.
, by a perfect "attention span" 
that preserves the divine "integrity."  Also focusing 
on suffering is this expoundment:  God is not "thirsty 
literally," but 
xl




xli and of God's "universal"xlii and "abso-
lute and unconditional participation."   Hartshorne 
tries to show the "sheerness" or "absoluteness" of the 
divine participation, which involves a kind of coin-
herence (but one in which God is not reducible to the 
lives in which God utterly participates):  "...all 
being is God in that only God participates adequately 
in all lives..."xliv
 A theme appearing in a number of Hartshorne's 
works is that in God self-love or self-interest and 
altruism or other-interest have "certain and absolute 
  Again we find "adequate" meaning 
not "so-so," but to correspond to and, indeed, coincide 
or coinhere with. 
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coincidence."xlv  He defends the possibility of altruism 
in the human case and in general by debunking the 
maintenance of an absolute distinction between "love as 
desire, with an element of possible gain or loss to the 
self, and love as purely altruistic benevolence," 
devoid of any such gain,xlvi
Altruism is identifiable in experience as a 
process of participation in the good of others, 
so that some sort of value accrues to the self 
through the very fact that value accrues to 
another self.  This does not mean that all moti-
vation is merely selfish.xlvii
 a distinction which leads 
some to believe that any genuine concern for others is 
impossible: 
 
Against the notion "that all motivation is merely 
selfish," he points to the concern that some people 
have for the distant future, even though they will not 
be present to reap the fruits of their efforts.xlviii  
More generally, he notes the fundamental misconception 
of those who, in "Catch 22" fashion, maintain that all 
supposed desire for the good of others is tainted 
simply because we desire it and derive satisfaction if 
this desire is met:  "...we desire to enjoy the 
fulfillment of our interests in others because we have 
those interests; we do not have them because we desire 
enjoyment."xlix  The model Hartshorne is arguing against 
seems to split knowing and valuing, reason and emotion: 
 one is supposed to recognize and act toward the good 
of others, but not have any positive feelings if 
successful.l  A key point is that for Hartshorne we 
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naturally and more or less immediately participate in 
the interests and feelings of others in relating to or 
perceiving themli--we have their interests and feel 
their feelings.  But only to a certain extent, for much 
of their reality is external to us.lii
 God, however, fully includes or knows each 
person's experiences, feelings, and desires without 
mediation or loss.  Hartshorne indicates that it is 
precisely omniscience that entails a complete coinci-
dence of love and self-interest in God.
lviii)  This 
does not deny that God suffers
 
liii  For, "in 
respect to value, perfect knowledge is perfect posses-
sion.  Any emotions of beauty and joy which God enables 
us to have, become elements in God's own all-embracing 
experience, contributory to the richness of that 
experience."liv  For the creatures, who cannot possess 
fully the experiences and enjoyments of others, there 
is conflict between self-interest and altruism--concern 
for the good of others can involve some sacrifice of 
our own good.lv  This is looking at the situation more 
or less in terms of present experience.  From the 
perspective of a longer stretch of time, Hartshorne 
suggests that God will always be around to enjoy the 
results of whatever actions God takes to promote the 
welfare of others, while a creature may not.lvi  This 
highlights the general rule that self interest and 
altruism coincide fully only in God and that the 
creatures have opportunities for sacrifice and 
"selflessness" that God does not.lvii  (This is morally 
"a glory," but metaphysically "a defect."
-- which is the only 
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sense in which it might be said that God makes 
sacrifices, merely that in feeling our sufferings, 
which Hartshorne believes cannot be separated from 
feeling our joys or from the perfect knowledge or 
inclusiveness that is an essential aspect of deity, God 
is not passing up some greater good.lix
 Hopefully it is clear that all this does not 
mean that God is "selfish."  As Hartshorne indicates, 
"...God through loving all individuals for their own 




lx  (Compare this Tillichian description of 
agape:  "the love God has toward the creature and 
through the creature himself."lxi)  Indeed, "a will 
perfect in knowledge as well as goodness could have no 
means of distinguishing between success for others and 
success for itself."lxii  The essential point of the 
concept of the coincidence of self- and other-interest 
in God is that God so intimately and utterly knows and 
loves the creatures that their joys are God's joys, 
their best interests, God's interests, that God "loves 
them 'as he loves himself,' since by direct sympathetic 
union they are parts of his internal life."   
 Certainly more than implicit in the above is 
that omniscience is not something that operates 
emotionlessly.  Hartshorne expressly states that 
"concrete knowledge, knowledge inclusive of the actual 
concrete feeling of creatures," must be a "kind of 
This 
was what I took to be the central intent of Tillich's 
formula that God loves God's self through the 
creatures. 
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sympathetic participation or love," for "purely 
nonemotional knowledge of particular emotions in their 
concrete uniqueness" is "gibberish."
lxvii
lxviii
lxiv  More briefly, 
he maintains that being included by God entails a 
perfect sympathylxv or entails that God "feels our feel-
ings."lxvi  Also, recall the quote from chapter 1, that 
Hartshorne does "not see how a conscious being can 
contain suffering and not in some sense suffer."   
Negatively, a lack of sympathy and externality are 
associated:  God is not "a mere spectator God who 
surveys creaturely sufferings and fears with 'mere 
happiness' (Whitehead), i.e., without participa-
tion,"  nor does God act upon the creation "coldly 
or from without."lxix  (In this latter, an active aspect 
of God's nonseparation and sympathy seems explicit, 
though whether Hartshorne's God is truly 
panentheistically active will be considered in the next 
chapter.)  Thus, to full inclusion and perfect 
knowledge as correlative concepts for Hartshorne, we 
can add perfect sympathy or love.  Says Hartshorne, 
"The 'simplicity' of God has here its true meaning, 
that there can be no duality of understanding and 
motivation" when each is perfect.lxx
 In 
 
Reality As Social Process, Hartshorne is 
especially eloquent on the divine inclusivity as 
sympathetic and the divine sympathy as inclusive, as he 
contrasts this with the externality of our caring, 
which tends to be "mere benevolence" and "external 
well-wishing"lxxi:  1) "...when any creature suffers--or 
rejoices--God is united with that suffering through a 
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sympathy so intimate and absolute, that what we call 




  2) "That other fellow...is not 
just a product of divine power, or just an object of 
divine well-wishing, but a very fragment of the life of 
God which is made all-inclusive through sympathy."  
 In the following, which is reminiscent of Tillich's 
claim that God is neither "spatial" nor "spaceless," 
but that space is in God,  
Men seem outside each other, and they imagine 
they are all outside God; but space is in God, 
not God merely in space or merely 'outside' 
space (in some superspace? [as in 
"supranaturalism"]).  All is within the divine 
sympathy.  We are members one of another because 
we are members of the living whole, bound 
together by solidarity of feeling, a solidarity 
imperfect in us but perfect and absolute in God. 
 If we even inconvenience our fellows, we 
inconvenience God; if we torture our fellows, we 
torture God...
Hartshorne suggests that 
people wrongly assume that the relative externality of 
others to them applies to God: 
lxxv
 That the creaturely lives are expressions of the 
divine life, a kind of formulation traditionally used 
in pantheistic or (implicitly) panentheistic ways, is 
affirmed by Hartshorne.  This type of formulation tends 
to connote the active aspect of God (though again just 
how panentheistic an active aspect Hartshorne actually 
intends will be discussed in the ensuing chapter).  He 
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asserts that "all wills somehow express and tend to 




  That all 
wills "tend to fulfill one Will" cannot mean for 
Hartshorne, who is adamant that all creatures have some 
measure of interminate freedom, that all creatures 
fully obey the divine will, as the parenthetical remark 
here suggests:  "He [Jesus] is an expression of the 
divine life, as are all things whatever (even though 
not all are in accord with the divine ideal for 
them)."   The following also attempts to protect the 
freedom and, in general, the reality of each creature 
in its own right in some sense:  the content of the 
divine knowledge "is not a mere state or adjective of 
the divine subject or substance....  True, the being of 
these individuals is their presence to him, and 
therefore, their being; not just his presence to 
himself or just his being."   Tillich twice said 
that God expresses (and also knows, wills, etc.) God's 
self through the finite.  That Tillich uses the 
reflexive form of "to express" with God as the 
grammatical subject, while Hartshorne uses "all wills" 
as subject, and the noun form, may be indicative of 
Tillich's relative emphasis on the active aspect and 
Hartshorne's on the passive, rather than merely due to 
chance.  Tillich also desires to uphold creaturely 
freedom (whether or not he succeeds), stating that the 
"individual is not a mere 'mode' of the eternal sub-
stance."  
 In Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism, 
Hartshorne proffers two types of analogy for apprehend-
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ing God and God's relationship with us, which 
strikingly parallel in structure and intent Tillich's 
positing of two aspects in our understanding of God 
(the personal and the "transpersonal") and in our 
relating to God (the "person-to-person" or "ego-thou" 
relationship and a transpersonal or more "mystical" 
relationship with being-itself).  One type of analogy 
is the "social analogy," which has to do with the 
relationship between "human beings and other human 
beings or creatures not radically superior or inferior 
to them."
lxxxi
lxxxii).  Hartshorne recognizes, as does 
Tillich, that the social or person
lxxxiii
lxxx  The other has to do with the relationship 
between radical unequals, as in the relationship of a 
person to its cells, which is called here the "mind-
body analogy"  (or less frequently the 
"organic"
-to-person analogy 
"seems to be the religiously preferred basis of 
analogy.  God is to the creatures as a human father to 
human children, or a ruler to the ruled, or a beloved 
to a lover, or a friend to the befriended."   
is doubly insufficient in itself; it throws no 
light on the radical superiority of creator to 
creatures; and it throws no light on the imma-
nence or omnipresence ascribed to God.  It sug-
gests that he is merely outside things, 
operating on them through intermediaries, such 
as sound waves, light waves, etc., whereas all 
such intermediaries are also his creatures.lxxxiv
But 
the social analogy 
 
The first aspect of the social analogy mentioned is 
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that of being "one among others" in the sense of 
relative equality, the second, that of relative 
separation from things.  These two aspects do not seem 
unrelated for Hartshorne here, for omnipresence is 
certainly part of God's radical superiority.  We have 
seen Tillich deny the appropriateness of calling God a 
person and qualify the appropriateness of applying the 
adjective "personal" and a person-to-person or ego-thou 
relationship to God, because of the separation and 
unambiguous distinction from things supposedly entailed 
in all this.  He specifically mentioned omnipresence 
(along with omniscience and omnipotence) as 
incompatible with God as "a person" who is relatively 




 And he further spoke to the denial of radical 
superiority here by claiming that God is finite as "a 
person"  and that divine holiness is at odds with a 
strict ego-thou relation.  
 The essential purpose of the mind-body analogy, 
as suggested in the first chapter, is to evoke the 
immediacy and directness of God's presence, of divine 
knowledge and control, in contrast to the externality 
of the social one.lxxxviii
lxxxix
  Omniscience cannot rightly 
"be conceived except as clear intuition of the entire 
cosmos...  Omnipotence could only be direct control of 
every part of the universe, since indirect control is 
subject to the imperfections inhering in all 
instruments."  
 The mind-body analogy, though, has its problems 
in interpreting the relationship between God and the 
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creatures, when taken in itself, apart from the social 
analogy.  This is one: 
The human body does not, for direct perception, 
contain distinct individual things, as the world 
to which God is to be related certainly does.  
It is a quasi-continuous solid, differentiated, 
but without clear-cut separateness or 
independence of parts.  Hence it is feared that 
to interpret the world as though it were God's 
body would be to deny the reality of individuals 
as such other than God.xc
However, Hartshorne notes that, in fact, the human body 
is composed of individual cells,
xciii
 
xci even though we do 
not perceive them distinctly, and suggests that in 
applying the analogy to God, God's immediate perception 
must be, unlike ours, wholly distinct and vivid.xcii  
Hartshorne also realizes that God's control or influ-
ence, as well as knowledge, with regard to the divine 
body must be perfect or unsurpassable,  including 
the infallible ability to ensure God's existence.xciv  
Still, Hartshorne indicates that the human mind-body 
relation is harder to get a grip on than the interhuman 
one,xcv is even, at this point, "mysterious or unintel-
ligible."xcvi  A further complication is that the rela-
tionship of "a man's mind to his cells appears to be 
the relation of 'mind' to 'matter,'" while God's 
relation to us is obviously one to sentient 
individuals.  However, Hartshorne believes that closer 
attention to our experience reveals that our cells are 
sentient entities whose feelings we immediately and 
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sympathetically share.  For Hartshorne, this both 
clears up the just-mentioned difficulty and provides 
the general key for grasping the mind-body relation.  
To add to the individuality of the members of the body, 
sentience, allows us to combine the two analogies.  
That is the mind-body relationship is immediately 
social."  Though from another chapter of Man's Vision 
of God
and inclusivity of the mind-body--are wedded for 
Hartshorne: 
, the following is important for grasping how the 
two analogies--the relative distinctness of beings 
involved in the social and the immediacy 
God is neither the whole in which all parts lose 
their value as distinct individuals--so that 
there is only the one loving the one--nor is God 
so exalted that he is not a whole at all, and so 
that our feelings and conflicts are not his 
feeling and conflicts, but rather God is the 
xcviisocially differentiated whole of things...  
This gets to the heart of panentheism.  It contrasts 
panentheism with both a kind of pantheism and a more or 
less deistic theism.  It attempts to show that neither 
are the creatures mere modes or appearances of God or 
ultimately undifferentiatedly the same as God, nor are 
they in utter contrast to God as a simply distinct 
being. 
 I would add that I do not think one has to 
panpsychically posit our own cells as sentient or aware 
in their own right in order for the relationship of 
oneself to parts of one's body to be helpful.  (I would 
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not refer to it as the "mind-body" relation, though, 
for this may suggest a dualistic distinction between 
the two--which Hartshorne on the whole does not 
intend.)  The feeling, say, in my hand, can still 
suggest the immediacy with which God experiences my 
experiences and feels my feelings, can still suggest 
the absence of any spatial or quasi-spatial distance 
between God and me.  After all, Hartshorne uses the 
analogy for God despite the indistinctness of our 
perceptions of what is part of or "within" our bodies 
and the imperfection of our control of our cells; so 
why not use it despite the nonsentience, or despite 
agnosticism concerning the sentience, of parts of our 
bodies. 
 In the remaining portion of this chapter I will 
consider Hartshornean material that is directly 
relevant to, and, in some cases, in response to, 
Tillich's ideas that God is being-itself, is not a 
being, and is not a being beside others.xcviii  In some 
relatively earlier works, Hartshorne speaks of God as 
in some sense being itself or being as such, though not 
frequently as does Tillich.  He uses it in the sense of 
necessary existencexcix
As supremely efficacious, God is the everlasting 
and ungenerated controlling power of the uni-
verse--the only way a maximum of efficacy can be 
conceived. 
 and being the ultimate source of 
all being, which are two of the intrinsic connotations 
of "being-itself" for me and probably for Tillich 
mentioned in the previous chapter: 
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 Thus it is a short step to the assertion that 
God is that without which other beings would not 
exist at all, would be nothing.  And it seems 
only another way of saying this to state that 
God is in some sense Being itself, while all 
other things participate in being through God.c
   Or more briefly: 
 
In some sense, then, God must coincide with 
Being as such; for he cannot be without 
existence, and therefore equally existence 
cannot be without him, so that the very meaning 
of "exist" must be theistic.ci
Whether Hartshorne was at all influenced to use the 
term in this manner by any familiarity with Tillich's 
use of it, I cannot say.  Certainly "
 
esse ipsum
 In more recent writings, Hartshorne uses being-
itself in connection with Tillich.  Evident now is the 
other intrinsic connotation of being-itself for me and 
Tillich, that God in some sense is or includes all 
being, which was at most tacit in Hartshorne's earlier 
reference to the term.  And as he sees this panentheis-
tic meaning in it, he basically approves of the term.  
He pens:  "Thus divine actuality and potentiality are 
definitive of actuality and possibility as such [modal 
coincidence].  This has some analogy with Tillich's 
'God is being itself.'"
" and 
"Being itself" are enough a part of the theological and 
philosophical tradition that we need not assume any 
connection here. 
cii  With respect to knowledge, 
which is more or less equivalent to inclusion for 
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Hartshorne, he writes:  "...God's capacity to know is 
as wide as being itself, coincident in this sense with 
being in general."ciii  More straightforwardly, he 
perceives Tillich's "being-itself" to mean that God 
must all-encompassingly "coincide with being or reality 
itself."civ  Sometimes this is in relation to approving 
half of the Tillichian formula that "God is not a 
being, but being-itself," while still maintaining that 
God is a being.cv  He does note that he prefers 
"reality itself," because it avoids any suggestion of a 
contrast between static "being" and dynamic "becom-
ing"cvi
 In one case, though, Hartshorne asks if Tillich 
by "being-itself" meant that God in "contingent 
concreteness...is all-inclusive."
 (to the detriment of God as temporal, and thus 
as actually inclusive, if identified with static 
"being").  However, he does not explicitly indicate in 
the above instance that by the term "being-itself" in 
itself Tillich means to imply a timeless God, and, in 
any case, seems to acknowledge the meaning of all-
inclusiveness in Tillich's "being-itself." 
cvii  It is not 
entirely clear there whether he is questioning 
Tillich's desire to associate "being-itself" with 
inclusivity or merely his success in carrying this 
through.  In the following, concern over whether 
concreteness is lost is evident, though here he is 
dealing with "being-itself" in conjunction with the 
denial that God is a being:  "...when Tillich says, God 
is 'not a being, but being itself,' do we not confront 
a new example of the Greek or Indian exaltation of the 
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undifferentiated or universal at the expense of the 
individual and particular?  I have some sympathy with 
this objection."cviii
cxiii
  Also in response to that Tillich-
ian formula, he says, "But alas, we now seem to have 
made deity a mere universal, wholly lacking in concrete 
or particular actuality."cix  In fact, in these two 
instances, as would seem to be the case prima facie, it 
is the denial that God is a being that prompts Hart-
shorne's feeling that individuality, concreteness, and 
particularity are threatened, for in the latter and 
elsewhere, he proceeds to argue that God is both a 
being or an individual and, "with Tillich,"cx being or 
reality itself.  Specifically in relation to "being-
itself," he writes of "the coincidence of God with 
reality which Tillich rightly sees as definitive of the 
divine."cxi  Apart from a particular context, he asserts 
that Tillich "rightly holds that God must be all-
inclusive."cxii  Thus, overall he does not gainsay the 
meaning of all-inclusiveness of "being-itself" in 
itself or for Tillich, but rather questions whether 
Tillich compromises this divine inclusivity.  
 As just indicated above, Hartshorne denies the 
exclusivity of Tillich's "disjunction, 'a being or 
being itself,'" in relation to God.cxiv  Specifically in 
response to Tillich, Hartshorne does affirm that God 
cannot be a being or thing in such a way as to compro-
mise God's radical superiority:  God "does not merely 
happen to exist, as one thing among others."cxv  And God 
"is not 'one more individual being,' since it is other 
individuals who are added to the primordial being 
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rather than vice versa,"
cxvii
cxviii
cxvi nor is God "simply one 
more, though the greatest, finite thing."   We 
apparently have in these two instances Hartshornean 
paraphrasing of "a being beside others" and "a being, 
even though the highest being," respectively, which he 
seems here to have taken only in the sense of relative 
equality.  In the following, though, the understanding 
of clear distinctness of being vis-a-vis others, rather 
than just relative equality, is evident in regard to a 
paraphrase of Tillich:  God is "not simply 'one more 
being additional to the others.'  Not at all; we have 
the universally presupposed individual, intrinsic to 
and in his actuality containing all reality.  In this 
case, a being is also the being..."  
 But, as this last quotation suggests, despite 
not being "one more being," God is still "a being" as 




cxix "an individual reality" as 
well as "reality as such."cxx  God has both the 
universality and inclusivity of being-itself, as well 
as the individuality, integration, unity, and self-
consciousness of a being.cxxi  "He is individual, but 
the individual with strictly universal functions, the 
all-encompassing and yet not merely universal principle 
of existence."   "He is the all as an individual be-
ing."   Or in a brief formula that appears many 
times, God is the "universal individual."   Harts-
horne agrees with Tillich that normally universality 
and individuality are more or less in opposition, but 
finds an irony in Tillich's formula, which attempts to 
show God's exceptionality: 
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...I accuse Tillich of a subtle form of the very 
error he is trying to avoid, that of putting God 
under an inappropriate rule.  It is a rule uni-
versally valid except with reference to deity 
that what is individual is not, to an equal 
degree, universal, and what is universal is not 
to an equal degree individual....  What Tillich 
overlooks, however, is that this seemingly 
inevitable contrast between universality and 
individuality is one of the very rules to which 
God as worshipful or unsurpassable must be an 
exception.  His uniqueness must consist 
precisely in being both reality as such and an 
individual reality....cxxv
 Hartshorne generally recognizes that being "a 
being" (in contrast to just plain "a"), apart from 
immediate contrasting yet complementary pairing with 
"being-itself," tends to undermine God's universality 
and inclusiveness (and unsurpassabilitycxxvi).  Except 




a being," stands 
alone,  Hartshorne states that, in addition,  or 
better,  God is "the
 I should add that the combination of 
universality and individuality in God is a theme that 




cxxx and likely originated in independence from 
Tillich, in that it appears in a fairly early work.  
 As Hartshorne allows that God is a being or an 
individual, one would expect that God is also a self or 
a person for him--and rightly so.  To Tillich he 
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responds, "That 'self implies contrast to everything 
which is not self' may be accepted, but not that it 
implies 'separation from everything.'"cxxxii
cxxxiii
  Of course, 
due to God's all-inclusiveness, certain contrasts to 
other selves are barred for Hartshorne.  But that God 
can be contrasted in some senses to the included selves 
is obvious enough for Hartshorne for God to be a 
"self."  While he does not specifically counter 
Tillich's denial that God is a person, this passage 
which voices an objection of some to the idea of God's 
inclusion of the creatures, is relevant:  "...if God is 
a person he must have other persons 'over against' or 
'outside of' him."   
 Just what are we to make of the discrepancy 
between Hartshorne and Tillich over whether God is a 
being, self, etc.?  Panentheism is operative in both 
opinions.  Tillich will not permit calling God an 
individual because this (normally) entails separation 
from and unambiguous contrast to other individuals 
rather than God's embracing and working immediately 
through everything that is.  Both agree that the usual 
tension between individuality and universality for 
Hartshorne or individualization and participation for 
Tillich "is in God simply transcended."cxxxiv
Tillich concurs with this 
objection, but, of course, rather than accepting the 
externality of other persons to God, he opts for 
denying that God is a person.  Hartshorne, on the other 
hand, demurs from the disjunction, maintaining that God 
is a--or the--person who fully contains all other 
persons. 
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 Why do they then draw divergent conclusions?  
Hartshorne once states that "the issue is at least 
partly verbal."cxxxv
cxxxvi
  I would go further and say that it 
is wholly "verbal."  This does not mean that the issue 
is insignificant, however.  The real issue is how best 
to express and safeguard from misinterpretation the 
panentheistic idea of deity.  On Tillich's side, there 
is the usual tendency to think of a person as relative-
ly separated from and simply distinct in relation to 
others and, more crucially, the usual inclination to 
picture God as someone who can be simply contrasted to 
me and the world, which is evidenced in both religious 
practice and theology.  To go so far as to deny that 
God is a being or individual can serve to bring us up 
short, to brake us and keep us from conceiving God as 
less than the all-encompassing ultimate.  In 
Hartshorne's corner, there is the fact (or at least my 
opinion) that to be an individual is not so utterly 
associated with externality and unequivocal contrast to 
others that it grates to hear it said that God is the 
individual who fully encompasses all other individuals. 
 And to speak of God as an individual or person 
safeguards against misunderstanding, indicating that 
God in panentheism is integrated and self-conscious and 
"not a mere or universal form, pattern system, matter, 
or force."   If I had to choose between referring to 
God as a being or refraining from the same, I would do 
the former, but with frequent and conspicuous 
qualifications.  I would affirm that God is a being in 
a sense, while denying that God is a being in the sense 
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of excluding or separating others from utter immediacy 
to the divine perception and power.  And in attempting 
to explain panentheism I would point to both Tillich's 
denial and Hartshorne's affirmation that God is a being 
or self, as ultimately expressing the same basic idea--
as, indeed, I have. 
 The last panentheistic material of Hartshorne's 
to be considered concerns worship.  He regards worship 





 all "thoughts" and "perceptions,"  "in 
the light of" a "supreme aspiration."   He cites the 
Great Commandment as expressing that.cxl  And he 
concludes that only if God is the integrated and "all-
inclusive whole,"cxli can the integrity, all-inclusive-
ness, and wholeness of response definitive of worship 
find an appropriate correlate.   For if any creature 
is not included by God, "then in thinking this very 
thought I have gone beyond loving God to loving (or 
being mildly interested in) certain individuals outside 
him.  But then my total interest is not in God, but 
only a part of my interest."  
 Tillich also cites the Great Commandment as 
definitive of his expression, "ultimate concern," and 
defines God as that which ultimately concerns us.cxliv  
Indeed, it seems to be "Tillich's proposal to define 
'God' through the idea of worship" that stimulated 
Hartshorne to do the same, as above.cxlv  Unlike Harts-
horne with worship, Tillich does not specifically refer 
to God as all-inclusive as an aspect of the proper 
correlate of ultimate concern.  But, in general, he 
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does not discuss properties of God in connection with 
ultimate concern, "for the first criterion of theology 
must remain formal and general."cxlvi  
 Hartshorne does take Tillich's other basic 
definition of God, that God is being-itself, to be 
correlative with the definition that God is that which 
concerns us ultimately:  "If God is what is loved or 
can be loved with all one's capacities, then he must in 




is no reason not to think that it is implicit. 
 
 "Thus Tillich's two proposals for defining God are not 
only mutually consistent, but they are equiva-
lent."   Hartshorne does not believe, though, that 
this "twofold definition of deity" is "followed out 
without deviation or contrary assumptions"  by 
Tillich.  Focusing on ultimate concern, he questions 
whether Tillich, by holding that God transcends the 
distinction between potentiality and actuality and by 
speaking of "unconditionedness"cl
But we love both self and neighbor as involving 
potentialities which 
 in relation to our 
ultimate concern, is consistent with himself.  On the 
first point, he writes: 
may or may not be realized, 
and not all of which can possibly be 
realized....  If there is a real and literal 
separation or difference between potentiality 
and actualization in ourselves as objects of 
concern and yet this concern is to be wholly 
concern for God, then the difference must be no 
less real and literal in God, for He is, for our 
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concern, the measure of reality.cli
And Hartshorne prefers a term like "unreserved" to 
"unconditioned" to avoid any implication that the 
referent of our concern is totally unconditioned (which 
would preclude that each creature is embraced by and 
thus "somehow qualifies God" cliii
 
clii).   These concerns of 
Hartshorne hopefully will whet the reader's appetite 
for chapter 5, when I will delve into whether Tillich 
sabotages his panentheism in certain ways. 
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lix. Man's Vision of God, pp. 161, 162. 
lx. Man's Vision of God, p. 294.  See also pp. 162-
63.  Cf. Whitehead's Philosophy, pp. 103-4. 
lxi. Systematic Theology, 3:138. 
lxii. Whitehead's Philosophy, p. 104. 
lxiii. Man's Vision of God, p. 294. 
lxiv. Natural Theology, pp. 13-14.  See also, "New 
Pantheism-II," p. 141.  Cf. Man's Vision of God, pp. 
162-63. 
lxv. "Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality:  What Was True 
in Idealism," Journal of Philosophy 43 (October 1946): 
581. 
lxvi. "New Pantheism-II," p. 142. 
lxvii. "Kinds of Theism," p. 130. 
lxviii. Creative Synthesis, p. 263. 
lxix. Whitehead's Philosophy, pp. 93-94. 
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lxx. Man's Vision of God, p. 163.  Cf. Divine 
Relativity, pp. 124-26. 
lxxi. Reality as Social Process, p. 146. 
lxxii. Reality as Social Process, p. 148. 
lxxiii. Reality as Social Process, pp. 151-52. 
lxxiv. See p. 8 above. 
lxxv. Reality as Social Process, p. 152. 
lxxvi. Reality as Social Process, p. 19. 
lxxvii. Reality as Social Process, p. 153. 
lxxviii. "Ideal Knowledge," p. 577. 
lxxix. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 384. 
lxxx. Man's Vision of God, pp. 174-75.   
lxxxi. Man's Vision of God, pp. 175-76. 
lxxxii. Man's Vision of God, pp. 186, 187. 
lxxxiii. Man's Vision of God, p. 175. 
lxxxiv. Man's Vision of God, p. 175.  Cf. p. 202. 
lxxxv.  Tillich, Philosophical Interrogations, pp. 381, 
384. 
lxxxvi.  Tillich, Philosophical Interrogations, p. 
384. 
lxxxvii.  Systematic Theology, 1:271-72. 
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lxxxviii.  See esp. Man's Vision of God, pp. 178-79, 
187, 200. 
lxxxix.  Man's Vision of God, p. 178. 
xc.  Man's Vision of God, p. 176. 
xci.  Man's Vision of God, pp. 176-77. 
xcii.  Man's Vision of God, pp. 178, 184-85.  Cf. p. 
188. 
xciii.  Man's Vision of God, pp. 178, 180.  Cf. p. 188. 
xciv.  Man's Vision of God, pp. 180-81. 
xcv.  Man's Vision of God, pp. 186-87. 
xcvi.  Man's Vision of God, p. 187. 
xcvii.  Man's Vision of God, pp. 294-95. 
xcviii.  There is a type of formulation by Hartshorne 
that structurally parallels Tillichian ones to the 
effect that God is not a being or a meaning, but the 
ground or ultimate source of every being or meaning.  
The relevant instances follow: 
1)  The ground of alternatives which makes it 
impossible that none shall be realized is not 
itself a member of an alternative... (Encyclope-
dia, s.v. "cause.") 
2)  ...divinity is not religiously conceived as 
a mere illustration of first principles but as 
somehow the first principle, the correlate of 
every interest and every meaning... (Natural 
Theology, p. 32.)  
3)  ...there is an abstract essence of God which 
is no fact at all, since it is rather a 
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principle expressed in possibilities as truly as 
in actual facts.  (Philosophers Speak of God, p. 
482.) 
4)  ...they have looked for the very principle 
of factuality as though it were itself just 
another fact.  (Natural Theology, p. 124.) 
 Alternatives, illustrations, and facts suggest 
contingency, which is why it is inappropriate to call 
the necessary basis of factuality and alternatives a 
fact or an alternative.  (For Hartshorne, though, it 
can be said that a particular contingent state of God 
is a fact, an illustration, or an alternative:  "Now, 
in our panentheistic view God in his concrete, 
superrelative actuality is indeed a great fact, 
inclusive of the facts of science and infinitely more" 
[Philosophers Speak of God, p. 481].  For Hartshorne 
makes a distinction between the "abstract essence of 
God which is no fact" and God's concrete actuality, 
which is an illustration or instantiation of God's 
perfect and necessary essence.  Yet despite a 
particular state of God being an alternative, 
illustration or fact, one would not want to say that 
God is an alternative, etc., because of the contingency 
entailed in such terms.)  The same logic does not seem 
to apply for "being" and probably "meaning." For to say 
that God is a being does not in itself entail 
contingency as to God's very existence.  "Meaning" 
("Sinn"), relatively common to Tillich's German 
writings in this connection, but not at all to his 
English, is harder to figure, because we do not in 
English normally refer to even a nondivine person as "a 
meaning"; but it does not seem to particularly entail 
contingency, even in German.  Thus, these sentences by 
Hartshorne make sense rather obviously and without any 
panentheistic or other explanation, while Tillich's do 
not. 
 Compare the following declaration with those 
above: 
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..."God" is not simply another word in our lan-
guage but, if anything rational, a name for the 
principle back of every word in any possible 
language.  He is not merely another topic to 
think about, but the all-pervasive medium of 
knowledge and things known, to recognize whom is 
a way of thinking about no matter what.  
(Natural Theology, p. 79.) 
xcix.  "God as Absolute, Yet Related," p. 47; Logic of 
Perfection, p. 31. 
c.  Man's Vision of God, p. 93. 
ci.  Philosophers Speak of God, p. 8. 
cii.  Charles Hartshorne, "Deity as Inclusive Transcen-
dence," in Evolution in Perspective:  Commentaries in 
Honor of Pierre Lecomte du Nouy, ed. George N. Shuster 
and Ralph E. Thorson (Notre Dame, IN:  University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1970), p. 158. 
ciii.  "Non-theological Meaning," p. 681. 
civ.  "Tillich and Tradition," p. 245; Creative Synthe-
sis, pp. 148, 150; Natural Theology, p. 34. 
cv.  "Necessity," Review of Metaphysics, 21 (December 
1967):295; "Tillich and Tradition," pp. 247, 259; 
Creative Synthesis, pp. 151, 157. 
cvi.  "Tillich and Tradition," p. 247; Creative Synthe-
sis, p. 149. 
cvii.  Creative Synthesis, p. 271. 
cviii.  "Non-theological Meaning," p. 676. 
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cix.  Natural Theology, p. 34. 
cx.  "Necessity," p. 295. 
cxi.  Creative Synthesis, p. 150. 
cxii.  Logic of Perfection, p. 144. 
cxiii.  See endnote 149 for an overview of Hartshorne's 
assessment of Tillich's doctrine of God. 
cxiv.  "Tillich and Tradition," p. 247; Creative 
Synthesis, p. 151.  This section of Creative Synthesis 
on Tillich's doctrine of God is taken, with some 
excising, rearrangement, and rewriting, from the 
article. 
cxv.  "Tillich and Tradition," p. 258; Creative Synthe-
sis, p. 150.  The context of this statement is to argue 
that, contra Tillich, it is all right to attribute 
"existence" to God.  In Logic of Perfection, p. 31, he 
speaks, in the context of necessary existence, of 
"nearly all" theologians and metaphysicians as 
regarding God as "not simply one being among others, 
but the Being, identical in some sense with 'Being 
itself,'" without any reference to Tillich. 
cxvi.  "Inclusive Transcendence," p. 156. 
cxvii.  Natural Theology, p. 36. 
cxviii.  "Tillich and Tradition," pp. 256-57.  Cf. 
"Tillich's Doctrine of God," pp. 192-93. 
cxix.  Ibid., p. 259; Creative Synthesis, p. 157. 
cxx.  Natural Theology, p. 35. 
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cxxi.  Creative Synthesis, p. 236; Natural Theology, 
pp. 35-36; "Tillich and Tradition," p. 247.  Cf. 
Natural Theology, pp. 6-7. 
cxxii.  Natural Theology, p. 36. 
cxxiii.  Creative Synthesis, p. 236. 
cxxiv.  "Non-theological Meaning," p. 681; "Inclusive 
Transcendence," p. 156; Reality as Social Process, p. 
176; Natural Theology, p. 136; Whitehead's Philosophy, 
p. 139. 
cxxv.  Natural Theology, pp. 34-35. 
cxxvi.  "Inclusive Transcendence," p. 156; "Tillich and 
Tradition," pp. 256-57.  Cf. Logic of Perfection, p. 
31. 
cxxvii.  "Tillich and Tradition," p. 247. 
cxxviii.  Ibid., p. 257. 
cxxix.  Creative Synthesis, p. 151; "Tillich's Doctrine 
of God," p. 192; "Necessity," p. 295. 
cxxx.  Creative Synthesis, p. 236, which was quoted on 
p. 137 above; Natural Theology, p. 136. 
cxxxi.  Reality as Social Process, p. 176. 
cxxxii.  "Tillich's Doctrine of God," p. 183. 
cxxxiii.  Divine Relativity, p. 91. 
cxxxiv.  Hartshorne, "Non-theological Meaning," p. 
681. 
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cxxxv.  "Inclusive Transcendence," p. 156. 
cxxxvi.  Natural Theology, p. 36. 
cxxxvii.  "Assessment of Christianity," p. 167. 
cxxxviii.  Natural Theology, pp. 4-5. 
cxxxix.  "Assessment of Christianity," p. 167.  Cf. 
Man's Vision of God, p. 158. 
cxl.  "Assessment of Christianity," p. 167; Natural 
Theology, pp. 7-8.  Cf. "Tillich and Tradition," p. 
245; Creative Synthesis, p. 148. 
cxli.  Natural Theology, p. 7. 
cxlii.  Natural Theology, pp. 6-8, 17; Logic of Perfec-
tion, p. 100; "Assessment of Christianity," p. 167.  
Cf. "Tillich and Tradition," p. 245; Creative 
Synthesis, p. 148. 
cxliii.  Natural Theology, p. 16.  See also "Tillich 
and Tradition," p. 246; Creative Synthesis, p. 149; 
Logic of Perfection, p. 100. 
cxliv.  E.g., Systematic Theology, 1:11-12. 
cxlv.  Logic of Perfection, p. 113. 
cxlvi.  Systematic Theology, 1:14. 
cxlvii.  "Tillich and Tradition," p. 245; Creative 
Synthesis, p. 148. 
cxlviii.  "Tillich and Tradition," p. 246; Creative 
Synthesis, p. 148. 
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cxlix.  "Tillich and Tradition," p. 259; Creative 
Synthesis, p. 157.  See also "Tillich and Tradition," 
pp. 243, 245.  In general, Hartshorne finds an 
ambivalence in Tillich, "a hesitation to choose" (Logic 
of Perfection, p. 9), a failure to envisage "clearly 
the issue between classical and neoclassical views" 
(Logic of Perfection, p. 144).  He declares that 
Tillich "rightly holds that God must be all-inclusive" 
(Logic of Perfection, p. 144; see also Creative 
Synthesis, p. 150; cf. "Non-theological Meaning," p. 
676), yet, he believes, Tillich incongruously makes 
statements that appear to entail that God is not at all 
temporal or contingent ("Process as Inclusive," pp. 98, 
100; "Non-theological Meaning," p. 677; Philosophical 
Interrogations, pp. 374-75; "Tillich's Doctrine of 
God," pp. 173-74, 177-78, 186-90; Logic of Perfection, 
p. 144) and not at all conditioned or affected by the 
creatures ("Process as Inclusive," p. 98; Natural 
Theology, p. 17; "Tillich's Doctrine of God," pp. 183-
84, 191; "Tillich and Tradition," pp. 247, 257; 
Creative Synthesis, p. 150).  An epilogue:  "It seems 
Tillich must be with us in all this but his language 
keeps making concessions to those who are not with us." 
 ("Tillich's Doctrine of God," p. 177.) 
cl.  Actually Tillich uses "unconditional" with respect 
to ultimate concern, and infrequently, if ever, "uncon-
ditioned."  Hartshorne apparently regards them as 
synonymous.  
cli.  "Process as Inclusive," pp. 97-98.  Cf. 
Philosophical Interrogations, pp. 374-75.  In "Tillich 
and Tradition," p. 147, Hartshorne uses a parallel line 
of argument with regard to "conditioned reality" (in 
which we have an interest) to conclude "that the divine 
must be both conditioned and unconditioned." 
clii.  "Tillich and Tradition," p. 246; Creative 
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Synthesis, p. 149. 
cliii.  "Tillich and Tradition," p. 247; "Tillich's 
Doctrine of God," p. 167; "Process as Inclusive," p. 
98. 
 CHAPTER 4 
 
 CRITICISM OF HARTSHORNE ON THE ACTIVE ASPECT 
 
 One may wonder about the asymmetry of the four 
middle chapters--Tillich as panentheist, then Harts-
horne, followed by criticism of Hartshorne and then of 
Tillich.  The two positive chapters were placed con-
tiguously for purposes of comparing the panentheistic 
formulations of the two thinkers, and as indicated at 
the end of the previous chapter, Hartshorne aptly 
followed Tillich, as he specifically responded to 
Tillich in various relevant ways.  As for the order of 
the critical chapters, I think it best to avail myself 
of the opportunity to maintain continuity with respect 
to Hartshorne, for this opportunity was, under the 
circumstances, not available regarding Tillich.  Plus I 
do not think that the additional wait for criticism of 
his thought will be crucial.  Indeed, given the length 
of the chapters on Tillich and the greater diversity 
and complexity of Tillich than Hartshorne in the areas 
of our concern, a longer respite between chapters on 
Tillich is probably felicitous. 
 As background, it is important to outline Harts-
horne's understanding of the general nature of reality, 
perception, and influence or causation.i  The basic 
unit of reality is a "unit event" or "unit occasion" 
that "synthesizes the many into one."  Any and every 
concrete entity is a momentary and discrete "state" of 
sentient experience, within which there are no dis-
tinctions between earlier and later stages, which 
"creatively synthesizes" "data" from the immediate past 
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into a whole.  "Creative" indicates that the data, 
which influence the unit event, which it must take into 
account, do not wholly determine the synthesis, but 
that every state has some indeterminate freedom.  The 
data from the immediate past that it synthesizes are 
themselves unit events that synthesized previous unit 
events, etc.  In this way, though what is immediately 
perceived is from the immediate past, the further past 
is included or accumulated in the immediate past, which 
now is included in the present.  However, creaturely 
states perceive or include other states, including past 
states of the same individual ("personal memory"), in 
attenuated fashion.  Only God fully perceives or 
possesses all prior divine and creaturely states in 
God's present creative synthesis.  That what is per-
ceived is always and only in the past applies to God, 
as well as to the creatures.  That is, God apprehends 
creaturely syntheses only after they are made, not 
while they are being made.  This opinion of the later 
Hartshorne represents a reversal of his earlier view.  
Now when a present unit event itself becomes past, it 
in turn becomes a datum to and thus exercises influence 
on subsequent unit events.  For Hartshorne only that 
which, whether relatively consciously or unconsciously, 
is experienced, perceived, or "prehended" (Whitehead's 
term sometimes used by Hartshorne) can exercise 
influence.  Since whatever is perceived is in the 
immediate past, nothing wields influence until it is 
past.  This applies to God as well as to the creatures 
in Hartshorne.  The divine synthesis that is taken into 
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account by present creaturely states is the divine 
state of the immediate past. 
 Now to the substance of this chapter.  Its 
general contention is that Hartshorne in various ways 
undermines his panentheism with regard to the active 
aspect.  As indicated in the first chapter, the active 
aspect refers to God's being the very power of being in 
all that is, the very power of acting in every action, 
in a full-fledged sense.  That is, whatever power we 
possess is also God's power and whatever action we take 
is in a (qualified because of some indeterminate 
creaturely freedom) sense also God's act, in that there 
is no power that can be simply contrasted to God's 
power, no power (just as no perception) that is 
external to or separated from God as the ultimate power 
(and perceiver).  All power is a part of or included 
within God's power; God immediately works through 
everything.  God's power coinheres with creaturely 
power, though there is much more to this power than its 
manifestation in the creatures per se.  Therefore, 
whenever I speak of God's (utterly) immediate or 
coinhering empowering, upholding, or sustaining of 
things, God's power or empowerment is not to be under-
stood as something additional to or as a particular 
aspect of a thing.  Rather, the entity itself, in its 
total existence or reality, is a part of or an 
immediate manifestation of God's power. 
 There are two basic facets of the active aspect 
of God in panentheism and Hartshorne's undermining 
thereof that will be explored.  The first has to do 
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with God's all-pervasiveness or total inclusivity with 
respect to power, described above.  This is actually 
not a particular facet of the active aspect, but the 
active aspect in its most basic and general sense.  I 
claim that Hartshorne's understanding of divine power 
is not panentheistic in this basic sense:  Hartshorne 
never gives an explicit formulation and affirmation of 
the active aspect in that all-encompassing sense.  
Moreover, Hartshorne not only undercuts his panentheism 
by this sin of omission but by sins of commission, 
through passages that can or must be interpreted to 
deny the utterly immediate and coinhering nature of the 
divine power.  First, he specifically speaks against 
all power as being God's power.  The second problematic 
area is this:  If God is the ultimate all-pervasive 
power, then God's immediate and coinhering empowerment 
of anything in all its aspects is what in the first 
instance keeps anything from instant and sheer 
nothingness.  However, Hartshorne stipulates aspects of 
God other than this immediate all-inclusive empowerment 
as that which gives things being or keeps them from 
nothingness, divine aspects that by comparison involve 
externality and which apply only to certain aspects of 
the creatures.  The implication of such material is 
that there is something creaturely that has some 
ultimate ontological externality and independence with 
respect to God.  Third, that each creaturely state is 
in the past when it is first perceived by God blatantly 
posits an externality of the creatures to God, which 
goes against the very heart of panentheism. 
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 The other basic area to be considered is God's 
governing of the universe, the nature of the divine 
decisions and actions that determine the shape and 
direction of the universe.  If the universe is not at 
all external to God's knowledge, sympathy, and power, 
then it follows that God must know what divine 
decisions and actions will optimally govern the 
universe and be willing and able to carry these out, 
with the result that the universe and creaturely 
experience on the whole will be very good.  While 
Hartshorne envisages God as effecting this type of 
perfect control, I will maintain that his model of 
divine influence is not adequate to the supremely 
effective control he desires.  I might note that what 
ultimately distinguishes this facet of the active 
aspect of panentheism, namely God's determination of 
the nature or direction of the world, from the active 
aspect in general, namely God's immediate and pervasive 
empowerment of everything, is indeterminate creaturely 
freedom.  Past and present creaturely decisions help 
determine the particular shape and direction of the 
world.  These decisions, insofar as indeterminate, are 
distinguished from divine decisions, though God 
empowers with utter immediacy creatures in their 
freedom.  The general active aspect of God in 
panentheism includes creaturely power, including its 
freedom.  This is why it is broader than God's deter-
minations concerning the shape of things.  Without such 
indeterminate creaturely freedom, God's immediate and 
coinhering empowerment of everything and God's deter-
162     Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich 
 
mination of the particular nature and direction of the 




Undermining God as All Power 
 We have seen that Hartshorne panentheistically 
maintains that God is or coincides with all reality, 
that God is reality itself.  However, Hartshorne has 
developed this notion only with respect to the passive 
aspect of knowledge or perception.  But if God is all 
reality
 Two statements that may seem to hint at 
immediate and coinhering empowerment are that "God is 
always actively sustaining all men"
, must God not likewise in some sense be all 
power?  Hartshorne, however, never does directly speak 
of God as in some sense all power, as the one power 
which wholly encompasses, utterly coinheres with, or 
immediately works through all other power.  There are a 
few passages that approach such formulations, but 
clearly fall short.  In the previous chapter, we saw 
Hartshorne speak of God's power or control over the 
creatures as direct and unmediated.  While Hartshorne 
probably intends to affirm a panentheistic 
understanding of divine power by so speaking, we shall 
see in the section on divine governance that what 
Hartshorne means by "direct and unmediated" is not a 
presently active and immediate empowering of all other 
powers. 
ii and that "God 
'creates' man in the radical sense that all of man's 
being involves the divine creativity as its sustaining 
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element."iii
 Perhaps Hartshorne's most promising declarations 
are that any thing is "an expression of the divine 
life" and that "all lives ["somehow express"] one 
Life," cited in chapter 3.  However, that, 
grammatically speaking, in neither case is God the 
subject expressing God's self through the creatures 
and, especially, that in the one case the creaturely 
lives are the subject doing the expressing calls 
somewhat into question just how active God is in this. 
 This verbal matter could also be a matter of 
substance.  That God passively includes all experience 
in the divine life could conceivably be the primary 
sense in which creaturely lives express one life.  
Still, despite their nonactive grammatical form, these 
phrases more naturally connote the active aspect of God 
than the passive and are probably, though not 
certainly, meant by Hartshorne to be interpreted 
accordingly.  However, that God somehow expresses God's 
self in the creatures does not tell us how direct or 
coinhering an active expression this is.  Though the 
  However, these are not at all explicit on 
the nature of this divine sustaining, as to whether 
this is a more or less external sustaining.  Though the 
divine creativity may be relevant to "all of man's 
being," this in itself does not tell us how it is 
relevant.  As shall soon be shown Hartshorne does write 
of God's necessity for our existence in terms other 
than immediate and all-pervasive empowerment.  
Therefore, we can hardly presume that these two remarks 
by Hartshorne should be interpreted panentheistically. 
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creaturely lives as "expressions" of God has tradition-
ally tended to be used in an active pantheistic or 
(implicitly) panentheistic sense, in the absence of 
corroborating evidence, one cannot say it is being used 
that way by Hartshorne. 
 Hartshorne then never does indicate in any 
definite manner that all power is God's power, that it 
coinheres with all other power.  Moreover, in his 
concern to protect creaturely indeterminate freedom, he 
instead declares that there must be a "division of 
power"iv and that "even the greatest possible power is 
still one power among others"v
 But this is precisely what we cannot do on a 
panentheistic understanding.  God's power cannot be 
unambiguously contrasted with any other, for it 
embraces any other; any other is a very manifestation 
of it.  Now as long as that is made quite clear, divine 
and creaturely power can pantheistically be contrasted 
in various senses, because they are not exhaustively 
equivalent.  Then we contrast that which is a part of a 
whole with that whole (that infinitely transcends its 
creaturely parts), and not two simply distinct 
entities.  One such contrast is that God does not make 
 (as he defies a Til-
lichian formula, apparently unwittingly; by the "among" 
here Hartshorne does not mean to deny the categorical 
supremacy of God's power--though insofar as he does not 
affirm God's all-encompassing power, that would be the 
ultimate effect).  Such phrases simply contrast God's 
power with creaturely power, implying that the latter 
cannot also be (part of) the former. 
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our decisions for us insofar as these are 
indeterminate, on which I agree completely with 
Hartshorne.  But we cannot act or choose without God's 
immediate and continual empowerment.  As with 
everything else, our freedom is a part of God's power. 
 Hartshorne does once state that God "gives us the 
power to do the act, but also the power not to do 
it,"vi though he does not indicate whether this 
empowerment is utterly immediate and pervasive or 
relatively external.  Hartshorne once speaks of a 
"division of responsibility"vii
 The second type of sin of commission against the 
concept of the all-pervasive divine power is that 
aspects of God other than immediate all-inclusive 
empowerment are cited by Hartshorne as that which gives 
things their being or saves them from nothingness.  But 
if all power is (part of) God's power, then it is God's 
immediate and coinhering empowerment that in the first 
instance keeps anything from immediate and utter 
nothingness.  By mentioning only relatively external 
and indirect ways of divine empowerment 
 in connection with 
indeterminate freedom, which is much better than 
"division of power," for it upholds our freedom and 
responsibility without undermining God's ultimate and 
all-encompassing power. 
in the context 
of stipulating how God is necessary for our existence, 
Hartshorne does not merely commit a sin of omission, 
but implies that utterly immediate and pervasive 
empowerment is not how God gives us being.  For if this 
panentheistic empowerment is subscribed to--while other 
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senses in which God is necessary for our existence are 
not precluded--it is so much the primary and overriding 
sense of God's necessity for existence that it would 
certainly be mentioned here. 
 What then are the ways that God is necessary for 
our existence according to Hartshorne?  In Man's Vision 
of God he twice indicates that it is God's measurement 
or assessment of things as giving objective or public 
criteria of truth or value that keeps them from 
nothingnessviii:  1) "He is that without which all 
lesser indi-viduals would be nothing, since devoid of 
definitive measure, ground of relationship with others, 
etc."ix
participation "being" would have no definite or 
public character, and "I am" (or "there is a man 
of a certain type") would have meaning only for 
the speaker, that is no meaning. 
    2) Without God's  
   Without God we should be nothing at all, for 
to be would be nothing.x
Now whether God's knowledge and valuation of things as 
giving public criteria of truth and value in itself is 
strictly necessary for anything to exist is not our 
concern (though I doubt it).  What is crucial for our 
purposes panentheistically speaking is 1) that God must 
be immediately empowering or working through us for 
there to be anything that is measured or assessed by 
God and 2) that our knowledge of God's assessment or 
valuation of things is only a part of our total being, 
so that God must be immediately upholding us in other 
aspects of our being for us to exist.  Moreover, even 
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our knowing of God's assessment cannot be given being 
by that assessment per se; God must be empowering us as 
knowing this assessment with coinhering immediacy.  
Furthermore, God's assessment or measurement is in the 
past when it is perceived by us for Hartshorne.  God in 
the present
 Concerning God's ability to provide God's self 
with creatures, Hartshorne pens that God "has power 
always to elicit or entice some such into being."
 must be upholding or empowering our knowing 
of God as in the immediate past.  For all these 
reasons, God's measurement as providing public criteria 
is a secondary and rather external sense of an 
empowerment that allegedly saves us from nothingness. 
xi  
Hartshorne here is indicating that it is our perception 
of God as an attractive or eliciting object or datum 
that gives us our being.  Whether such a perception is 
a necessary part of our being without which we could 
not even exist is not our concern (though I doubt it). 
 What is important are the following points.  Though 
the perception of the divine datum is our total 
perception for Hartshorne, since the divine datum is 
the all-inclusive object, it is not our total being.  
For Hartshorne, at least our response to or synthesis 
of that datum is another aspect of each unit event.  
Thus, even if we accept Hartshorne's metaphysical 
schema of perception, God must be empowering us with 
total immediacy as synthesizing the attractive divine 
object in order for us to be.  Moreover, our perception 
of the enticing datum cannot be given being by that 
datum per se.  God must be immediately sustaining us as 
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receiving this datum.  Furthermore, the divine object 
is in the past when it is perceived by us according to 
Hartshorne.  God in the present
 The ensuing lines "elicit" the same basic 
problems as the preceding instance: 
 must be empowering our 
perceiving of the divine state of the immediate past.  
Therefore, God as enticing datum is a secondary and 
rather external sense of God's giving us being. 
In one sense, however, perhaps God creates ex 
nihilo.  At each phase of process God sums up 
the entire actuality of previous phases; and 
thus any datum which we now, say, can use in our 
self-creation is "nothing" unless it be an item 
in the divine reality as just prior to now.xii
Hartshorne's comment touches on what the symbol of 
creation 
 
ex nihilo tries to express, namely, that it is 
God's creative power, and ultimately only divine 
creative power, that keeps things from utter nothing-
ness.  Here Hartshorne is not directly speaking of the 
giving of being to the creatures or keeping them from 
nothingness, but of keeping the divine datum from 
nonbeing.  However, God creates as much ex nihilo with 
respect to anything and everything, as God does with 
respect to the datum per se; without God's immediately 
upholding power, anything is nothing.  As with the 
previous case, God in the present
 In all three cases then, it is God as object--as 
 must directly be 
giving the very power of being to us as receiving and 
"self-creatively" synthesizing the divine datum from 
"just prior to now." 
 Criticism of Hartshorne on the Active Aspect  169 
 
criterion for truth and value, as "enticing" datum, as 
datum summing up the past--which is designated as that 
which gives being or preserves from nonentity.  But God 
as object to us is very external and exclusive vis-a-
vis God's unmediated and all-encompassing empowerment 
of everything.  For one thing, there are other aspects 
of our reality than our knowing and perceiving the 
divine object (in Hartshorne's schema, there is our 
synthesis of this datum).  Thus, this model of 
empowerment involves externality in that it excludes 
part of our being.  More importantly, our receiving of 
this object itself requires coinhering empowerment, 
which the divine object per se, or in any sense since 
it is past, cannot provide.  More fundamentally, then, 
this model involves externality because God as past 
object offers no sense in which God as present subject 
immediately upholds us in the present in any, let alone 
all, aspects of our being. 
 Hartshorne develops no stronger sense in which 
God is necessary for our existence, of how God upholds 
us against nothingness.  In his only other specific 
statement on this issue, he speaks of God's ordering as 
keeping the universe from disintegrating into nothing-
ness.  This concerns how God keeps the various ongoing 
individual streams of momentary creaturely states from 
conflicting with each other such that they do not all 
eventually destroy each other.  The three instances 
concern what is necessary for any single creaturely 
state, or unit event, to come into existence in the 
first place.  Therefore, God's ordering seems to offer 
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a comparatively indirect and secondary sense for Harts-
horne of how God is necessary for existence.  In any 
case, it is God as past datum (which includes preferen-
ces for possible creaturely action in the present) that 
orders the world. 
 Critics have long contended that process 
theology entails some kind of ultimate dualism.  While 
process theologians have not so intended, my preceding 
analysis 1) suggests that dualism is indeed an 
implication of the Whiteheadian-Hartshornian systems 
and 2) pinpoints the crucial area--namely the creature 
as receiving and as creatively synthesizing data.  
Unless God is presently empowering and giving existence 
to each creature as it receives and synthesizes data, 
then each creature's existence is ultimately due to 
something in addition to God--be it each creature 
possessing its own necessity and power to receive and 
synthesize data, be it the metaphysical principle of 
creative synthesis, or be it ultimate chance or 
ultimate mystery.   
 Such a dualism goes against Hartshorne's inten-
tion.  He insists as firmly as any theologian that God 
exists necessarily and is necessary for the existence 
of anything else,xiii
God is thus the great "I am," the one whose 
existence is the expression of his own power and 
none other, who self-exists--rather than is 
caused, or happens to exist--and by whose power 
of existence all other things exist.
 as in the following: 
xiv
He specifically denies that there can be more than one 
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self-existent beingxv and avers that "there is no 
presupposed 'stuff' alien to God's creative work."xvi
 In itself the pastness of God before being 
perceived by any creature need not entail any exter-
nality of the creature to God, as long as the present 
creaturely state is embraced with regard to power (as 
God immediately empowers it as receiving the divine 
synthesis of the immediate past) and knowledge by the 
present divine state (though as we have seen above 
Hartshorne happens not to endorse such empowerment).  
Practically speaking, though, one might perhaps wonder 
why God as object should possibly be past, 
  
Yet some kind of ultimate dualism is precisely the 
implication if God as datum is the sole or primary 
sense in which God empowers things. 
if God is 
immediately sustaining the creature in the present:  
why would God not present God's present state or 
synthesis rather than that of the immediate past to the 
creature? There are some reasons, though, why someone 
might accept that aspect of Hartshorne's thought (and 
still could subscribe to God's utterly immediate 
empowerment).  Since God in some sense must have 
completed a synthesis before this is a datum, it might 
be called "past," even though it be the specific 
contents of God's present.  Moreover, for Hartshorne 
the durations of the various types of momentary 
creaturely states (human versus insect versus cellular) 
can vary, so that God may be completing additional 
syntheses of processive creaturely states even as 
another creaturely state is working on the strictly 
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"past" divine datum from before the additional 
syntheses.  Therefore, I cannot take issue with calling 
God "past" when God is perceived under this model 
(though I do not accept the basic model--however a 
basic acceptance or rejection is not relevant to the 
concerns of this project), nor does this pastness 
necessarily entail any separation of the creation from 
God. 
 But while the pastness of God as perceived need 
not have deleterious consequences for God's all-inclu-
siveness and, therefore, ultimacy, the notion that God 
does not perceive or prehend creaturely syntheses until 
they are past mostly definitely does.  It represents 
the most blatant and serious undermining of God's all-
inclusiveness and ultimacy in Hartshorne's thought--and 
more directly with respect to the passive aspect than 
the active, though it torpedoes both with equal effec-
tiveness.  I say that it is the most serious because, 
if Hartshorne would come to acknowledge that all power 
is (part of) God's power, his desire that God's power 
not be deterministic could be upheld if he modifies his 
concept to one of a division of responsibility rather 
than of power, and the divine datum as somehow 
necessary for the existence of any creaturely state 
could still be maintained (though it would become a 
secondary sense of this necessity).  However, the only 
way Hartshorne can escape the problems of his opinion 
presently under consideration is to (re-) reverse it. 
 For most of his career, Hartshorne demurred from 
Whitehead and held that "prehension of contemporaries" 
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was possible.  But later in his career he came to 
conclude that no one, including God, prehends the 
synthesis of a unit event until it is over.xvii  Harts-
horne gives hardly any sign of recognizing the problems 
with this notion if applied to God:  each creaturely 
state in its present, in its actualization, is external 
to God's knowledge and power.  This externality to 
God's knowledge is obvious, for that God does not know 
it until it is past is precisely the point.  And this 
in itself subverts God's all-inclusiveness and ultimacy 
with respect to the divine omniscience.  But 
externality to God's power--and thus some kind of 
ultimate dualism--is mutually implicative with 
externality to God's knowing.  For if God does not know 
each creaturely state in its present, how can God be 
presently relating to it in any sense, including as 
empoweror, let alone empowering it with utter 
immediacy, that is, coinheringly? Either some other 
power must be presently upholding it, or it possesses 
an ultimate power or aseity
 As David R. Griffin suggests, there is one 
statement by Hartshorne that may disclose his sensing 
that the nonprehension of contemporaries by God under-
mines the inclusion of all reality by God and may be an 
 of its own.  Conversely, if 
God is the immediate sustainer of each creature, how 
could God fail to know each creaturely state in its 
present, each creaturely decision or synthesis as it is 
made rather than only afterwards?  As Tillich notes, if 
God is "the creative ground of everything in every 
moment," there is no basis for an external relation. 
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attempt to avoid facing this implicationxviii:  "The 
present is nascent, it is coming into being...and there 
is no definite entity to prehend."xix  But that the 
present is "nascent" seems particularly inappropriate 
to Hartshorne's model of process with its spurning of 
time as continuous in favor of a radical discreteness. 
 For Hartshorne, as I understand it, within a unit 
occasion, which lasts a finite length of time, there is 
no distinction between earlier and later stages.  This 
would seem to entail that a creaturely decision is made 
immediately at the beginning of the state's existence 
and is thus without any preceding time during which it 
is nascent.  But in any case, as Griffin notes, even 
that which is "nascent" must have some reality.xx  It 
must be more than nothing and should be embraced by God 
in a panentheistic outlook.  However process is con-
ceived, whether continuous or discontinuous, the 
central distinction is that, in panentheism, God must 
perceive what happens as it happens, creaturely choices 
as they are made, rather than divine awareness being 
"just subsequent to its data."xxi  Everything in the 
present must be in God, included in God's knowledge and 
power, instead of being a "latest class of subjects"xxii
 
 
waiting to be admitted. 
 
Undermining the Divine Governance 
 We now move from the most basic and general 
sense of the active aspect of panentheism--that all 
power is God's power, that God coinheres with or 
immediately works through all other power--to God's 
 Criticism of Hartshorne on the Active Aspect  175 
 
governing or ordering or shaping of the world, to 
divine control of its destiny.  As mentioned in the 
preview at the beginning of this chapter, if the 
universe is not at all external to God's knowledge, 
sympathy, and power, God must know what divine 
decisions and actions will optimally govern the 
universe and be willing and able to carry these out, so 
that creaturely experience overall will be very good.  
I will examine Hartshorne's understanding of divine 
control of the world and then consider whether it 
allows for such perfect governance worthy of the active 
aspect of God in panentheism. 
 Hartshorne maintains that God's controlling 
power is able to ensure both the universe's continuing 
existence and its goodness on the whole.  He suggests a 
number of times that God has the power to order the 
universe in such a way that it will not disintegrate, 
as in the following:  God is 
the 
xxiii
only social being able to guarantee the 
survival, the minimal integrity, of its soci-
ety....  This is a new definition of 
omnipotence.  It means power adequate to 
preserve the society no matter what other 
members may do.   
Now it would seem that merely keeping the universe from 
destruction or chaos can be distinguished from keeping 
it well-ordered and on the whole very good.  Does God 
only do the former in Hartshorne?  There are one or two 
remarks that seem to imply so.  Writes Hartshorne, God 
 
tolerates variety up to the point beyond which 
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it would mean chaos and not a world; but his in-
tolerance of what would lie beyond that excludes 
nothing real from his fullest participation, but 
rather prevents reality from losing all definite 
character.xxiv
Also, remarks in the context of arguing for God's 
necessary existence, which are not worth delving into 
for our purposes, seem to imply that a world with any 
less order than what God in fact supplies would be too 
 disorderly even to exist.
 
xxv
 In any case, despite the above writings, he 
clearly believes that God not only prevents the 
universe from destroying itself, but maintains its 




  Perhaps because of the 
importance Hartshorne places on variety in aesthetics, 
he actually does believe that the best ordering by God 
and the best world are those which stop just short of 
chaos, though I doubt that he does. 
xxvi ensures a preponderance of good over 
evil in the universe for any given time  (whether or 
not merely preventing destruction also guarantees 
overall goodness).  In order to do so, Hartshorne 
envisages for God a very effective and very substantial 
control over the creatures.  God's control in some 
sense is irresistible:  God's deciding "irresistibly 
and universally imposes limits upon the arbitrariness 
of the others."   God's selection of "a particular 
world order" is "an irresistible datum."xxix  Natural 
laws are "something like divine--that is, unsurpassably 
influential--decrees, free creations which the universe 
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xxx  Since for 
Hartshorne there is always some indeterminacy involved 
in any creaturely decision, God's irresistible 
influence does not determine the decision to the last 
iota.  Rather, God sets "optimal limits" to creaturely 
freedomxxxi or fixes "the range of possibilities open to 
us."   But God does put creaturely choice within 
narrow bounds, having determined to a large extent the 
outcome, according to Hartshorne:  God "is the 
essential object for us.  Hence God can set narrow 
limits to our freedom; for the more important the 
object to the subject, the more important is its 
effects upon the range of possible responses."   
Animals "impulsively" take the roles which God assigns 
to them, only "the small details being left to 
them."   In general, what is left for the creatures 
to decide is "by comparison trivial" in relation to 
God's choice of the "world order."xxxv  And in inter-
pretation of and in the terminology of Whitehead, 
Hartshorne says that God furnishes "all but the last 
element of determinateness to the subjective aim of the 
actual entities"  (though what is furnished would 
depend upon past creaturely and divine choices as well 
as upon the present divine choice or synthesis for 
Hartshorne).  I do not believe, though, that he has 
interpreted Whitehead properly, agreeing with Lewis 
Ford that for Whitehead God only assigns values to the 
various options open to one, and that it is past 
creaturely choices alone that set the range of pos-
sibilities.  
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 Expanding upon his above statement on God's 
setting "
xxxviii
narrow limits," Hartshorne indicates that God 
does this by presenting "himself as essential object, 
so characterized as to weight the possibilities of 
response in the desired respect."   That is to say, 
we perceive or feel God's preferences, the divine 
"weighting," concerning all possibilities for action.  
Now this is actually a different notion than that of 
"imposing limits" or "fixing
 There is at least one passage of Hartshorne's 
which seems to diverge from his usual position that God 
to a large extent decides for the creatures what is in 
their best interests, leaving to them 
 a range of possibilities" 
in the sense of excluding all others as real 
possibilities for us, which is the sense these phrases 
naturally suggest.  Instead, in Whiteheadian fashion, 
apparently all possibilities are open and one could 
theoretically resist the ones favored by God.  But to 
the extent that Hartshorne opts for this model as the 
way God "sets limits," he apparently believes that 
statistically all or at least enough would choose 
within a desired range so as to ensure that a 
particular world order would continue as long as God 
desired.  Even this kind of inevitability goes further 
than Whitehead. 
comparatively 
small or trivial decisions, by either actually limiting 
the range of possibilities or by weighting certain 
possibilities heavily.  In this passage creaturely 
judgments that their best interests are not in choosing 
the negativities of disorder is important for even the 
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basic structure of the world:  "They submit to partial 
control because they want to 
xxxix
be, and they cannot be 
except within an ordered and adequately inclusive 
experience."  
 As to how God influences and sets limits on us, 
I will sum up the relevant material that has been pre-
sented in the background section at the start of the 
chapter, in recent paragraphs, and elsewhere in the 
chapter:  We perceive God as object or datum of the 
immediate past, which consists of God's synthesis of 
past creaturely and divine states and a "partly new 
ideal or order of preference" for possibilities of 
action for us, so that we feel "what God as of this 
moment desiderates."xl  In addition there is for 
Hartshorne a sense in which God influences or attracts 
us that can be distinguished from summing up the past 
in a particular creative synthesis that includes 
preferences concerning possibilities, though it 
complements and could be regarded as a part of that.  
It is by our sensing that God appreciates or enjoys or 
loves us.xli  God's appreciation of what we choose is 
something that occurs in the present, or will occur in 
the immediate future for the later Hartshorne, and not 
something that the divine datum of the immediate past 
will do.  It could be, though, that part of perceiving 
that datum is the realization that, as God has included 
all past creaturely values in the divine experience, 
God will do the same for our present.  And knowing that 
God appreciates and will "everlastingly cherish"xlii the 
creaturely lives is incentive to choose possibilities 
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that are preferred by God, though in itself that tells 
us nothing of what the preferences of a particular 
creative divine synthesis are.  Here follows a long 
passage covering the importance for us of being known 
and enjoyed by God: 
...we know we are (or will be) known; our being 
entirely known is itself known by us.  We enjoy 
God's enjoyment of ourselves.  This enjoyment-
of-being-enjoyed is the essential factor in all 
our enjoyment.... Who is so happy as the 
successful singer or actor in the hours of 
imparting supreme joy to multitudes!  How much 
more is the value of living due to the secret, 
yet ever-present sense of being given, with all 
our joy and sorrow, to God!  For, other men 
being also similarly given to God, whatever joy 
we impart to them we also impart to deity.  And 
only God can adequately enjoy our joy at all 
times, and forever thereafter through the divine 
memory, which alone never loses what it has once 
possessed.xliii 
 Hartshorne indicates that we do "not have the 
divine as a clear and distinct datum" but instead as "a 
vague environment," analogous to what he imagines the 
relationship of a human cell (which is sentient for 
Hartshorne) is to our thoughts and desires.xliv  We have 
just seen Hartshorne refer to the "secret" sense of 
being enjoyed by God.  He carries this type of thinking 
further by speaking of our prehension of divine syn-
theses in general and of our sense of God's sympathetic 
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love and our returning this love as "subconscious" or 
"unconscious."  On the first score, he writes, "...per- 
sons in the world in the depths of their largely un-
conscious feelings take account of the divine reaction 
to them."
xlvii
xlv  And he pens, "The 'monarch' sees to it 
there is enough involuntary or unconscious cooperation 
to make voluntary forms of cooperation possible without 
intolerable risks."xlvi  (The influence of the non-
divine individuals upon each other also involves "more 
or less unconscious prehensions."   
...to be is to know (feel) oneself as known.  
Our dependence on God is simply the radical or 
supreme aspect (for that very reason largely un-
conscious since if--
xlviii
On our sense of 
God's sympathetic awareness, Hartshorne avows, 
per impossible--we were 
fully conscious of it we should be God) of this 
familiar phenomenon, that our being for 
ourselves essentially or constitutively includes 
our being-for-others.  
Our responding love, too, is "subconscious":  "...we 
know ourselves and everything else in relation to our 
dim but direct sense of God's love, with which we are 
one by our subconscious but inalienable returning love 
for him."xlix  Or "unconscious":  "Because only God can 
appreciate us fully, we unconsciously respond to this 
appreciation as we do to no other."l  Also, Hartshorne 
avers that "God has power over us because we cannot but 
love him, at least unconsciously."li
 Hartshorne has envisaged a very effective divine 
governance of the universe, involving a substantial 
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amount of control over or setting of limits upon the 
creatures, that ensures its continuing existence and 
overall beatitude.  My criticism will be directed to 
whether his model of divine governance is conducive to 
such perfect control.  I will first be concerned with 
its internal clarity and consistency, for we need to 
know clearly how God governs under this model in order 
to evaluate whether this rule is optimal.  I will then 
trace out one of its possible internal implications, 
one which is not favorable to a perfect control that 
guarantees the ongoing existence, let alone the good-
ness, of the universe.  I will next examine whether a 
basic facet of Hartshorne's model squares with our 
actual experience.  For, even if Hartshorne's model 
internally or theoretically allows for a coherent way 
in which God might perfectly govern a possible world, 
if this is not compatible with experience in the real 
world, he has not offered a viable conception of how 
God perfectly administers the world.  Finally, I will 
consider an aspect of Hartshorne's thought that entails 
unclarity in wording and nonconformity with experience 
and more importantly--panentheistically speaking--that 
entails a denial of any truly direct and immediate 
shaping of the world by God.  Some direct and immediate 
shaping of the world being a natural concomitant of a 
panentheistically active God, I will conclude by 
attempting to clarify Hartshorne's one-time and 
seemingly out of character affirmation of God's 
"unmediated" and "direct control of every part of the 
universe." 
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 Hartshorne is not at all explicit or concrete as 
to how or, in what sense, God synthesizes the many 
creaturely decisions into a whole.  Particularly, how 
does God's synthesis of decisions after they have been 
made bring more unity and wholeness than had to be 
there in the first place for these decisions to be made 
within a socially interconnected world?  Of course, 
that these decisions were within a unified world could 
be referred back to a previous synthesis.  But the 
question remains as to what unifying synthesizing God 
does in this round beyond what unity was already there 
in the previous round and back to the time when the 
basic spatial continuity and basic order of the 
universe were established.  Of course, we are not God 
and cannot with anything approaching full concreteness 
know or imagine how God synthesizes, if that is what 
God essentially does in perceiving the creatures.  But 
Hartshorne might have made a little more of an effort 
here. 
 One might mention God's weighting of possibili-
ties, God's "order of preferences," in answer to how 
God synthesizes.  However, this weighting presumes a 
whole with attendant possibilities; it would seem to 
follow the synthesis of the many creaturely decisions 
into one whole.  The preceding points to the fact that 
if the evaluation of possibilities is the only divine 
deciding, then God "synthesizes" in at best an 
attenuated sense.  Certainly God would not be 
synthesizing the many creaturely decisions into one 
whole, as Hartshorne posits.  The only "synthesis" by 
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God would be of creaturely decisions, which already 
were a whole and carried their own possibilities, and 
the divine preferences regarding these possibilities. 
 From the standpoint of consistency, it is a 
definite weakness that Hartshorne never picks--or even 
recognizes the discrepancy--between divine choices as 
making real certain possibilities and precluding others 
versus as only weighting possibilities (though thinkers 
can sometimes be more fecund for others by such incon-
sistency--or at least they provide topics for books).  
This conflict is manifested in widely divergent state-
ments.  On the one hand, Hartshorne indicates that God 
decides what is to even be a definite possibility.lii  
And he pronounces that God "imposes limits" and does 
"impose and maintain laws of nature"liii and speaks of 
"constraint"liv and "involuntary cooperation" in connec-
tion with God's power over the creatures.  On the other 
hand, Hartshorne speaks even of the laws of nature in 
terms of inspiration, one instance of which has preced-
ed,lv in line with the declarations that "all that God 
can directly give us is the beauty of his ideal for 
us"lvi and that all divine--or any--power is "the direct 
and indirect workings of persuasion."lvii  (In relation 
to creaturely power, that is certainly a gross 
overstatement.  Even philosophically speaking, does it 
make sense to say my head or its constituents are 
"persuaded" to move when hit by a baseball bat?  In 
relation to the divine power, perhaps by "indirect 
workings" Hartshorne meant that which is not persuasion 
at all, but which determines the basic order that makes 
 Criticism of Hartshorne on the Active Aspect  185 
 
divine persuasion possible.  But if so, he should have 
been much clearer.) 
 There may be a basis on which God as only assig-
n-ing preferences to, rather than as determining, pos-
sibilities might be able to effect the same result as 
if doing the latter, might be just as "irresistible" 
and able to put creaturely choices within narrow 
bounds--though the distinction between the two and 
Hartshorne's failure to note it would still stand.  And 
so would the inappropriateness of "imposition," 
"constraint," and "involuntariness" or of God's 
deciding what is to be a definite possibility, if God 
exercises influence only by offering preferences 
concerning possibilities.  It might be posited that, 
though God does not preclude any possibilities by God's 
synthesis, but allows all possibilities not cut off by 
creaturely choices to be prehended, the creatures will 
find God's preferred choices so supremely attractive 
that there is absolutely no chance that a creature will 
choose possibilities low on God's order of preferences, 
even though these are definite and real.  I will not 
say that that notion is incoherent, though it certainly 
is controversial and should have been specifically 
described and argued-for by Hartshorne, if that is at 
bottom his position.  If this above notion of 
irresistible attractiveness cannot be sustained, then 
the arguments and conclusions of the following 
paragraph must hold sway. 
 I have examined Hartshorne's model of divine 
governance in regard to internal consistency.  I will 
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now draw out the implications of one of Hartshorne's 
conflicting sides:  If God only governs by letting the 
creatures know or feel divine preferences regarding 
possibilities, rather than determining possibilities, 
then, strictly speaking, God would not set (optimal) 
limits on the creatures' freedom, as Hartshorne often 
states.  For whatever the strength of God's desire, 
whatever the probability, that a creature would choose 
a certain possibility, it would be possible for the 
creature to opt for the possibility least desired by 
God.  And, however unlikely, cosmically it would be 
possible for the creatures as a whole to make a 
decision that did not fall within the range of "limits" 
God desires.  (The universe would not be "inevitably 
inspired to adopt" natural laws selected by God.)  This 
is the Whiteheadian position.  And Lewis S. Ford, who 
defends it against the strain in Hartshorne wherein God 
imposes the laws of nature,lviii is willing--or almost 
willing--to accept the consequences:  "The world could 
possibly generate into near chaos..."lix  I do not see 
how stopping at "near chaos" can be justified.  Harts-
horne's remark, in one of his most Whiteheadian moments 
on this subject, that the creatures accept some control 
because they want to exist, suggests a possible jus-
tification.  But how can the desire to exist be guaran-
teed to countervail creaturely ignorance about just how 
close destruction might be and about how a particular 
decision might impinge upon this, as well as creaturely 
willingness to take a chance on destruction in order to 
satisfy an immediate desire for a selfish good?  Chaos 
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and destruction of the universe would seem to be a 
possibility in this model.  Another comment by Ford 
appears to accept even that consequence:  "The forces 
of evil could conceivably overwhelm God.  Against that 
there is no metaphysical guarantee."lx
 Having considered Hartshorne's model of divine 
governance internally, I now turn to its relationship--
or lack thereof--to experience.  In a fundamental way--
in its great reliance on our knowledge, feeling, or 
prehension of God--Hartshorne's model does not square 
with our experience.  To the extent that God's 
influence depends upon prehension of divine desires and 
divine appreciation of our lives, the problem is fairly 
obvious.  Human beings are the only known earthly 
creatures who can consciously or explicitly base their 
decisions on awareness of God's will and memory, and on 
the whole they do so infrequently.  By claiming that 
such awareness is for the most part "subconscious" or 
"unconscious," Hartshorne makes his position harder to 
attack, especially for someone like me who strongly 
senses the deep tacit and implicit element in 
perception and knowing.  But Hartshorne's position that 
even animals have an intuitive knowledge of God strikes 
  But if God is 
sovereign, God's perfect love must be united with power 
to ensure the ultimate fruition of this love.  Harts-
horne is right in maintaining that God must have power 
to ensure both the continued existence and overall 
goodness of the universe, even if his understanding of 
how God exercises power is insufficient to that inten-
tion. 
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me as counterintuitive.  To make credible his position, 
 Hartshorne would have to offer some "psychoanalysis" 
of our experience that causes an "aha," that brings to 
consciousness the sense of God's preferences and en-
joyment of us that was on a nonconscious level in a 
past experience, and in such a way that we see all our 
experiences in those terms and have some sense of how 
the least of subhuman creatures likewise sense God's 
wishes and appreciation.  This Hartshorne does not 
attempt, as far as I can see.  And even if one were 
convinced of the universality of awareness of the 
divine thoughts and memory, there are still the 
questions of whether such awareness is strong or full 
enough to potentially have much effect on behavior and, 
if so, whether in actuality it does
 There are problems with placing God's influence 
on perception solely on the side of that which is ap-
pre-hended, solely on God as molding God's self as 
 have much effect. 
object of our perception.  Hartshorne's model of 
perception and causation seems to entail a wholly 
amorphous or unlimited subject in the present which is 
shaped or defined by its perception of a datum or 
object from the past.  Even all bodily cells and prior 
states of a said individual are part of the overall 
datum for Hartshorne.  But does not the perceiver in 
some sense bring its own structure to whatever it 
perceives?  And must not God have a role in determining 
that structure, if only through selection of basic 
laws, including those relating to sentience in the 
universe?  (Insofar as creaturely free choices have 
 Criticism of Hartshorne on the Active Aspect  189 
 
played a part in the evolution of a species, God would 
not have the sole responsibility in determining the 
perceptual structure of that species).  This would 
entail that God in some sense is acting immediately and 
directly in the present in determining the nature of 
things, at least if God's empowerment is understood 
panentheistically, and not only by being a past datum 
(if God's syntheses of past creaturely decisions are 
needed at all for that purpose).  I should add that the 
structure of the perceiver cannot be unambiguously 
separated from the structure of the world that is 
perceived; these are correlative. 
 I will close this section by investigating 
whether God's governance of creation can be said to be 
direct or immediate for Hartshorne.  His basic 
position, that God's decisions and actions shape the 
world only by being (past) object to the creatives, 
seems irreconcilable with direct or unmediated control 
in an active panentheistic sense.  Yet we have seen 
Hartshorne declare that "omnipotence could only be 
direct control of every part of the universe, since 
indirect control is subject to the imperfections 
inhering in all instruments."lxi  In the same section of 
Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism, he writes 
of God's controlling the world by "direct power of his 
will, feeling, and knowledge" (eminently analogous to 
the way we control our nerve cells, believes 
Hartshorne).lxii  I believe that Hartshorne's use of 
such language in this early work reflects his sensing 
on one level that a panentheistic understanding of God 
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requires divine power and activity and control to be 
direct and immediate with respect to the creatures.  
While Hartshorne is not explicit about what "directness 
and immediacy" mean, they can be interpreted in a way 
consistent with his Whiteheadian views on causation and 
ultimate causation.  Hartshorne refers to indirect 
power or control as "through intermediaries, or 
'instruments.'"lxiii  The directness and nonmediation 
may mean that we perceive the (past) divine datum with 
its inclusive "knowledge" and its "will" or preferences 
apart from "intermediaries" or "instruments."  This 
then would be in keeping with Hartshorne's position 
elsewhere, that God's control is only as passive (past) 
object not present active subject, that all of God's 
control is in fact mediated
 
 through our prehension of 
God.  Just above we have seen the need for a genuinely 
immediate and direct divine governing of creation, in 
addition to whatever comparatively indirect influence 
God exercises through creaturely perceiving of God.  Of 
course, in panentheism, our awareness of God as object, 
as with our exercise of indeterminate freedom, is a 
part of or manifestation of God's power, though these 
are distinguished from God's direct and immediate 
shaping of things beyond our ken. 
 
 
Other Undermining of the Divine Majesty 
 I will close this chapter by discussing ways in 
which Hartshorne does not do justice to the divine 
majesty and ultimacy that do not directly relate to 
 Criticism of Hartshorne on the Active Aspect  191 
 
either divine immediate and coinhering empowerment of 
everything or governing of the universe.  And these do 
not specifically involve doing injustice to the active 
aspect as contrasted to the passive.  However, insofar 
as a sense of God's awe-inspiring majesty and holiness 
arises from God's ultimate power, the power of self-
existence and empowerment of all, and insofar as the 
all-inclusiveness and majestic nature of the passive 
aspect rests upon this ultimate power, the following 
problems are symptomatic of his not giving the active 
aspect of divine power its full due. 
 Tillich indicated that liberal Protestantism had 
taken away the numinous and awe-inspiring character of 
God by reducing divine holiness to just moral goodness 
or righteousness.lxiv  Hartshorne falls into this liber-
al Protestant tradition by using God's "holiness" only 
in the sense of righteousness.lxv
 The following is perhaps Hartshorne's least 
fortuitous phrase:  "This strict 
  Just how much can be 
read into this is not easy to say.  To some extent he 
may have been using the word in the usual way of his 
culture.  Yet he was not unaware of other, and less 
circumscribed, senses of holiness.  It is fairly safe 
to say that Hartshorne's use of "holiness" shows 
liberal Protestant influence upon him and is a manifes-
tation of a tendency to slight God's majesty and power. 
logical 
incomparability of deity is his unapproachable 
majesty."lxvi  (Emphasis his.)  Hartshorne is correct 
that God's unsurpassability can be expressed logically 
or abstractly as a difference in principle.  But to 
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imply that that is all there is to it undercuts the 
majesty and power of God in its concreteness and our 
emotion-laden and intuitive sense of this.  That remark 
is not representative.  We have seen more sensitive and 
holistic statements on God's unsurpassability, 
including God's power, that evoke a sense of the divine 
majesty and holiness.  Yet this above declaration is an 
extreme manifestation of a tendency to shortchange the 
divine grandeur.  
 Finally, Hartshorne undercuts God's ultimacy, 
transcendence, and majesty by restricting God's reality 
and enjoyment of value to God's relationship with the 
universe.  He reacts against any notion that God's 
absoluteness consists of anything in addition to "the 
eternal adequacy of type in the divine relational 
acts,"lxvii
lxviii
 that God as absolute "is more than the su-
preme as relative to the world."   
 The limiting of God to relationship to the world 
is manifested in the identification of God with the 
"universe"
The only way in 
which he implicitly backs away from this understanding 
of God's absoluteness is by holding that God eternally 
knows all logical and mathematical truths and 
apparently derives some aesthetic value from that. 
lxix or "nature"lxx in his earlier works.  In 
doing so, Hartshorne is clear that the universe or 
nature as a whole is an integrated consciousness or a 
person.  In our culture, though, nature or the universe 
is not thought of as aware or personal; this factor may 
be responsible for the absence of the equation of 
either of these with God in later works.  Also, concern 
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lest anyone assume that God does not have some 
indeterminate freedom with respect to the nature of the 
universe or that God's experience is only the sum of 
what happens in the universe (instead of an aesthetic 
synthesis greater than the sum of the parts) may have 
contributed to this change.  But this apparently only 
represents a change in manner of speaking, to avoid 
misinterpretation, not a change in substance. 
 Since I have criticized Hartshorne on the above 
point, it is incumbent upon me to suggest what 
experiences or values, independent of relation to the 
universe, God is thus prevented from having.  With 
Hartshorne, I demur from the notions of actus purus, 
that is, of God eternally realizing all particular 
values, and of a certain type of mysticism, in which 
God's enjoyment is essentially "beyond" any and all 
particular values.  However, contra Hartshorne, I do 
not think God should in principle be limited to having 
just this one universe.  Besides obviously limiting 
God's creative power and possibilities a priori, such 
tying of God by necessity to just this universe and its 
spatiality strikes me as perhaps entailing that God is 
spatial or quasi-spatial, thus undermining Hartshorne's 
panentheistic intention that God not be at a distance 
or separated from anything (not to mention undermining 
God's aseity.)  And apart from the values God derives 
from any and all worlds, both from the creaturely 
experiences per se and divine syntheses of them, I find 
it plausible that God realizes other concrete aesthetic 
values (not just the value of abstract logical and 
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mathematical truths, an idea I find somewhat 
problematic in any case).  That is, very metaphorically 
speaking, God composes music that only God hears and 
paints pictures that only God sees.  This issue will be 
further explored in chapter 6. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
 
 CRITICISM OF TILLICH ON THE PASSIVE ASPECT 
 
 The time has finally come to examine how Tillich 
 undermines his panentheism--that finite reality is 
embraced by and not external to God, that God is 
utterly near to and absolutely participates in each 
creature--especially in relation to the divine 
passivity.  If God fully includes the creatures, who 
are temporal, who have some freedom, and who suffer, 
God must in some degree genuinely be temporal, be 
affected by the creatures, and suffer.  (Though, of 
course, temporality, conditionedness, and suffering 
must apply to God in categorically eminent ways, not in 
the ways these qualities are manifested in the 
creatures.)  My theological mentor in seminary, the 
late Ronald L. Williams, was fond of saying that 
"theologians take away with the left hand what they 
have just given you with the right."  Tillich could be 
used as a prime example of that saying as far as the 
issues of this chapter are concerned.  The relevant 
Tillichian material is rife with unclarity, ambiguity, 
and inconsistency. 
 The general plan of the chapter is as follows:  
I will first consider the divine vis-a-vis temporality. 
 Included will be Tillich's uses of phrases such as, 
"God transcends the distinction between potentiality 
and actuality," and, "in God the poles of dynamics and 
form or self-transcendence and self-preservation are 
not in tension," and his descriptions of eternity and 
its relation to time.  I will offer possible 
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interpretations of God's transcending or balancing 
without tension the relevant polarities and categories 
and possible interpretations of God's eternity, and by 
examining key passages, make certain determinations.  
My overall conclusion will be that the balance tips 
toward a divine temporality, and some genuine openness 
of the future, but hardly unequivocally.  Indeed, 
various passages, if interpreted in themselves in the 
most natural manner, are decidedly antitemporal.  It is 
only in the larger context of Tillich's works that 
other interpretations suggest themselves.  And some of 
that larger context will await the final portions of 
this chapter. 
 I will next consider whether Tillich upholds 
genuine creaturely freedom, that is, freedom with an 
element of indeterminacy to it.  My finding will be 
that he does, though not without a few discordant 
notes, particularly in connection with the divine-human 
inter-relationship.  This will add some support to 
openness with regard to the future in the divine life. 
 This affirmation of indeterminacy is in either tension 
or contradiction with the next aspect of Tillich's 
thought to be covered, namely, his holding that the 
creatures do not at all "condition" God.  The 
subsequent topic, that God includes and participates in 
the negativities and sufferings of creation, has an 
aspect which points to Tillich's way of trying to 
reconcile God's inclusion of  creatures who have some 
indeterminacy and who suffer with God's non-
conditionedness by them:  that negativities are 
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overcome or conquered in the divine life.  It is 
pointed to even more clearly when we move to the nature 
of fulfillment in the divine life:  what occurs in 
creation is unambiguously and totally fulfilled by God, 
resulting in total divine blessedness, however well or 
poorly the creatures realize their potentialities, as 
God thoroughly purges the negative element and then 
unites whatever positive element is left with the 
essential potentialities which were not achieved in 
time (but are in eternity). 
 The composite Tillichian position on the issues 
of the chapter then is this:  Creaturely actions are 
not entirely predetermined or foreseen by God and thus 
do processively affect or condition divine knowledge, 
but they do not affect or condition God's experience of 
value or happiness with respect to creation, which is 
maximal however the creatures choose and however much 
they suffer.  I will argue that this represents a 




Divine Temporality?:  Open or Closed? 
 The affirmation of a divine temporality is 
crucial for a coherent panentheism:  For if God is 
related to the universe, which is temporal, with utter 
immediacy and directness (of knowledge and power), God 
must be correspondingly temporal, at least in part; 
divine experience must in some sense be processive.  
And unless everything is wholly predetermined or 
foreseen, this temporality must have some openness to 
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the future. 
 Tillich expresses a clear desire to do more 
justice to temporality in God than does the doctrine of 
actus purus
 Potentiality and actuality appear in clas-
sical theology in the famous formula that God is 
: 
actus purus, the pure form in which everything 
potential is actual, and which is the eternal 
self-intuition of the divine fullness (pleroma). 
 In this formula the dynamic side in the 
dynamics-form polarity is swallowed by the form 
side.  Pure actuality, that is, actuality free 
from any element of potentiality, is a fixed 
result; it is not alive.  Life includes the 
separation of potentiality and actuality.  The 
nature of life is actualization, not actuality. 
 The God who is actus purus is not the living 
God.i
Tillich also rejects 
 
actus purus more briefly on other 
occasionsii and often affirms the "living God"iii (not 
to mention countless references to "the divine life"), 
again combining the two in this declaration:  "...the 
idea of a living God seems to me to contradict the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of God as pure actu-
ality."iv  Tillich thus affirms an element of poten-
tiality,v a "dynamic element,"vi and an element of 
becoming...and consequently an element of 
temporality"vii
 It must be remembered that "life" and attendant 
 in God, which supposedly precludes God's 
being "not alive." 
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terms when applied to God are symbolic (as is anything 
from finitude for Tillich).  In the first instance, 
this reflects a desire that God not become less than 
God in the process of the divine life.  For Tillich the 
finite being actualizes its potentialities less than 
perfectly:  its existence falls short of its essence; 
it is "fall-en."  But God "is not subjected to a 
conflict between essence and existing....  His 
existence, his standing out of his essence, is an 
expression of his essence.  Essentially, he actualizes 
himself."viii  It was this concern that God's existence 
not be less than essence, that is manifested, though 
improperly or too extremely, in the Scholastic idea of 
actus purus, indicates Tillich.ix
 A key aspect or movement of life, related to 
that of the movement from potentiality to actuality, or 
actualization, is that of dynamics in polarity with 
form.  This is also expressed by related polarities of 
self-alteration and self-identity, self-transcendence 
and self-preservation, and going out of or separating 
from and returning to or reuniting with oneself.  
Tillich applies all of these to God.
 
x
 The dynamic character of being implies the 
tendency of everything to transcend itself and 
to create new forms.  At the same time 
everything tends to conserve its own form as the 
basis of its self-transcendence.  It tends to 
  Before proceed-
ing further, it may be helpful to let Tillich briefly 
describe this polar relationship of dynamics and form 
in general: 
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unite identity and difference, rest and 
movement, conservation and change.  Therefore, 
it is impossible to speak of being without also 
speaking of becoming.xi
However, in finite life the uniting or balancing of 
these polarities, as with all polarities, is relative 
or imperfect; the poles are always in "tension."  And 
this tension tends to "disruption" of the poles, to 
rigidity and stagnation or recklessness and chaos, 
depending upon which pole is emphasized.
 
xii  And, with 
respect to an individual, if the polar imbalance is 
severe enough, the result is fatal:  "Inhibition of 
growth ultimately destroys the being which does not 
grow.  Misguided growth destroys itself and that which 
transcends itself without self-conservation."xiii  The 
creature can "lose itself"xiv relatively--which it 
always does to some extent in Tillich's opinion--or 
absolutely.  But these problems of creaturely 
actualization cannot be applied to divine 
actualization.  God "does not lose his identity in his 
self alteration."xv  God "is dynamic not in tension 
with form but in an absolute and unconditional unity 
with form, so that his self-transcendence never is in 
tension with his self-preservation, so that he always 
remains God."xvi
threatens the other, nor is there a threat of 
disruption.  In terms of self-preservation one 
could say that God cannot cease to be God.  His 
going-out from himself does not diminish or 
  Similarly, "neither side" of the 
dynamics-form polarity  
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destroy his divinity.  It is united with the 
eternal "resting in himself."xvii
What we have seen so far on dynamics and form--and 
earlier on potentiality and actuality--does not deny 
and in fact seems to demand some temporality and change 
in the divine life.  (And Tillich does accept Peter 
Bertocci's "statement that 'God [is] that kind of 
creativity that endures through change.'"xviii)  Tillich 
seems to be saying that actualization and self
 
-
 His criticism of process thought concerning the 
relation of dynamics and form, in volume 1 of the 
transcendence on the basis of self-conservation do not 
have the pitfalls they do in the case of the creatures 
but they do apply to God in a perfect way.  His 
principal concern appears to be to avoid attributing 
the "tension" involved in normal dynamics-form, with 
its threat of "disruption," to the divine life and 
instead attribute a perfect balance. 
Systematic, reflects this concern that there be not 
tension but perfect balance.  As such, though it is 
somewhat misinformed and unfair, it is not antiprocess. 
 Tillich speaks of some who "try to distinguish" a 
dynamic and a form element and "assert that in so far 
as God is a living God, these two elements must remain 
in tension."xix  He then mentions Hartshorne and "the 
contingent" as "an expression of what we have called 
'dynamics.'"xx  Actually Hartshorne does not posit the 
necessary and contingent in God as "in tension" but 
rather as in perfect harmony.  Each contingent divine 
state necessarily embodies the perfect abstract divine 
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essence.  To borrow Tillich's phrase, God's standing 
out of the divine essence is an expression of that 
essence. 
 Tillich also criticizes 
 ...a nonsymbolic, ontological doctrine of God 
as becoming.  If we say that being is actual as 
life, the element of self-transcendence is 
obviously and emphatically included.  But it is 
not in balance with becoming.  Being comprises 
becoming and rest, becoming as an implication of 
dynamics and rest as an implication of form.  If 
we say that God is being-itself, this includes 
both rest and becoming, both the static and dy-
namic elements.  However, to speak of a "becom-
ing" God disrupts the balance between dynamics 
and form and subjects God to a process which has 
the character of a fate or which is completely 
open to the future and has the character of an 
absolute accident.xxi
The preceding quotation need not signal any substantial 
disagreement between Tillich and Hartshorne.  For 
Hartshorne, becoming includes both an element of fixity 
or abstract "being" and an element of motion.  Which is 
to say that the discrepancy may be essentially verbal. 
 Tillich himself suspects "that the discussion about 
'being' and 'becoming' as basic concepts is merely 
verbal."
 
xxii  In this dialogue both make concessions 
suggestive of that.  Apparently because "becoming" in 
this particular connection suggests an imbalance of 
motion over fixity (which is how Tillich had used it), 
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Hartshorne concedes, 
 It is doubtless best, as Tillich says, not to 
speak of a "becoming God" (translated from 
Scheler's German?), because this suggests that 
perhaps God can be born, ...or...could 
degenerate or die,...or, as our author puts it, 
that God is subject to a process which...is 
completely open to the future and has the 
character of an absolute accident.xxiii 
For his part, while maintaining that being as the 
negation of nonbeing precedes in "logical" or "onto-
logical" dignity any characterization of being, such as 
the polarity of dynamics and form, that being said, 
Tillich is "not disinclined to accept the process-
character of being-itself."xxiv  Indeed, he affirms 
that, "if being means static self-identity [which is 
how Hartshorne uses it], becoming must be the ultimate 
principle."xxv
 But all of the section to this point hides an 
ambiguity.  One would normally assume that 
actualization and dynamics involve various real 
potentialities, only some of which will be actualized, 
and various paths "dynamics" might take within the 
limits set by "form."  But it might be posited 
  This seems to uphold Hartshorne's 
insistence that a whole which includes both fixity and 
motion must overall change or become, rather than 
compositely be a static or changeless identity.  So 
even the above criticism of process thought contains 
nothing to gainsay temporality and change in God and, 
indeed, seems to demand it. 
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otherwise.  Suppose there is just one real possibility 
for the divine actualization, its standing out of its 
essence.  That is, the divine life, including all that 
happens in the universe which is embraced by that life 
(indeed it is only via creation, the positing of 
"nonbeing" or "otherness," that God for Tillich "lives 
in the first place"
xxvii
xxviii
xxvi), consists of the temporal or 
processive execution of an eternally totally 
predetermined--or at least foreseen--plan.  If we use 
the description of Tillich's God as a "dynamic form" by 
Edgar A. Towne  or an "inexhaustible form" by James 
Luther Adams  
 Note how this differs, perhaps subtly, from what 
I will call "classical eternity," a corollary of 
and picture it as extending through 
all time (which is probably infinite for Tillich--at 
the very least he rules out any positing of or 
speculation about a beginning or end to creation at a 
particular moment of time), this would be an eternally 
preplanned and set dynamic form.  Form, as it were, 
would determine to the last iota the direction of 
dynamics.  This is a "closed temporality." 
actus 
purus.  In actus purus, if it is stipulated that part 
of God's eternally actualized and unchanging experience 
consists of knowing the world, then the whole of 
creation through all time is already and always actual 
from the divine perspective, but, from our (deficient 
or illusory?) perspective, to be acted out in time.  
The actual relation of God to the world for God would 
not be at all temporal or processive.  This presents 
the, I believe, insurmountable incoherency of trying to 
 Criticism of Tillich on the Passive Aspect  211 
 
relate the utterly unchanging to the changing, the 
literally timeless to the temporal.  But in a closed 
temporality, God's eternal vision is to be acted out or 
actualized in time--from the divine perspective, not 
just the creaturely--instead of an actuality already in 
every sense real or accomplished.  God, as the driver, 
comes along for the ride through time, so to speak.  
God is processively related to the universe, knowing 
when a stage of the unfolding actually occurs, knowing 
whether or not a particular stage has been or has yet 
to be actualized in time.  For classical theology, on 
the other hand, to ask if God knows when something now 
happens or knows whether it has yet
 But what reason is there to think that Tillich 
may be going against the normal assumption regarding 
actualization?  What reason to think that the require-
ments that the poles of dynamics and form be without 
tension or in perfect balance or unity, and that God 
not cease to be God in going out of God's self, can 
only be met by a closed dynamic form?  Actually, as the 
reader may suspect, for the purposes of organizing our 
discussion, I have been preventing Tillich's left hand 
from obfuscating what he has been giving us with the 
right.  One could not read too much by Tillich in this 
area without seeing ambiguity and perhaps 
inconsistency. 
 happened for us 
temporal creatures is to speak improperly, for God is 
eternal in a timeless sense; all "times" of creation 
are eternally and equally actual for God. 
 Much of Tillich's language on God's relationship 
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to the ontological polarities generically (which 
include dynamics and form along with freedom--destiny 
and individualization--participation) suggests either a 
closed temporality or classical eternity.  His claim 





xxix if applied to dynamics-form 
would rule out an open temporality, which requires some 
distinctness of the two poles such that form does not 
wholly predetermine the path of dynamics.  His state-
ments that God "transcends"xxx or "is not subject to"xxxi 
the polarities or that they "disappear" in God,  if 
taken at their face value, would mean that the polarity 
of dynamics and form does not apply to the divine life, 
as in classical eternity.  On the latter score, though, 
I suspect, from his respective descriptions of the 
three polarities vis-a-vis God  and the phrases to 
be immediately quoted, that it is the polarities only 
insofar as "in tension" with a "threat of 
dissolution"  that are transcended, and not the 
polarities absolutely.  (In that case, "disappear" 
would only suggest that operationally the poles have no 
disharmonious separation.  Transcendence and nonsubjec-
tion would then be compatible with either a closed or 
open temporality, depending upon what the criterion for 
nontension was.)  Moreover, precisely because the above 
remarks are not made specifically about dynamics and 
form, they can only provide fairly indirect and tenuous 
evidence in favor of even a closed temporality (versus 
an open one).  But at the least, Tillich's language 
here is careless and ambiguous. 
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 More serious problems attend a basic and common 
type of Tillichian phrase specifically on the relation-
ship of potentiality and actuality in the divine life. 




xxxv or "difference"  between poten-
tiality and actuality, or, in shorthand, that God 
transcends potentiality and actuality,  or that 
there is "no distinction"  or "no difference"  
between them in the divine life.  Since Tillich 
indicated that it is the separation of potentiality and 
actuality characterizing life that separates the living 
God from actus purus, one may be ready to throw up 
one's arms in exasperation.xl  And the most obvious, 
which in this case is the strictest, interpretation of 
such phrases taken just in themselves yields actus 
purus.  If there is no
 Let us now examine how the concept of a closed 
temporality stands in relation to such phrases.  There 
is here a sense in which potentiality and actuality are 
distinct for God.  Knowledge that a particular stage of 
process has been actualized becomes actual only when it 
is actualized and before then is potential.  But in the 
sense of content or scope, there is no distinction or 
difference between potentiality and actuality.  That 
is, every real potentiality will become actual in its 
 distinction in any sense, if God 
wholly transcends any such distinction, then the 
unavoidable implication is that all real potentialities 
are already or eternally (in this case meaning without 
involving any passage of time) actual or actualized in 
every sense. 
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time.  So this model allows for a strict, though not 
absolutely strict, interpretation that does justice to 
the claim that God transcends the distinction between 
potentiality and actuality. 
 Now consider the following model vis-a-vis that 
formula:  There is some indeterminate creaturely 
freedom, thus entailing that there are real potentiali-
ties for the divine life, regarding its knowledge, that 
do not become actualized.  (For example, God as knowing 
that a person picks A rather than B at a particular 
time cannot become actual if the person opts for B.)  
However, no matter how the creatures utilize their 
freedom, God derives maximal fulfillment and happiness 
from each juncture of the unfolding of creation.  That, 
I believe, is Tillich's view.  And if God is assured of 
realizing a maximum of value from each stage of this 
unfolding, can God eternally possess a maximum of 
happiness with regard to the creation as extending 
through all time?  This is perhaps Tillich's view.  
(This would be an actus purus with respect to value 
rather than just a closed temporality in that respect.) 
 God's maximal happiness or possession of value is 
either assured or complete in the mosaic of the divine 
life, but free creaturely decisions and God's knowledge 
of them are filled in only when the decisions are made. 
 Since God always maximally actualizes potentialities 
with regard to value, there is "no distinction" or 
"difference" between potentiality and actuality in a 
fairly strict sense that at least would do no great 
injustice to that formula. 
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 So the apparent options to ascribe to Tillich 
are classical eternity, closed temporality, and open 
temporality (though closed with regard to the divine 
beatitude).  But why not dismiss out of hand the 
strictest reading of the transcendence of the 
difference between potentiality and actuality--
classical eternity--after Tillich has rejected 
xliii
actus 
purus and has applied dynamics-form in perfect harmony 
and balance to God?  Well, there is the strain in 
Tillich wherein we can only know God in relation to us 
but not in God's self.  This strain is manifested in a 
couple of agnostic comments on God and time:  1) "I 
really do not know what past and future are in the 
ground of being.  I only know they are rooted in it."xli 
 2) "...the question of a 'before' or 'after' in God 
cannot be answered,..."xlii  This can create some 
suspicion that the following is Tillich's view:  "For 
us" God is naturally thought of and "sym-bolically" 
spoken of as being processively or dynamically related, 
because we are temporal, but God's own experience of 
this relation is not processive, but strictly 
unchanging--or at least we do not know whether God's 
experience is processive.  Moreover, Raphael Demos 
proposes a sense in which he believes Tillich is using 
"dynamics" that is compatible with a nonprocessive 
eternity.  He suspects that the only dynamism is the 
dialectical positing and overcoming of "nonbeing" in 
the divine life:  "But I think by dynamism the author 
means dialectical movement, and that, of course, is 
lacking in the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception."  
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 "...but dialectical movement ('the inner movement of 
the divine life') is timeless."xliv  It is true that 
God's dynamic element and God's not remaining in 
"immovable" or "dead identity" are sometimes associated 
with this relation to nonbeing.xlv
 But despite the "agnostic" strain in Tillich, 
there are some reasons why classical eternity should be 
discarded.  His specific and rather frequent 
application of dynamics-form to the divine life, his 
rejection of 
  If Demos is correct, 
Tillich's agreement with Hartshorne that becoming must 
be the ultimate principle, if being means static self-
identity, could be reconciled with an atemporal divine 
life.  On the other hand, the association of dynamic 
self-transcendence with nonbeing in itself says nothing 
against this self-transcendence as involving a real 
temporal aspect.  Demos' remark does point to a not 
insignificant point:  However inadequate Tillich's 
treatment of time, freedom, and the divine 
participation in negativity, Tillich does improve on 
classical theology simply by holding that there is 
nonbeing in the divine life. 
actus purus
 This leaves two main contenders.  One is a 
--that "everything potential is 
actual," and his endorsement of becoming as the 
ultimate principle, over being as static, certainly 
count for something.  A later section on the relation 
of time and eternity will favor temporality--albeit 
ambiguously.  Other important evidence is his basic 
panentheistic temperament, as with his characterization 
of God as absolute participant (in temporal creatures). 
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closed temporality in which in every sense every real 
potentiality will be actualized in its time, as God 
temporally enacts an eternal plan that predetermines or 
foresees each creaturely actualization.  This at least 
would allow for a processive and nonexternal 
relationship of God to creation--but only if novelty 
and indeterminate freedom are denied.  Since Tillich on 
the whole upholds such freedom, this would entail quite 
a contradiction.  In any case, this closed temporality 
would be an improvement over classical eternity--yet 
not a very satisfying improvement.  If we think again 
in terms of a "dynamic" or "inexhaustible form," this 
eternally given "inexhaustible form" would, in a very 
real sense, be eternally exhausted and not very 
"dynamic."  Though God would be temporally involved in 
its execution, in its substance it would be a "fixed 
result," to hark back to Tillich's critique of actus 
purus.  Though more politely than in actus purus
 The other option is that there are real poten-
tialities that the creatures may not actualize and thus 
real potentialities for the divine knowledge of the 
creatures that may not be actualized, though God is 
maximally happy, maximally fulfills divine poten-
tialities, despite how the creatures actualize theirs. 
 (Ruled out by foresight is God as optimally fulfilling 
potentialities by doing all that can and should be done 
by God, but not necessarily maximally fulfilling poten-
, form 
would swallow dynamics, rest would swallow motion, 
actuality would swallow potentiality, and eternity 
would swallow time. 
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tialities in every sense, due to creaturely decisions 
having a role in the degree of divine beatitude.)  This 
would allow for a processive and nonexternal relation-
ship to the temporal world as productive of novelty. 
 Which is it?  Is there any openness, or is the 
universe and the divine life a totally closed system 
for Tillich?  Some general statements on the polarities 
favor closedness.  But these are general rather than 
specifically on dynamics and form.  The stricter and 
more obvious interpretation of the transcendence of the 
distinction between potentiality and actuality favors 
closedness.  However, a closedness with respect to the 
divine actualization of value but not to knowledge of 
the creatures, though not an option that obviously 
presents itself, would provide a fairly strict reading. 
 We need to look at Tillichian passages that clearly 
point one way or the other--to openness or closedness. 
 We will look first at passages that refer to poten-
tial-ity and actuality or dynamics and form in 
connection with God.  Then Tillich's characterization 
of eternity and its relationship to time will be probed 
(including also the question of whether any of this 
favors classical eternity).  "I put before you life or 
death," said God.  The question put before us is 
whether Tillich's God has any claim to be the living 
God or is in fact "dead." 
 Our first bit of evidence, from two different 
sources, is somewhat indirect.  Tillich starts by 
mentioning "self-transcendence" or "self-creativity" in 
the creaturely case as involving some openness.  Self-
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transcendence or growth, the movement from form to 
form, is not completely determined by self-preservative 
"forms of growth," but involves a gap and "risk"; 




Similarly, growth is not "a continuous series of forms 
alone"; it "is made possible only by breaking through 
the limits of an old form," by "a moment of 'chaos' 
between the old and the new form."   He then applies 
this element of "risk" or "chaos" to God.  God 
symbolically takes a risk with the creation.   At 
least part of why this is "symbolic," I would propose, 
is that there will be a maximal fulfillment, no matter 
what the creatures do.  This receives some support from 
the other source:  "...in the divine life the element 
of chaos does not endanger its eternal 
fulfillment..."xlix
It belongs certainly to the possibility of 
finite freedom to fail; and therefore one can 
say that God may fail in what he intends to do 
through men and mankind.  But there is the 
transcending certainty that in spite of every 
individual and group failure, an ultimate 
  But that "risk" or "chaos"--that 
is, that form does not entirely determine dynamics--
applies at all to the divine life seems to allow for 
some openness, at least in relation to creaturely 
decisions and God's knowledge thereof.  Of course, the 
open or "chaotic" element within the crea-tures 
themselves, who are known by God, provides support for 
that interpretation.  Offering some collaboration on 
all of this is a remark from another context: 
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fulfillment can be expected.l
 In passing, one might ask whether the element of 
"chaos" applies at all to 
 
divine decision making and 
not just to God's inclusion of creatures with freedom. 
 This is secondary to our basic panentheistic concern 
of whether God can include the creaturely world with 
its temporality and relative openness.  But it is not 
totally beside the point.  If there is no temporality 
or indeterminism in God's actual choosing (if God's 
choice is a necessary eternal one to be acted out in 
time that allows creaturely freedom within certain 
limits), then this tends to cast the relative 
indeterminacy of our acting as deficient and to deny 
the value of novelty, insofar as we take God as our 
model, and to lend credence to the idea that God should 
not and does not permit any such openness.  Tillich's 
admittedly few and brief comments on the relevant 
polarity of freedom and destiny are not very assuring. 
 He speaks of "an absolute and unconditional identity" 
of those poles,li of their oneness,lii of their 
disappearing,liii and of losing "the sense of their 
distinction."liv  And he mocks the notion of God as "a 
being who asks himself which of innumerable 
possibilities he shall actualize," thus subjecting God 
to the "split between potentiality and actuality."lv  
Tillich is concerned lest there be "arbitrariness,"lvi 
lest God be "a highest being who is able to do whatever 
he wants."lvii  While the notion of more than one 
optimal or perfect divine choice for a given juncture 
rules out "arbitrariness" in a negative sense, it does 
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involve a certain arbitrariness:  God is called upon to 
choose between equally good--and perhaps "innumerable"-
-possibilities.  The question is whether a lack of 
arbitrariness for Tillich is only met when there is 
just one real option for divine deciding.  The evidence 
above seems to say "yes."  
 We now come back to the main track.  It is time 
for Tillich's left hand to offer an opinion on poten-
tiality-actuality in God: 
But an existence of God which is not united with 
its essence is a contradiction in terms.  It 
makes God a being whose existence does not ful-
fill his essential potentialities; being and 
not-yet-being are "mixed" in him, as they are in 
everything finite.lviii 
The most obvious interpretation of this passage, 
because of the denial of "not-yet-being," is that there 
is absolutely just one particular existence compatible 
with God's essence, that the divine experience is 
closed, the divine knowledge of all time complete.  The 
idea that God always possesses a maximum of value and 
happiness, of "being," though not a complete or 
completed knowledge of just what the creatures will do, 
is granted, not an interpretation suggested by the 
quote itself, yet one that would not do it violent 
injustice by any means.  (Note that an eternal 
possession of all the value of creation through all 
time is more appropriate to this passage than a maximal 
garnering of value from each stage of creation only as 
it is actualized, for this latter would clearly entail 
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not-yet-ness.) 
 The following pronouncement provides a balance 
on the "not-yet" issue:  The divine creativity, 
balancing dynamics and form, "includes a 'not yet' 
which is, however, always balanced by an already within 
the divine life.  It is not an absolute 'not yet,' 
which would make it a divine-demonic power, nor is the 
'already' an absolute already."lixThis is not the most 
precise of theological language.  In the wider context, 
the "absolute 'not yet'" he wants to avoid is a 
"complete openness to the future having the character 
of an absolute accident" that he sees in certain doc-
trines.lx
 There are three passages from the 
  This leaves room for some openness.  And the 
denial of an "absolute already," however poetically, 
upholds some openness. 
Systematic
For the divine ground of being we must say both 
that the created is 
 
which expressly speak to the relationship of creaturely 
potentiality and actuality to divine potentiality and 
actuality.  One of these unmistakably affirms some 
temporal openness: 
not new, for it is 
potentially rooted in the ground, and that it is 
new, for its actuality is based on freedom in 
unity with destiny, and freedom is the 
precondition of all newness in existence.  The 
necessarily consequent is not new; it is merely 
a transformation of the old.  (But even the term 
"transformation" points to an element of 
newness; total determination would make even 
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transformation impossible.)lxi
Here, being potentially rooted in the ground does not 
entail a total predetermination or foreseeing.  Crea-
turely actuality involves some indeterminate freedom 
and some newness.  At the most, the lack of newness for 
God means that God knows all relevant possibilities for 
actualization in all their concreteness or 
definiteness, but that God does not know just which 
ones the creature will in fact actualize. 
 
 Two related passages are not quite so 
forthright.  However, this one does definitely support 
some openness: 
The new is beyond potentiality and actuality in 
the divine life and becomes actual as new in 
time and history.  Without the element of 
openness, history would be without creativity.  
It would cease to be history.lxii
The first sentence, taken by itself, would be quite 
compatible with complete predetermination and 
foresight.  However, the latter part indicates that, 
though history must of course be within certain limits, 
it does have some creativity and openness.  In this 
case, the new as beyond potentiality and actuality must 
mean that God knows beforehand each possibility and 




 Finally, we have this declaration:  "The concept 
of 'the purpose of creation' should be replaced by 'the 
(unlike in Hartshorne), but that God 
does not foreknow just which will be actualized. 
telos of creativity'--the inner aim of fulfilling in 
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actuality what is beyond potentiality and actuality in 
the divine life."lxiv  This is certainly compatible with 
a totally predetermined eternal plan being acted out.  
However, it at least does not explicitly indicate that 
the "fulfilling in actuality" requires one set of 
creaturely decisions.  Moreover, it does not state that 
creatures always make decisions maximally conducive to 
fulfilling the divine aim in actuality.  This statement 
is in the context of depreciating the notion that "God 
lacks something which he must secure from the crea-
ture."lxv
 Thus, we have some indirect evidence in favor of 
openness, three passages that clearly affirm some 
openness, one passage that is most readily interpreted 
to favor closedness (but which would not be 
incompatible with this closedness as applying only to 
the divine experience of value), and one ambiguous 
passage.  When we also consider Tillich's dictum of no 
distinction between potentiality and actuality, which 
most obviously would be read to mean closedness 
(though, as above, might apply only to value), and his 
remarks on the polarities (which include dynamics-
form), which generally favor closedness (albeit 
indirectly), my conclusion is that, so far, an open 
temporality is supported, though hardly unequivocally. 
  That lends some contextual plausibility to 
the interpretation that fulfillment or happiness 
regarding creation is what is beyond potentiality and 
actuality in God, not being threatened by creaturely 
indeterminate freedom, which has a part, though, in 
"fulfilling in actuality." 
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 This concludes our consideration of the relationship 
of potentiality and actuality and dynamics and form in 
the divine life. 
 We are now ready to consider the relationship of 
time and eternity in the divine life.  Tillich often 
affirms that eternity includes time or temporality, as 
well as transcending it,
lxvii
lxviii
lxvi and that eternity is not 
timelessness.   This may seem to be enough to es-
tablish that Tillich's position here is not that of 
classical eternity, that at least there is a real 
temporal relationship of God to creation (even if 
temporality be wholly closed).  However, while it 
points in that direction, such material is not 
conclusive.  For in one sense, classical eternity could 
be said to include time and not be timeless, in that 
God does survey the temporal creation.  True, God's 
eternal vision was in itself or subjectively unchanging 
or timeless.  But no "classical eternist" denied that 
God was aware of the sequential character of time, of 
its process character, for the creatures, though for 
God the whole sequence is eternally and unchangingly 
actual, no part of it being relatively past or future 
for God.  (This is not to say that this is a coherent 
combination.  I do not think it is.)  Therefore, this 
adumbration of timelessness by Tillich is also not 
decisive:  "It is not adequate to identify simultaneity 
with eternity.  Simultaneity would erase the different 
modes of time; but time without modes is timelessness. 
 It is not different than the timeless validity of a 
mathematical proposition."   In classical eternity, 
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God's vision realizes that for the creatures there is 
not simultaneity, there are modes; but this vision 
itself sees everything "simultaneously" and as 
simultaneously actual and has no
 The key difference between classical eternity 
and a divine temporality, even if closed, is that the 
latter involves some concrete relation to the actual 
movement or procession of creaturely time, while the 
former merely abstractly views time as a whole.  Now 
when Tillich says that, "since time is created 
 modal relation to 
creaturely time.  (An incoherent combination again.) 
in the 
ground of the divine life, God is essentially related 
to it" (emphasis mine) or that God "includes 
temporality and with this a relation to the modes of 
time,"lxix this suggests a concrete relationship in a 
way that saying that eternity, which is a quality, 
includes time does not.  (We have just seen the sense 
in which classical eternity could be said to "include" 
time.)  Certainly classical eternity would shy away 
from any suggestion that God includes creaturely 
temporality, because God does not include creation.  
Classical theology is not on the whole panentheistic.  
The creatures and creaturely time concretely are 
external to God.  Now if God includes creaturely time, 
logically, God must have a real, concrete, and 
processive--a temporal--relation to time, rather than 
the abstract, wholly nonprocessive one of classical 
eternity; there must be a divine temporal-ity.  
However, in the history of theology, thought has not 
always been so logical.  Classical pantheism has held 
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that God includes creation, which is temporal, but that 
God or the all is timeless--temporality becomes 
illusory.  So to say God includes creaturely time 
supports a concrete relationship to it, a real divine 
temporality, but is not wholly conclusive. 
 Tillich does, though, sometimes speak not just 
of God's inclusion of creaturely time, but in terms of 
a divine time or temporality.  On two such occasions, 
Tillich's concern that this be an eminent temporality 




lxx nor to the split between essence and 
exis-tence.lxxi   Those qualifications  present  no 
problems.  However, Tillich goes beyond that and states 
that the divine time is not subject to "the 'not yet' 
of our time" and that "the moments of time"  or 
"past and future" are "united"  in it, thereby 
clouding and partly undermining the positing of a 
divine temporality.  Though the future must be more 
"present" or presently known to God than to us, there 
must be some "not yet" for God, if only in knowledge of 
the part of an eternal plan yet to be acted out, in 
order for there to be a "divine time."  It is 
grammatically ambiguous whether it is only the "not 
yet" of our time
 In addition, there is this attempt to define a 
 that is here denied, or any "not yet." 
 Though, knowing the larger picture, I would say that 
it is probably the former that is being denied, in the 
passage itself there is much ambiguity.  And the unity 
of the different moments of time might commonly be 
taken as classical eternity.  More on this later. 
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temporality that can relate to all creaturely tem-
porality: 
The character of a time which is not related to 
any of the dimensions of life but to all of 
them, thus transcending all of them, belongs to 
the mystery of being-itself.  Temporality, not 
related to any identifiable temporal process, is 
an element in the transtemporal, time-creating 
ground of time.lxxiv 
This does seem to indicate that there is no intrinsic 
divine temporality, apart from the creation of and 
relating to creaturely time.  That is to say, if 
lxxvi
per 
impossible for Tillich, God did not create a world, 
there would be no divine temporality.  (This is col-
laborated by Tillich's endorsement of the view that God 
creates time with creationlxxv and statements that, 
without the positing of "otherness" and "nonbeing," 
which is to say, finitude, in the divine life, God 
would remain in dead identity with God's self.   
This opinion may produce a tendency to undermine a 
concrete temporality in relation to the creatures and 
may be a cause of some of Tillich's ambiguity, though 
it need not be.  In any case, the denial of relation to 
"any" dimension or "identifiable temporal process" 
seems in this context to be an attempt to avoid 
identifying God exclusively with one finite temporality 
in order that God be able to relate temporally or 
processively to all finite temporality, though one 
cannot be absolutely sure (per usual) just what Tillich 
means here.  Finally, we have what represents Tillich's 
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most direct and simplest affirmation of divine 
temporality:  "...God is beyond 
lxxvii
lxxviii
our temporality, though 
not beyond every temporal-ity."   There is also this 
sentence which appears to speak of eternity as 
processive:  "The eternal present is moving from past 
to future but without ceasing to be present."  
 Are there passages which tilt toward classical 
eternity rather than at least a closed temporality?  
Tillich does occasionally speak of God as transcending 
time, failing to couple this with an inclusion of 
temporality.lxxix  These are rare enough that we 
probably should not interpret these to mean that God 
absolutely transcends and is in no real sense temporal; 
but this is a carelessness that might cause readers to 
see classical eternity and might betoken some tornness 
in Tillich.  In a German work, Tillich clashes even 
more strongly with his usual position, referring to the 
eternal as "the negation of all time."lxxx
 Tillich usually couples his denial that eternity 
is timelessness with the denial that it is the 
  This is in 
connection with the attempt to realize ultimate 
fulfillment at some utopian point in time.  But 
Tillich's basic stance is that our eternal fulfillment 
essentially includes temporal fulfillment and completes 
it, not that it negates it completely--it negates it 
only as complete in itself.  I doubt that Tillich meant 
to abandon this position with the above phrase.  
Rather, it is a case of hyperbole and carelessness.  
(So Tillich can be careless in German as well as in 
English.) 
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"endlessness of time," of "temporality,"lxxxi
lxxxii lxxxiii
lxxxiv
 or of 
"mere process"  or is "permanent change."   As 
with the former, this is not in itself unambiguous or 
conclusive.  It could be taken to imply classical 
eternity.  For if time extends infinitely forward, as 
it probably does for Tillich, then if God is 
processively related to it, there must be an 
"endlessness of time" and ever-ongoing change for the 
divine experience, if only in processively and 
knowingly carrying out a closed eternal plan.  Strictly 
speaking, Tillich's formula does not state that 
eternity does not or cannot involve an endlessness of 
time--only that that is not what eternity is.  Instead 
he may be saying that it is a quality, a quality of 
relating to time, rather than how far something extends 
through time, rather than the mere fact of endless 
duration per se.  The "mere" qualifying "process" above 
suggests this.  Also, Tillich does associate 
"dissected" temporality with the "endlessness of 
time."   
In spite of the continuity of the time-flux, 
every discernible moment of time in a physical 
process excludes the preceding and the following 
moments.  A drop of water running down the 
riverbed is here in this moment and there in the 
next, and nothing unites the two moments....  it 
is bad theology that uses the endless 
continuation of this kind of time as the 
symbolic material for eternity.lxxxv
What he means by dissected temporality is 
perhaps best elicited by the following sentences: 
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Subjecting God "to the structure of dissected temporal-
ity would deprive him of his eternity and make him an 
everliving entity of subdivine character."lxxxvi
lxxxvii
  Thus, 
it may be the dissected nature of ordinary temporality, 
rather than an endlessness of divine temporality per 
se, to which Tillich objects.  And it is the quality of 
in some sense uniting the dissected moments of time 
that defines eternity.  Whether eternity has an ongoing 
or processive character, which would be endless if time 
were, is another matter.  However, since Tillich never 
does specifically sanction an endless divine 
temporality by stating that it does not necessarily 
entail dissected temporality, or otherwise, and since 
explicitly it is only spoken of in negative terms, an 
interpretation of classical eternity can hardly be 
ruled out.  Moreover, Tillich criticizes theological 
theism for envisioning God as having "an endless 
time."   Here one cannot point to the grammatical 
structure and say, he may just be denying that endless 
time is what essentially defines eternity, though 
eternity may include it.  Though, as a possible reading 
between the lines, he could be censur-ing theological 
theism for only
 On the whole then, Tillich's treatment of the 
category of time in the divine life and its 
relationship to eternity favors a divine temporality of 
 stipulating an endless time and not 
eternity.  All things considered, the negativity in 
relation to an endless temporality does provide 
evidence in favor of classical eternity, though not 
conclusive evidence. 
232     Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich 
 
some kind as opposed to classical eternity, but hardly 
unambiguously.  But whether this divine temporality is 
open or closed is another matter.  This is a question 
of how the dissected or transitory moments of 
creaturely time are "united" by God.  Certainly any 
worthwhile concept of divine temporality--or eternity 
as including temporality--would hold that God does not 
lose the concreteness of the past in the way we do, 
that divine memory is perfect; that God foresees or 
anticipates the future in a perfect way to whatever 
extent it is foreseeable; and that this is all a part 
of God's present state, is "united" with God's 
awareness of the present.  But if there is openness, 
then such a unity is not a once-for-all completed 
thing.  As indeterminate creaturely creativity occurs, 
this must become part of the unity in a way it was not 
before.  The future within this unity cannot be 
determinate in the same sense in which the past is 
determinate.  The eternal unity must be an ongoing and 
changing unity if there is openness--and not just in 
the sense of realizing which stages of a totally 
predetermined or foreseen project have thus far been 
executed. 
 Tillich generally does not elaborate upon his 
statements on eternity as the unity of the (dissected 
or separated) moments of time or of the modes of time--
past, present, and future.lxxxviii  Since the unity is 
not described as changing, and since no distinction is 
made between how future and past moments are 
incorporated in the eternal unity, the most natural way 
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of reading such averments is that the future is 
included in the same way as the past, that God already 
knows the future precisely as it will be.  The tendency 
to read it this way is encouraged by the normal 
connotations of "eternity" or "eternal unity," based 
upon traditional theological use.  In the words of a 
popular song, eternity traditionally means, "Just one 
look, that's all it took." 
 At least, in reference to those formulations, 
Tillich does not expressly indicate that this is a 
closed unity.  A related passage, though, may seem more 
specifically to entail exact divine foreknowledge of 
the future: 
 The creative process of the divine life 
precedes the differentiation between essences 
and existents.  In the creative vision of God 
the individual is present as a whole in his 
essential being and inner 
lxxxix
telos and, at the same 
time, in the infinity of the special moments of 
his life-process.  
Actually, I believe that the point here is that God's 
vision of one's possibilities involves not just one's 
essence in a relatively general or universal sense but 
what one could be as a particular individual at par-
ticular times.  (The preceding paragraph deals with the 
relation of essences to universals and individuals, how 
both should be taken into account and united.)  And if 
this is just a knowledge of possibilities, of what one 
could be, or of what one will be within certain limits, 
rather than of precisely what one will be, then 
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openness is not controverted.  But once again Tillich 
is unclear and has given us something that can easily 
be read in terms of closedness.  In passing, this 
passage would appear to confirm that for Tillich 
possibilities are totally definite and concrete. 
 What do we have on the side of eternity as 
involving an open temporality?  Not much in quantity.  
Tillich does speak of the eternal "unity of the 
temporal modes and moments which are separated in 
empirical time" as "dynamic."xc  This offers a little 
support, but is unelaborated.  Happily, the one other 
passage supporting openness is definite and 
unambiguous.  And it is the only definite and 
unambiguous one on whether eternity is open or closed. 
 Leading up to the decisive sentence, we have:  "The 
future is genuine only if it is open, if the new can 
happen and if it can be anticipated."  Of course, if 
anticipation is absolute, newness and openness would be 
denied.  Tillich then chides Bergson for insisting on 
an absolute openness of the future.  When Tillich says 
that a God unable "to anticipate every possible future 
is dependent on an absolute accident," one is not 
totally sure, given Tillich's equivocacy, whether this 
means that God must foresee exactly what will transpire 
to ensure no absolute accident (an unreasonable 
position, to be sure) or that God must foresee the 
possibilities that may be actualized and set these 
within limits.  The answer:  "Therefore, a relative 
although not an absolute openness to the future is the 
characteristic of eternity."xci  This joins three other 
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comments of the English Tillich which have definitely 
and directly spoken for some openness of the future for 
the divine life.  In fact, the comment on potentiality 
and actuality and history immediately follows the one 
just above on eternity.  In the next paragraph Tillich 
adds that the past has an openness in virtue of the 
future; it can be reinterpreted or seen in a new light. 
 This is not unlike Hartshorne's idea of an element of 
the past, which in itself is unchanging and finished 
(which Tillich does not denyxcii
 It is time--overtime--to conclude this section 
on time.  I must apologize for the length.  However, I 
wanted to be true to and fair to Tillich.  If he had 
been clearer and more distinct and less split within 
himself, I could have done so in much less space.  My 
overall conclusion is that there is some openness of 
the future, some novelty, for God, at least in respect 
to creaturely decisions (though probably not with 
regard to divine ones), but that divine fulfillment or 
happiness is not open to the future.  Probably there is 
nothing that Tillich wrote that has to be interpreted 
as contradictory to that.  Therefore, Tillich may have 
been clearer within himself than he is in print.  
However, the most natural interpretation of many a 
Tillichian passage, as with transcending the 
distinction between potentiality and actuality or 
uniting all time, 
), being synthesized in 
a somewhat new way in each new divine experience. 
does contradict it.  One has to be 
able to read between the lines, based on a knowledge of 
the whole corpus, to give an interpretation consistent 
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with openness in many cases, as by using the 
distinction between the openness of divine knowledge 
and closedness of the divine beatitude.  And one cannot 
always be totally sure even with this in-depth 
knowledge.  Many passages are as susceptible to being 
interpreted in terms of classical eternity as of a 
closed temporality.  Even more susceptible to an 
interpretation of classical eternity is Tillich's 
negativity surrounding an endless divine temporality 
and some remarks on the polarities.  Because of the 
strain in Tillich wherein we do not know what God is 
"in God's self," one cannot completely banish suspicion 
that perhaps the "symbolic" applications of 
potentiality, dynamics, and temporality concern the way 
it appears "for us" temporal creatures, though God's 
actual experience may or may not be at all processive. 
 It is the definite affirmation of an open temporality 
in a few passages that provides the very best evidence 
against classical eternity, rather than Tillich's 
symbolic language that on the face of it affirms at 
least a closed temporality (though this is certainly 
some evidence).  I have said that Tillich may have been 
more consistent within himself than in print.  But it 
cannot be ruled out that in some passages he was 
thinking in terms of a closed temporality or even of 
classical eternity--or that he just was not sure.  In 
any case, the pull of classical tradition and its 
antitemporality is manifested, at the least, in am-
biguous language and, perhaps, in ambivalence.  But for 
us what Tillich wrote is what is most important.  On 
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that score Tillich's affirmation of a temporality and 
of an open temporality for God is not full-fledged and 
unambiguous enough to escape conviction for undermining 




Divine Impassibility and Creaturely 
 
Freedom and Suffering 
 In a proper panentheism, God is not active in 
absolutely every sense.  For a proper panentheism 
recognizes the importance of genuine creaturely 
freedom, of some degree of real indeterminacy, 
contingency, or spontaneity.  God must be active, the 
very power of acting in every action, must be working 
through us with utter immediacy, in order that we can 
act freely.  But God cannot determine our decisions or 
actions for us to whatever extent they are 
indeterminate.  Which is to say that God is passive to 
them in some sense.  Genuine creaturely freedom is one 
of the things that distinguishes panentheism from 
pantheism.  Mutual creaturely and divine freedom is one 
of the ways that God transcends the creation that God 
includes with total intimacy. 
 And Paul Tillich in the following suggests both 
panentheistic non-separation and freedom:  "This mutual 
freedom [of God and the world] from each other and for 
each other is the only meaningful sense in which the 
'supra' in 'supranaturalism' can be used.  Only in this 
sense can we speak of 'transcendent' with respect to 
the relation of God and the world."xciii  It is this 
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freedom which prevents pantheism
xcviiAnd it is this 
freedom to say "no" to God that permits "true love" for 
xcviii
xciv or emanationism.xcv 
 Indeed, it is finite freedom, Tillich suggests, that 
separates his doctrine of God from Spinozistic monism, 
from the creatures being "mere 'modes' of the eternal 
substance."xcvi  (Both this and the previous quote 
further support Tillich's basic panentheistic intent 
argued for in chapter 2.)  It is this freedom that 
allows for turning away from God.
God.  
 So far, so good.  However, many have talked a 
good game of freedom without meaning it.  By freedom 
they have only meant self-determination in a weak or 
tautological sense, as freedom from external 
compulsion.  That is, what one wills or wishes is what 
one wills or wishes.  But for them there is no real 
possibility of a different choice than that which is 
made.  This may not be mechanistic or biological 
determinism, but such self-determination is determinism 
nonetheless.  (This is what Augustine meant by freedom 
in the later anti-Pelagian writings.)  A couple of 
passages speaking negatively of "indeterminacy" or 
"indeterminism" could create suspicion that that is all 
Tillich means by freedom:  "Man is essentially 'finite 
freedom'; freedom not in the sense of indeterminacy but 
in the sense of being able to determine himself through 
decisions in the center of his being."xcix  And Tillich 
inveighs against a doctrine called "indeterminism," 
which allegedly "asserts something absolutely 
contingent, a decision without motivation, an 
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unintelligible accident."c  Since this would appear to 
be arguing against a strawperson, or at least to be 
very unfair to some who have advocated "indeterminism," 
one might well wonder if this is a reductio ad absurdum
 As it turns out, it 
 
attacking any degree of indeterminacy. 
is only an absolute indeter-
minacy in which decisions are not rooted in a "destiny" 
in polarity with freedom, in a situation, in a past, 
that would seem to be attacked by Tillich, not 
"indeterminism" or "indeterminacy" as I understand or 
use them, which is always in a relative sense.  In that 
sense, there are many Tillichian passages that 
unequivocally uphold indeterminate freedom.  We have 
already witnessed some such material in the previous 
section:  on the dynamic movement from form to form as 
not wholly predetermined, as involving "chaos," "risk"; 
the new as not necessarily consequent and even 
transformation as precluding total determination.  To 
add to that are the following assertions:  1) The 
"empty tautology" "that the stronger motive always 
prevails" [perennially used against indeterminacy] 
fails to take into account that the person who weighs 
motives is "above the motives" and "not identical with 
any" of them.ci  2) "A decision cuts off possibilities, 
and these were real possibili-ties, otherwise no 
cutting would have been neces-sary."cii  3) "...nothing 
is determined a priori... decisions cannot be deduced a 
priori."ciii  4) "Spontaneity" involves a "reaction  not 
 calculable."civ  5)  "Freedom"  involves   "creating   
the  underivably  new."cv   6) A "reaction is only 
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partly calculable and ultimately undetermined....  
Every moment of a living relationship is characterized 
by an element of indeterminacy."
cviii
cvi  (Here he obviously 
is willing to use the term "indeterminacy," if 
qualified as relative.)  Tillich even sees in subhuman 
beings "spontaneity," analogous to "freedom"--a term he 
reserves for humans, which "makes an absolute 
determination impossible" in their cases.cvii   And 
Tillich twice denies that there is a divine plan in 
which everything is predeterined.  
 But though Tillich advocates some indeterminacy 
in general, he becomes less bold when he approaches the 
realm of the sacred--which seems to include not only 
God, but traditional theology.  I find some of what I 
would regard as excusings of traditional theology in 
this area somewhat interesting and indicative.  He 
mentions Augustine as fighting "for a way between 
Manichaeism and Pelagianism."cix  While he quite rightly 
accuses Pelagius of missing "the tragic element of 
man's predicament, manifest from earliest infancy" (our 
intrinsic "self-centeredness" in a negative sense?), 
and allows that Pelagius saw that bad examples 
influence one's decisions,cx he does not note that 
Pelagius also saw the influence of habits and in 
general realized that our control over ourselves is not 
absolute, nor that the final Augustine was 
unflinchingly deterministic.  According to my study of 
these two thinkers, there is a need for "a way between" 
Pelagius and Augustine!  Tillich also speaks of a 
"divine determinism" that is present in biblical 
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thought and given sharpest expression in Augustine, 
Thomas, Luther, and Calvin without any criticism of it 
and with a nebulous sentence on how "this can be 
understood" as compatible with "divine-human 
reciprocity."cxi
 Tillich does commit some, however.  In the same 
work in which "an element of indeterminacy" in every 
moment is affirmed, there is this observation on 
"ethical" decisions: 
  But in themselves these declarations 
just manifest the pull of theological tradition against 
the position of indeterminate freedom, advanced 
elsewhere, in "sins of omission," rather than in 
definite "sins of commission." 
...after the decision we realize that it was not 
our own power but a power which decided through 
us.  If we make a decision for what we 
essentially are, and therefore ought to be, it 
is a decision out of grace.  If it is a decision 
contrary to what we essentially are, it is a 
decision in a state of being possessed or in-
habited by demonic spirits.cxii
If this is meant only in a relative experiential sense-
-either that certain ethical decisions seem wholly 
beyond our control or that the element of indeterminacy 
is overshadowed but not eliminated in many or most 
ethical decisions--I have no quarrel with it.  But it 
sounds very absolute, and there are no surrounding 
qualifications preservative of some indeterminacy.  And 
it covers a wide swathe:  all decisions with moral 
ramifications. 
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 Other Tillichian remarks undermining 
indeterminacy more or less specifically deal with the 
quality of our relationship with God, rather than 
morality in general.  Very possibly, though, especially 
since he holds that all persons have an immediate 
awareness of God, Tillich may feel that all ethical 
decisions bear on the quality of this relationship.  
That points to the difficulty of trying to exclude 
indeterminate freedom from the religious realm, while 
trying to preserve it in others.  Here is Tillich's 
most deterministic sounding avowal regarding our 
relationship with God:  "But with respect to the 
unconditional, we can never in any way gain power over 
ourselves, because we cannot gain power over the 
unconditional."cxiii  I can agree with Tillich that a 
person does not have "in every moment" "the 
undetermined freedom to decide in whatever way he 
chooses--for good or bad, for God or against him."cxiv  
Our control, freedom, and responsibility are never 
absolute.  And they are greater at some moments than 
others.  And our decisions are not absolutely good or 
bad, but relatively ambiguous.  But if indeterminate 
freedom is upheld in general, it makes no sense to say 
that we have no religious self-determination.  We must 
have some control over the degree
 Tillich seemingly senses the difficulty here and 
takes some apparent stabs at reconciling some degree of 
general indeterminate freedom with the traditional 
 of rightness or 
wrongness in our relationship with God, and God must in 
some sense be passive to this. 
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notion of no freedom or control with respect to the 
unconditional, none of them convincing.  And they 
undermine the premise that we have no such control.  In 
a sermon he preaches: 
Isaiah did not produce either the vision or the 
purification....  Isaiah's decision to go must 
be free.  With respect to our fate and vocation 
we are free; with respect to our relation to God 
we are powerless.cxv
But surely Isaiah's decision itself "to go" and 
prophesy for Jahweh, rather than not go, directly bears 
upon the relative rightness of his relationship with 
God.  Also, he states that humanity has essential 
freedom in the realm of finite relations, but that 
human decisions are unable to break through 
estrangement or achieve reunion with God; "they remain 
in the realm of 'civil justice.'"
 
cxvi  It is not clear 
here whether he is denying that we have any control 
over our relationship with God.  But if so, such an 
attempt to preserve some freedom while denying any 
control over our relationship with God will not work.  
For while we may not be able to completely overcome 
estrangement, our "essential freedom" with respect to 
the realm of "civil justice" should have relevance to 
the degree
 While the above attempts seem to imply some 
indeterminate freedom in our relationship with God, 
even as he tries to hold on to contrary traditional 
 of estrangement or unity (at least assuming 
some freedom to act out of compassion for others and 
not merely out of selfishness or self-righteousness).   
244     Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich 
 
ideas, Tillich does use certain traditional formulas 
that normally would be taken to imply no such freedom, 
no "religious self-determination."  Says Tillich, "If 




he does], then the act of accepting the act of faith in 
the justifying grace of God, is an act of God Himself 
in us."  God works "the beginning and the fulfilling in 
us."   Tillich also uses the phrase that in relation 
to God, everything is God.  As a panentheist who 
believes that God immediately empowers and works 
through us, there is a real sense in which I can very 
much accept such talk.  But it is a sense that 
preserves indeterminate freedom.  I will say more on 
how a proper panentheism can offer a solution to the 
perennial problem of "grace and free will" in the final 
chapter.  Unfortunately, Tillich does not say more.  
And if he did not want these formulas understood 
deterministically, he should have said more.  For the 
natural tendency is to interpret them thusly, 
reinforced by the fact that they have usually been used 
theologically in ways denying or undermining freedom.  
Moreover, by unqualifiedly hailing Luther and 
denigrating Melanchton in this area, he himself 
reinforces a deterministic reading.   On the 
profreedom side, Tillich avers that humans can resist 
salvation.cxix
 Overall then, Tillich does support some indeter-
minate freedom in the creatures, though undercutting 
this to some extent, especially when it comes to the 
quality of our relationship with God, at least in part 
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because of the weight of theological tradition.  This 
provides some corroborating evidence as to a temporal 
openness in Tillich's God.  Of course, Tillich need not 
follow out the logical implications of creaturely 
indeterminacy, so any such evidence is not simply 
"transferable," especially since many of his statements 
on the divine relation to time, as most readily inter-
preted, do not follow out such logical implications to 
an open divine temporality. 
 And Tillich's insistence that God is not at all 
conditioned by or dependent upon the creatures which 
God includes totally and perceives utterly, does not 
seem to recognize  the  implications  of  indeterminate 
freedom:  1) God's "freedom means that that which is 
man's ultimate concern is in no way dependent on man or 
on any finite being or on any finite concern."cxx  2) 
"The internal relations [as God's relations with all 
things are for Tillich] are, of course, not conditioned 
by the actualization of finite freedom."cxxi
But Mr. Hartshorne's resistance against the term 
"unconditional" follows from his doctrine that 
creaturely contingency conditions God in some 
respect and makes him literally finite in rela-
tion to it.  My resistance against this doctrine 
(not against the positing of the finite in God) 
is rooted in the overwhelming impression of the 
divine majesty as witnessed by classical reli-
gion.  This makes any structural dependence of 
  (Of 
course?)  3) In response to Hartshorne's critique of 
his doctrine of God, he pens, 
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God on something contingent impossible for me to 
accept.cxxii 
In the absence of further qualification, I would 
normally use "depends upon" or "is conditioned by" to 
mean "is affected by."  Surely, given creaturely 
indeterminate freedom, the specific or concrete
 We have already seen some evidence that Tillich 
will not brook God's beatitude being in any degree 
dependent upon what the creatures do, and we shall 
eventually see much more such evidence.  There is also 
some evidence that is appropriately presented in this 
section of the thesis.  In rejecting the idea that 
there is a "purpose of creation" for God in any usual 
sense, Tillich cites Calvinist and Lutheran theologies, 
apparently approvingly, to support his point: 
 
contents of God's experience, of divine omniscience, 
especially true omniscience to which nothing is at all 
external, must be affected by its actualization.  That 
is, to the extent of indeterminacy, God's knowledge of 
what we choose must by definition (of omniscience) be 
affected by what we chose.  Unfortunately Tillich gives 
no explicitation of what "condition" or "depend" denote 
or connote for him.  (By now the reader is probably as 
accustomed as I am to Tillich's failure to be explicit 
in the face of ambiguity in the areas of our concern.) 
 One or both of the following connotations may be 
entailed by one or both words for Tillich:  1) 
dependent upon for fulfillment or happiness and 2) 
being affected by something against one's will. 
No Calvinist theologian will admit that God 
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lacks something which he must secure from the 
creature he has created.  In creating the world, 
God is the sole cause of the glory he wishes to 
secure through his creation...according to 
Lutheran theology, there is nothing which the 
created world can offer God.  He is the only one 
who gives.cxxiii 
In a similar vein, Tillich pronounces that the "
cxxiv
libido 
element" in divine love in devotional and mystical 
language is "poetic-religious symbolism, for God is not 
in need of anything."  
 Relevant to the second possible connotation, 
Tillich writes that aseity "means that there is nothing 
given in God which is not at the same time affirmed by 
his freedom."cxxv
 There is a passage that may seem to back off 
  Concerning creaturely freedom, one 
might then say that God willingly grants it.  I would 
certainly agree that creaturely freedom is not 
something at all imposed upon God (and so would 
Hartshorne).  But for me there is a secondary sense in 
which God can be affected against God's will:  God has 
preferences on the use of the freedom willingly given, 
so that the creatures must be able to do things 
contrary to willingness in that sense--and therefore 
divine happiness would apparently be somewhat affected. 
 I doubt that Tillich would want to part company with 
me on God's having preferences concerning creaturely 
actualization.  But he does not follow out its obvious 
implication that "the actualization of finite freedom," 
"of course," conditions God. 
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from Tillich's view that God does not depend upon the 
creatures in any respect.  These words on reciprocity 




Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality:  "God 
reacts differently to different human actions.  
Logically, this  means   that  he  is  partly   
dependent  upon them."   However, this is in the 
voice of "biblical religion," which he is contrasting 
with "ontology" in rhetorical fashion (in that he does 
not feel them to be as irreconcilable as he is making 
them to sound at that point).  Conversely, ontology 
asks, "how can a being act upon being itself," "how can 
a being influence the ground of being?"   
 To conclude, once again the force of theological 
tradition is evident, along with its version of the 
divine majesty that "overwhelmingly has impressed" 
Tillich, as he denies that the creatures and creaturely 
freedom condition or make God dependent "in some 
respect," despite the fact that for him the creatures 
and their freedom are wholly internal to God.  Though 
Tillich probably would not have denied that the 
Nowhere in 
the rest of the book does Tillich give an endorsement 
of biblical religion's "logical" implication that God 
"is partly dependent upon" "human actions."  Instead, 
his attempts to find a common ground between biblical 
religion and ontology in this area are on the side of 
nondependency:  these are the references to the feeling 
that a gracious or demonic power decides through us and 
to the aspect of "divine determinism" in biblical 
thought, mentioned earlier. 
 Criticism of Tillich on the Passive Aspect  249 
 
specific contents of divine knowledge "depend upon" or 
"are conditioned by" creaturely freedom, that he never 
did use these terms thusly perhaps stems from this 
general reluctance to use such words in relation to 
God. 
 If God fully includes the creatures, God must 
fully include the sufferings of the creatures and thus 
with total intimacy participate in them--and therefore 
in some real sense suffer.  Tillich does make a con-
siderable break with classical theology in this area.  





  Tillich 
is willing to draw the consequence that this embracing 
entails participation.  God participates "in the 
negativities of creaturely existence" or "life,"  
"in the suffering of existential estrangement,"cxxx "in 
the suffering of the world"  and "of the uni-
verse."   He states that blessedness, even in the 
divine case, must involve an element of negativ-
ity,  and joy an element of sorrow.   
 However, the infrequency of his speaking of God 
as "suffering"--only twice in his writings that I am 
aware of, and the circumstances thereof, probably 
represent a reluctance to directly use the term in 
relation to God, an indication of the left hand taking 
back some of what the right has given us.  One instance 
is the mention of the divine life's "suffering over and 
He even 
seems to follow out the obvious implication that 
participation in suffering means that the participant 
must in some sense suffer (even more obvious when the 
participation is absolute). 
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with the creatures" as one historical symbolic 
manifestation of the "chaotic element" in God.cxxxv
cxxxvi
  
Though he does not take exception to the phrase, 
neither does he specifically "own" it.  On the other 
occasion, he opines, "We do not know what divine 
suffering may mean, as we do not know what eternal 
blessedness means."   
 While used more frequently than suffering per 
se, God's participation in suffering does not escape 
qualification.  Beginning the just mentioned passage on 
suffering, which was in response to a question by 
Albert C. Outler, Tillich characterizes Outler's 
"phrase that God 'participates in the agony and tragedy 
of human life'" as "highly symbolic."cxxxvii
While he does "own" divine 
"suffering" here, the expression of agnosticism  may be 
 indicative of a  reluctance  to use it--at least he 
does not pen it elsewhere (though we shall see an 
apparent instance of it in conversation). 
  
 And in reference to the earlier phrase that God 
"participates in the negativities of creaturely exis-
tence," Tillich does add that  
"Symbolic" 
is one thing, as is every description of the divine 
life for Tillich; but "highly symbolic" indicates 
special reservations. 
the idea must be stated with reservations.  
Genuine patripassianism (the doctrine that God 
the Father has suffered in Christ) rightly was 
rejected by the early church.  God as being-
itself transcends nonbeing absolutely.  On the 
other hand, God as creative life includes the 
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finite and, with it, nonbeing, although, 
nonbeing is eternally conquered and the finite 
is eternally reunited within the infinity of the 
divine life.cxxxviii 
In what may be a shorthand version of the above, 
Hartshorne quotes Tillich, apparently from 
conversations with him, as saying, "God is suffering 
not in his infinity, but as ground of the finite."cxxxix 
 Tillich repeats on a couple of occasions that 
nonbeing or negativity is eternally "conquered" or 
"overcome" in the divine life that includes it.
 If distinctions between God as transcending nonbeing 
absolutely versus God as creative, as infinite versus 
as ground, are interpreted concretely in this context, 
this would compartmentalize the totality of the divine 
experience with regard to (participation in) suffering, 
making God a "split-brain," part of whom suffers and 
part of whom does not.  The more sensible and probably 
correct interpretation is that there is a unity of 
experience in which the nonsuffering in God's infinity 
and absolute transcendence of nonbeing mean that the 
negativity that is grounded or included in God is 
"eternally conquered" for the whole of the divine 
experience. 
cxl  Now 
if this "conquest" is a relative one, such as God's 
deriving value from negativities as part of an 
aesthetic whole, value that is not in these 
negativities taken in themselves, such talk need not be 
problematic.  But from what we have seen just above (as 
well as from previous intimations), this would appear 
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to be an absolute overcoming, in the sense that 
creaturely suffering is not or is "no longer" operative 
or effective as a negative factor, as an element of 
disvalue, in the divine experience.  That 
patripassianism can be rejected, that God as infinite 
could be said not to suffer, certainly appears to 
demand that suffering be absolutely overcome.  That in 
another place patripassianism is rejected on the 
grounds that it "too obviously contradicts the 
fundamental theological doctrine of God's 
impassibility"
cxlii
cxli demands it even more strongly.  The 
"no longer" is put in quotation marks to suggest that 
there is no time lapse before which creaturely 
suffering is not completely overcome for Tillich, no 
time when suffering is present as an element of 
disvalue followed by its absence as disvaluable.  This 
is suggested by the use of "eternal" in relation to 
"conquering."  And it is demanded if impassibility is 
to be maintained, for there must be no time stretch, 
however limited, during which God is negatively af-
fected.  But this would contradict all he has given us 
with the right hand.  
 In general, that a negative element can be 
present in an experience without having a negative 
effect, without being an effective factor of disvalue, 
is absurd; it destroys the very meaning of negativity. 
 But more concretely, and panentheistically more to the 
point, how can God participate with utter intimacy in 
creaturely suffering, how can creaturely suffering be a 
direct and immediate part of the divine experience, a 
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very part of God, without its being felt as an 
effective element of disvalue--an effective element of 
suffering?  If anyone should say that it is
 Central to Tillich's notion of unambiguous 
divine fulfillment is the purging or "exclusion"cxliii
cxliv
 felt by God 
as an effective element of disvalue and suffering just 
as I have said, but one that is nevertheless entirely 
overcome, I would say--besides that I have no idea what 
you mean--how is it effective?  If an instance of 
creaturely suffering were more or less intense, it 
would make no difference to God.  Any degree of 
suffering would be wholly "overcome" and God would be 
equally blissful.  Where here is any "effectiveness"?  
How here is any suffering "felt"?  The pull of the 
classical tradition, of the "fundamental doctrine of 
God's impassibility," has caused Tillich effectively to 
sabotage his desire to affirm God's participation in 
the suffering of the world.  The immediately following 
treatment of the divine blessedness and eternal ful-
fillment in Tillich will confirm that negativity is 
overcome absolutely and without any lapse of time, as 
well as consider related issues. 
 of 
the negative in creaturely life and history, the 
liberating of "the positive from its ambiguous mixture 
with the negative."   In his last major work, volume 
3 of the Systematic, Tillich pens, "...the ever present 
end of history elevates the positive content of history 
into eternity at the same time it excludes the 
negative....  The positive becomes manifest as 
unambiguously positive and the negative...as 
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unambiguously negative...."cxlv
 The ultimate meaning of history is the supra-
historical unification and purification of all 
elements of preliminary meaning which have 
become embodied in historical activities and 
institutions.... 
  This basic idea was not 
new for Tillich, receiving expression in a much earlier 
piece, written in German: 
 ...purification means that the ambiguous em-
bodiment of meaning in historical realities, 
personal and social, is related to an ultimate 
meaning in which the ambiguity, the mixture of 
meaning and distortion of meaning, is overcome 
by an unambiguous, pure embodiment.cxlvi 
Following is an expoundment on the nature of this 
purification or exclusion: 
 
 ...here and now, in the permanent transition 
of the temporal to the eternal, the negative is 
defeated in its claim to be positive, a claim it 
supports by using the positive and mixing 
ambiguously with it.  In this way it produces 
the appearance of being positive itself (for 
example, illness, death, a lie, destructiveness, 
murder, and evil in general).  The appearance of 
evil as positive vanishes in the face of the 
eternal.  In this sense God in his eternal life 
is called a "burning fire,"... [But] Nothing 
positive is being burned....  And since there is 
nothing merely negative (the negative lives from 
the positive it distorts), nothing that has 
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being can be ultimately annihilated... but it 
can be excluded in so far as it is mixed with 
nonbeing....cxlvii 
 This whole notion of wholly extracting the 
negative from the positive with respect to concrete 
experiences and values is extremely questionable.  Is 
not a negative element often an integral part of an 
experience and even more so of the experiences of a 
group of individuals as they collectively interact?  A 
man who generally is not a rationalist has offered us a 
rationalistic and abstractive model that ignores the 
Gestalt or holistic and social character of reality.  
But that whole issue is of a fairly abstract nature.  
More concrete and, panentheistically, more fundamental 
than whether any such exclusionary attempt could 
conceivably be successful is whether the exclusion of 
any part of reality is appropriate to deity.  Such 
attempted abstracting by God seems more appropriate to 
a God to whom things are relatively external and 
abstract in the first place, "a half-deistic, half-
theistic" God, than to the all-embracing infinite.  
Note how the notion of segregating and excluding the 
negative goes beyond the earlier cited one of the 
inclusion of nonbeing that is eternally totally 
overcome, for the latter seems to want to affirm that 
negativity is a part, and an integrated part, of the 
divine experience, though it contradicts itself.  Even 
more directly does the separating and excluding of 
negativity entail that suffering is not included or 
participated in by God.  It is probably no coincidence 
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that Tillich's way of speaking just above is not very 
applicable to suffering.  "Claiming" or "pretending" or 
"appearing" to be positive seem much more appropriate 
to relatively active moral evil than to passive 
suffering, as do references to the "exposure" of 
negativity as negativecxlviii
cxlix)  Does one usually experience one's own great 
pain as positive and need God to defeat its claim to be 
so?  Does one even want one's pain to be "here and now" 
"burned" by the eternal, either in the sense of being 
banished from or "negated"
 (yet Tillich uses them in 
relation to "evil in general" and "universally," 
including nonindividual and "non-human" negativ-
ity.
cl
 The "here and now" in relation to the 
"transition" into the eternal strongly suggests that 
the eternal conquering of nonbeing or the negating or 
excluding of the negative is immediate, entailing no 
time lapse.  This is confirmed in another elaboration, 
this time in terms of "eternal memory": 
 in the divine experience? 
 Or would it be more comforting to feel that God 
utterly shares that pain, suffering with the sufferer? 
...the negative is not an object of eternal 
memory in the sense of living retention.  
Neither is it forgotten, for forgetting 
presupposes at least a moment of remembering.  
The negative is not remembered at all.  It is 
acknowledged for what it is, nonbeing.  
Nevertheless it is not without effect on that 
which is eternally remembered.  It is present in 
eternal memory as that which is conquered and 
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thrown out into its naked  
nothingness (for example, a lie).cli
There is then no time lag, no "moment of remembering," 
before the negative is "conquered and thrown out."  The 
negative is "not without effect," but it never is 
affecting God negatively.  Note also that "naked 
nothingness" is more appropriate to the exposure of 
moral evil, as with the example of a lie, than to 
suffering.  Finally, this passage illustrates a tension 
or discrepancy in Tillich's language about and concep-
tion of the status of negativity vis-a-vis divine 
experience, which was touched on above:  between the 
negative as present or as absent.  The words 
"conquered" or "overcome" allow, at least on the 
surface, that the negative is present, though not as 
effective, but as overcome.  The terms "excluded," 
"annihilated," or "thrown out" do not, with "negated" 
somewhere in the middle.  The former are 
panentheistically less objectionable, for they imply at 
least some sense in which the negative is "included" by 
God, even if a tenuous, rather external, and incoherent 
inclusion. 
 
 There is more to Tillich's understanding of 
divine fulfillment with regard to creation than the 
negating or purging of the negative per se.  Not only 
is the negative removed, but the positive is maximally 
realized:  "Eternal Life, then, includes the positive 
content of history, liberated from its negative distor-
tions and fulfilled in its potentialities."clii  There 
is one comment that might sound as if the negating of 
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the negative in itself brings an absolute fulfillment 
of essential potentialities (remember that for Tillich, 
"essence" and "essential" refer to what a thing ideally 
should be):  Tillich speaks of the "positive" that is 
left  or   "saved"  "as  the   created   essence  of  a 
thing."cliii  If the whole created essence is thereby 
produced, then negating the negative per se brings 
maximal fulfillment.  However, while negating the 
negative yields a total positive in the rules 
fabricated for arithmetic, this seems more than dubious 
for the case of concrete entities and values.  If this 
notion of the exclusion of the negative is used at all, 
it would seem more sensible that a certain amount of 
positive value be left, commensurate to how much 
negativity had to be removed.  Then, if maximal 
fulfillment must be maintained, this positive is 
supplemented by that part of its "essence," what it 
ideally should be, that it has fallen short of; God 
makes up the difference, as it were.  This is in all 
probability Tillich's view, for he defines "essen-
tialization" as meaning "that the new which has been 
actualized in time and space adds something to 
essential being, uniting it with the positive which is 
created within existence."cliv  Similarly, he writes, 
"The conflicts and sufferings of nature...serve the 
enrichment of essential being after the negation of the 
negative in everything that has being."clv  In any case, 
Tillich is quite clear that there is always a maximal 
fulfillment of history in Eternal Life:  1)  "...there 
is no ought-to-be-in it which at the same time is 





clvi  2)  "...there is no truth which is not also 
'done,' in the sense of the Fourth Gospel, and there is 
no aesthetic expression which is not also a 
reality."   3)  "The only unconditional prospect is 
the promise and expectation of the supra-historical 
fulfillment of history, of the Kingdom of God, in which 
that which has not been decided in history will be 
decided and that which has not been fulfilled will be 
fulfilled."   
 What shall we then say vis-a-vis panentheism 
about Tillich's idea of a maximal fulfillment in which 
creaturely disvalue is purged and creaturely value is 
supplemented to the precise degree it fell short of 
perfection, in which all is decided that was left 
undecided in history?  We have already delved into the 
inappropriateness of Tillich's position on the over-
coming or exclusion of negativity, so that aspect will 
not be focused upon.  If God includes the whole of 
creaturely experience without mediation or loss, then 
God perceives it 
(Of course, Tillich is not meaning a 
temporal eschaton after history, but the immediate 
eternal fulfillment of each moment of history.) 
as it is, knows its precise value in 
and for itself; and God garners that value, since there 
is no mediation or loss.  To put it more briefly, the 
creaturely experiences and the values these have for 
the creatures are a very part of the divine experience. 
 If there were a greater or lesser degree of value, 
depending upon which creaturely possibilities had been 
actualized, God would include, know, and value ap-
propriately.  Any additional value for God, based upon 
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any kind of synthesis involving the creaturely values 
(even making use of "essential potentialities") or 
totally unconnected with the creatures, cannot in-
validate that a greater or lesser amount of creaturely 
values will be an immediate part of the total divine 
experience of value and that therefore this total 
experience can have a greater or lesser amount of 
value, of happiness--however small the differential be 
that the creatures can affect in comparison with the 
total divine happiness. 
 Tillich's conception of an absolutely maximal 
fulfillment in relation to creation is then not consis-
tent with the idea that God is the all-inclusive and 
utterly immediate knower--and likewise appreciator--of 
existence.  Some of the ramifications of Tillich's 
position follow:   
 The divine knowing of the creaturely existence 
that has various possible degrees of joy and sorrow 
open to it is split from the value that this has for 
God.  Creaturely life and the divine knowledge are 
variable, but the divine experience of value, its 
happiness, does not vary. 
 The notion of supplementing the actualized value 
of realities with the value of their essential poten-
tialities, such that their essential potentialities are 
fully realized for God, confuses possibility and 
actuality.  It entails that a part of abstract poten-
tiality, that part by which the creatures have fallen 
short, is as valuable as mere potentiality as its 
concrete actualization by the creatures would have 
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been.  One might insist that for God it is not "mere 
potentiality" but actuality.  But what does this mean? 
 Surely it does not mean that in God's knowledge the 
actual creature itself did concretely actualize all its 
potentialities.  Therefore, that God realizes all the 
creatures' potentialities, that everything that ought-
to-be is, seems very much to entail an abstract divine 
wish-world paralleling the real world.  Tillich, who 
rightly censures supranaturalism for positing a supra-
world beyond this one, can be criticized on the same 
score, though not as severely. 
 Worst of all in this model of divine fulfillment 
is its practical meaning for the creature.  
Contributing to the divine life, to its level of value, 
its happiness, cannot legitimately be a motive for 
doing the good.  Whatever we do, God purges the 
negative and makes up the difference.  Nor can it 
consistently be said that God has preferences or a 
"will" regarding creaturely decisions and actions.  For 
if God did, it would make a difference to God what was 
actualized.  If one might say that God cares or has 
preferences for the sake of the creatures' happiness 
but not for the sake of the divine happiness, which is 
maximal, I must say that, whether or not God has any 
direct concern for God's own happiness, if God truly 
cares for the creatures, God will be relatively happier 
or sadder on their account depending on whether things 
go relatively well or poorly for them, depending on the 
extent to which divine preferences are enacted.  And 
with this model we cannot feel that God shares both our 
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joys and our sorrows.  For whether we are joyously 
delirious or woefully despondent, it makes no 
difference to God, who is equally blissful.  I am not 
saying that Tillich was fully aware of or fully inten-
ding the divine indifference implied in his model.  For 
he affirms God's love and "infinite concern"clix
 Tillich's conception of the purgation or con-
quering of the negative and supplementation of the 
positive such that all essential creaturely poten-
tialities are fulfilled allows us to understand how he 
can claim that God transcends the distinction between 
potentiality and actuality, despite an overall en-
dorsement of an open temporality, and claim that God is 
not conditioned by or does not depend upon the 
creatures  for anything, despite a basic upholding of 
indeterminate freedom.  For all essential 
potentialities will be actualized for God; 
actualization will never be less than ideal 
possibility, whatever particular purifying and 
supplementing are called for by the novel actualized in 
time.  For whatever the creatures in their freedom 
decide, God will make up the difference between that 
and essential potentiality.  The creatures contribute 
no value by a relatively good use of freedom that God 
would not have if they made the worst possible use of 
it.  Furthermore, if God is able to realize the 
actualized value of essential potentialities whatever 
possibilities the creatures actualize, then perhaps God 
does not need to wait to see what possibilities the 
  for 
the creatures.  But that is its consequence. 
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creatures do actualize but can always possess the 
actualized value of all essential potentialities 
through all time.  Since Tillich does not make a 
distinction between an assured perfect actualization of 
value when the time comes and an eternally complete 
possession of all value from all time, one cannot say 
for sure which was his view, or whether he even thought 
about the issue.  But certain considerations point 
toward the latter.  It would make for a stronger or 
stricter sense of God's transcendence of the 
distinction between potentiality and actuality and for 
a stricter interpretation of the passages in which "not 
yet" is said to be inapplicable to God.  And it could 
help explain Tillich's talk of eternity as the 
transcendent unity of all time, as if it were 
completed.  For God would already possess the full 
value of the future, despite its openness regarding 
creaturely decisions. 
 I would be remiss if I did not mention some 
statements in volume 3 of the 
clxii
Systematic that may be 
taken--or mis-taken--to imply that the creatures can 
contribute to the divine life in the sense of making it 
richer or poorer, depending upon how they choose to 
act.  Tillich does declare that "every finite happening 
is significant for God"clx and that "the world process 
means something for God"clxi and uses the phrase, "man 
in his significance for the Divine Life and its eternal 
glory and blessedness."   However, the model that we 
have seen does stipulate that the positive content of 
creation is elevated to eternity, that creation does 
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therefore have significance for God in some sense, but 
not in the sense that our decisions can influence how 
much significance God derives from creation.  To recall 
the comments about God as the sole source of divine 
glory (and blessedness) and as the only one who gives, 
the question is whether God gives to God's self all the 
significance and meaning of creation apart from how our 
indeterminate freedom is used, or whether we can really 
give something to God that God would not have 
otherwise.  Since God empowers and works through each 
creature even in its freedom, if God then makes up 
whatever distance one falls short of one's essential 
possibilities, then God would be the sole cause of 
divine happiness in every sense.  If, however, the use 
of our freedom makes a valuational difference to God, 
then, even though God is the very power of acting in 
our acting, we would have a causative role in divine 
happiness; God would have some nontautological 
passivity to God's own activity of working through us. 
 God's creativity with respect to us is significant for 
God, but whether our
 There is an occasion on which Tillich uses 
"contribute" in a manner that might be taken--or mis-
taken--to mean that we affect the divine life for 
better or worse.  In a sermon he states that, in 
looking back at certain past pleasurable experiences, 
we may feel now that these are empty, that they "have 
not contributed to the eternal."clxiii
 creativity is significant for God, 
that is the question.  Of course, what we have seen 
thus far gives a "no" to this question. 
  Since this is a 
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sermon, his language may be looser than usual.  But 
beyond this, since in Tillich's model the positive that 
is created within existence, which can vary depending 
upon whether we relatively "waste" or "fulfill" our 
potentialities,clxiv 
 The following is the remark by Tillich that most 
sounds as if we can affect the level of divine ful-
fillment:  "...the eternal act of creation is driven by 
a love which finds fulfillment only through the other 
one who has freedom to reject and accept love."
clxvi
is elevated to eternity, he perhaps 
would be willing to say that our actions do contribute 
to the divine life.  But this would not be a "contribu-
tion" that makes a positive difference to that life.  
For if we had "contributed" less, God would negate the 
greater negativity involved in this and fully 
compensate for the greater distance between this lesser 
contribution and our essential potentiality. 
clxv  
That sounds pretty good.  However, it is not 
conclusive.  For it is Tillich's position that our 
estrangement from God or rejection of God in each 
moment, as with all negativity, is negated or overcome 
as this is "here and now" elevated to eternity; 
everything in each moment (not in some future time or 
afterlife) returns to and in some sense is reunited or 
reconciled with God in eternity.   
 Talk about the significance of the finite for 
Therefore, though 
the most natural way of interpreting that declaration 
is that God remains somewhat unfulfilled to the extent 
we reject God's love, that probably is not Tillich's 
meaning. 
266     Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich 
 
God suggests that Tillich may have been trying to break 
away from the divine impassibility.  But we cannot say 
that the shackles were loosened enough for him that he 
would have wanted such passages to be taken to mean 
that we can affect the divine life for the better or 
for the worse. 
 How then on the whole does the Tillich of this 
chapter stand in relation to panentheism, particularly 
the passive aspect?  He seems to allow for a processive 
relationship of God to the world, though ambiguously.  
To the extent that he does, God's panentheistic rela-
tionship, God's utterly immediate and coinhering 
relationship, with the temporal world--both with 
respect to knowledge and ultimate empowerment--can be 
preserved.  In general, he affirms indeterminate 
creaturely freedom fairly strongly, which is a key 
factor in preventing his panentheism from becoming a 
pantheism.  However, given indeterminate freedom, he 
severely undermines his panentheism by denying that 
this freedom, which can affect creaturely experiences 
for better or for worse, can valuationally affect the 
divine experience of which these creaturely experiences 
are in panentheism an utterly immediate part.  This 
entails that Tillich's God cannot very convincingly be 
called the living God.  For as far as divine happiness 
and experience of value are concerned, God is closed, 
fixed, static, rather than in living relationship with 
creation.  And more or less apart from the issue of 
indeterminate freedom, for there would be evil even if 
every creature optimally used its freedom, Tillich 
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severely undercuts his panentheism by denying that the 
creaturely suffering that is a very part of God in 
panentheism is effective as an element of suffering and 
disvalue for God at God's core.  And these problems 
with respect to the passive aspect of panentheism 
ultimately undermine the active as well, for these are 
mutually implicative.  To whatever extent the totally 
inclusive and immediate relationship of God to the 
world is denied or only ambiguously upheld in 
connection with temporality, dependence upon creaturely 
free choices for degree of happiness, or suffering, and 
externality or separation therefore implied, God cannot 
then be the all-encompassing power, the immediate 
empoweror working through all existence.  God cannot be 
"the creative ground of everything in every moment"; 
instead there is "an external relation between God and 
the creature."clxvii  Only the God who suffers with the 
creatures can be the ultimate and a se power that is 
the very power of being in the creatures. 
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 What has preceded concerning Tillich and Harts-
horne has been previewed and summarized enough and has 
been, I believe, clear enough that any large-scale 
summary here would be repetitious (though a brief 
summation will be a part of the final words of this 
chapter and this project).  My "synthesis" of Harts-
horne and Tillich, namely, a panentheism that fully 
embraces both an all-encompassing active aspect and an 
all-encompassing passive aspect, was outlined in 
chapter 1 and developed through my exposition on, 
agreements with, and disagreements with Tillich and 
Hartshorne in the subsequent chapters; so to give a 
basic description of my brand of panentheism, as so far 
developed, would again be repetitious.  Instead, what I 
propose to do in this final chapter, as promised in the 
first chapter, is to use what has come before, 
especially material in chapters 4 and 5, as a basis or 
springboard for further considerations.  This, in fact, 
will provide some summary of the panentheistic outlook 
presented thus far, but without needless repetition. 
 A major thrust of this chapter will be an apolo-
getic one of showing how the active and passive aspects 
of God in panentheism can be held together without 
final contradiction.  The first area concerns whether a 
panentheistic active aspect is compatible with the 
indeterminate creaturely freedom that has been main-
tained throughout, or whether the only sense God can be 
"passive" is to God's own self-decided activity.  The 
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second and probably more important area of concern, 
which is relevant to the coherence of any theism in the 
usual sense of the word, involves the following 
dilemma:  How can the ultimate and a se
 Growing out of the discussion of that dilemma 
will be the possibility and perhaps desirability of the 
notion of God as truly inexhaustible and therefore 
intrinsically temporal.  I will contend that such an 
eminent temporality and openness is at least as pro-
tective of the divine majesty as any notion of a fixed 
maximal possession of value by God. 
 power, with 
nothing with any ultimate ontological independence from 
it that could negatively affect it, be anything other 
than unchangeably in possession of all possible value, 
with no negativities?  But if this is the case, any 
actual relation of God to the world, as passive and 
even as ultimate empoweror, is dubious and, in fact, I 
will argue, impossible.  I will maintain that the 
existence of other individuals included in God follows 
from God's ultimacy and provides value God would not 
otherwise have, despite the negativities entailed in 
finitude by its very nature. 
 With these further discussions upon the concepts 
broached in earlier chapters, I will try to consummate 
my attempt to offer a process theology that does full 
justice to the divine majesty and a Tillichian theology 
that does full justice to the concept of a living God. 
 Though I have consistently insisted that there 
is some genuine indeterminacy and spontaneity in 
creaturely activity, some will feel that if God is 
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immediately and coinheringly empowering each creature 
in each decision and action, this, in fact, entails 
that God completely determines each decision.  If such 
determinism be upheld, then the passive aspect of 
panentheism, except in a tautological sense (of God 
being passive only to God's wholly self-decided ac-
tivity), is obliterated, and our doctrine of panen-
theism moves towards pantheism (though if a strict 
qualitative difference between God and the nondivine 
individuals God includes and totally determines be 
strictly maintained, there would still be a dif-
ference).  The active aspect would swallow the passive, 
rather than just being its ultimate basis. 
 However, I will now argue that there is no 
contradiction between panentheistic empowerment and 
indeterminate creaturely freedom.  I claim the fol-
lowing:  creatures find themselves with the freedom, 
capability, power to decide, but they do not create 
their freedom to be creative, they are not ultimately 
responsible for this freedom of decision.  A creature's 
power to decide, as well as its total existence, is 
contingent.  Such contingent freedom is either ul-
timately unexplained or it is given, empowered by an 
ultimate and necessary reality and power.  If one 
admits the conceptual possibility of an ultimate 
empowerment behind creaturely contingent freedom, then 
I submit the following is conceptually possible:  God 
empowers each exercise of creaturely freedom in 
decision and action, but "holds back" or limits divine 
power in not making the decision, instead allowing and 
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empowering creatures to choose among possible options, 
empowering them in whatever decision they make and 
carry out.  Thus, the absence of mediation with respect 
to divine power--that there is "nothing between" our 
decision and God's empowerment--does not mean God 
decides for us, but rather that the God who relates to 
us with total intimacy gives existence to our free 
choice and to whatever action we choose.  And if it 
were not for such empowerment and upholding of 
creatures in their freedom, they would not be able to 
act, they would not be at all (if I am correct in my 
belief that contingent creaturely freedom is in need of 
an ultimate cause). 
 Conversely, to maintain that our power to freely 
decide is simply external to God has entailments 
incompatible with divinity.  As Tillich stated, there 
is no basis for an external relation from the side of 
ultimate power.  What could such externality mean?  
That we are spatially outside God, thus rendering God 
spatial?  That God is not paying attention to us, is 
not fully aware?  Externality, whether spatial or epis-
temological, implies that there is some God behind or 
beyond God setting the conditions for interaction 
between us and this alleged "God", who is actually non-
divine regarding presence and knowing. 
 We have also seen Hartshorne argue against 
external relations with respect to God: 
...if we deny the inclusiveness of the divine 
unity, we will either have to admit that rela-
tions between God and the lesser minds belong to 
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no real individual, no real substance, or have 
to admit a superdivine individual to which they 
belong.i
However, Hartshorne did not follow out the logic of his 
endorsement of a "genuinely single entity which 




 If the absence of external relations with re-
spect to God be upheld, then our whole being, including 
the aspect of indeterminate freedom, which concretely 
cannot be separated from other aspects of our being, is 
itself (a part of) God's power.  Parenthetically, this 
discussion points to the incompatibility of paying lip 
service to God's sustaining empowerment of everything 
by much of traditional theism, while explicitly or 
implicitly denying God's coinhering empowerment, 
denying that everything is part of God's power, of God 
(since there is nothing divine that is not in some 
sense divine power).  This makes God's empowerment just 
one aspect or factor of or in things, in addition to 
many others, thus denying its total and utter immediacy 
and directness in relation to anything in its totality, 
in all its aspects--and implying some ultimate 
ontological independence of the creature from God.  Now 
if by "external," one is simply meaning that God does 
not make the decisions God coinheringly gives us the 
power to make, that, of course, I grant--in substance, 
though not approving such use of "external." 
  Instead the creature's 
reception and synthesis of the divine datum is external 
to God, rather than within God's knowledge and power. 
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 My uncompromising upholding of a panentheistic 
divine active aspect entails that God indeed is passive 
to God's own activity through the creatures--but not in 
a tautological sense, not to wholly self-decided ac-
tivity.  For a part of that activity is our activity 
involving indeterminate freedom.  We are active not as 
"secondary agents" completely determined by the primary 
agent, but as creators.  This model allows for an 
outlook on the question of "grace and free will" that 
preserves some real human freedom and responsibility, 
while fully crediting the proper religious intuitions 
and motivations (and there have also been some improper 
ones) of those who have emphasized the divine primacy, 
"preceding," and grace.  Since our whole being, since 
our freedom, since any good action we take (and also 
since anything good we receive from creation) is by 
virtue of or, better, is God's coinhering empowerment, 
without which there would be absolutely nothing, 
everything is of grace.  We do nothing deserving of any 
reward, and indeed even of existence, that itself is 
not this immediate working through us by God.  To 
merely say that God "enables" us to do the good is too 
weak to do justice to the panentheistic empowerment I 
have presented. In my scheme there is not a division of 
what we do and what God does.  The trouble with many 
traditional attempts to preserve human freedom has been 
precisely a tendency to make a simple distinction or 
division between what God does and what we do in the 
economy of our moral and religious determinations.  But 
God is the one who cannot be simply distinguished from 
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or contrasted to other beings, for God immediately 
embraces them.  Instead of a division then, we are 
looking at the same thing on different levels--a 
penultimate and ultimate level.  And the ultimate level 
encompasses the penultimate. 
 But have I not endorsed Hartshorne's talk of a 
division of responsibility (while vetoing a division of 
power)?  Indeed, I have.  Human responsibility has 
nothing taken away from it by God.  Since God does not 
make our decisions for us to whatever extent they are 
indeterminate, to the extent we deliberately make worse 
use of our freedom than we could have, we are to blame; 
God is not responsible.  (But there still is no 
division of power, for God is immediately empowering us 
in our sinfulness, some measure of which in each of us 
is the inevitable, or virtually inevitable, result of 
our freedom and the relative exclusivity of our 
awareness.)  Conversely to the extent we deliberately 
make better use of our freedom than we might have, some 
credit is appropriate.  But this does not mean that 
"God is not responsible"!  While human responsibility 
has nothing taken away from it by God, in one sense it 
has everything it is given to it by God.  Since God is 
the coinhering power in any good action (and is 
desirous of our choosing the best possible action), it 
would be the height of arrogance--or at least 
ignorance--to deny that God is responsible for the 
goodness of an act.  But this does not contradict or 
detract from our responsibility. There is a penultimate 
and an ultimate level of responsibility that do not 
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conflict (to the extent we opt for the good), for the 
one, as it were, is within the other.  We might say 
this:  we can rightly receive some credit for a good 
deed, but God should receive all the glory. 
 We come now to the second area in which I will 
try to show that the active and passive aspects of 
panentheism can finally be held together without 
contradiction--an area which is relevant to whether any 
theism can hold together.  The active aspect points to 
God as ultimate power.  It is this ultimate power that 
enables God to be fully passive to everything, that is, 
perfectly passive in adequacy and scope, perfectly 
knowledgeable of and sympathetic to everything.  And 
such knowing and loving is itself a participatory 
activity.  Moreover, for there to be anything for God 
to be passive to, to know and sympathize with, God must 
be immediately and coinheringly empowering it.  On all 
these counts, the active aspect of power underlies the 
passive one.  But if God has this all-encompassing 
power, why would God want to include a world, as in the 
basic postulate of panentheism; why would God want to 
be passive to a world in any sense?  Why would God not 
unchangeably possess all possible value apart from, and 
thus not bother with, a world, and especially not 
bother with one that brings any negativity into the 
divine life?  For there is no power external to God's 
self that could negatively affect God, that could 
hinder God from unchangeably possessing all possible 
value without any tinge of negativity.  Our dilemma is 
this:  On the one hand, only God has the ultimate power 
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to immediately give being to the world.  On the other 
hand, giving being to our world may not seem 
appropriate to the ultimate power. 
 While I have phrased this dilemma in panentheis-
tic terms, the same basic quandary applies to any the-
ism in which God's ultimacy or aseity is affirmed--any 
theism in which God is God.  God's aseity means that 
God has an--or the--ultimate power of self-existence, 
that God is the ultimate power whose existence and 
experience are not dependent upon any powers that have 
any ultimate ontological independence from God.  By 
implication then, God must be the ultimate source of 
anything else that exists.  This must be the starting 
point, the most basic assumption, of any viable theism. 
 But aseity, in general, like aseity
 The approach of classical theism, though, has 
been precisely to deny the seeming changeability, 
 panentheistically 
construed, means that there is no power beyond God's 
ultimate control that could prevent God from 
unchangeably having all possible value without trace of 
negativity.  But if God possesses a completed maximum 
of value, creating a world either seems pointless and 
incomprehensible, or, if there is a point to it--which 
is to say that it has some value for God--the premise 
of immutably possessing all possible value is seemingly 
denied.  And relating to the world, with its many 
negativities, would seem to imply some participation in 
negativity.  Therefore, relating to our world, deriving 
either value or disvalue from it, may not seem fitting 
to the ultimate power. 
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purposeful increase in possession of value, and 
subjection to negativity involved in God's relating to 
the world.  Classical theists strictly adhered to the 
belief that God's aseity
 Classical theism will not permit that God be at 
all changeable, lest God decrease in value or need to 
increase in value to reach a maximum.  The concept of 
"classical eternity" has been described in the preced-
ing chapter.  Since God's experience is not at all 
processive, there is absolutely no way God can have a 
relationship with the processive world that is at all 
immediate or direct.  Supposedly God has an indirect 
relationship of sorts by having an unchanging vision of 
 entails unchangeable 
possession of all possible value sans mixture with 
disvalue and attempted to construe God's relationship 
to the world in terms consistent with that belief, at 
least formally (though informally, classical theists 
did not wholly refrain from speaking of God as in 
dynamic and changing relationship with the world, of 
the world as having meaning for God, and of God as 
sympathizing with the sufferings of the world--and how 
could any Christian avoid speaking of God's love for 
the world, even if this ran counter to one's 
theology!).  By looking at the classical view, I will 
argue that our apparent incongruity of relating God, as 
unchangingly having an unadulterated maximum of value, 
to the world is a real incompatibility and 
impossibility and that this classical view of God and 
God's (supposed) relating tends to finitize God, to 
make God less than ultimate. 
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all of time, all of which is equally actual, none of it 
more in the past or future for divine experience.  
Divine certainty of things that have not yet happened 
from our perspective apparently is based on God's 
creative power which (pre-)determines things.  However, 
without a processive relationship of empowering things 
in the present, there is no basis for even this 
indirect relationship of knowing based on creative 
power.  Unless God's upholding power is temporally 
related, it will not find its target; it will be blind. 
 In this model, God makes creative decisions for all 
time and sits back in a timeless boudoir while these 
are automatically carried out (by whom?) without God's 
immediate attention.  But unless God is directly and 
temporally involved in executing these plans, nothing 
will be carried out, for nothing can exist without 
God's immediate sustaining.  Classical eternity, then, 
makes the real world in its concreteness and 
temporality blatantly external to God, even if the 
indirect timeless relationship to the world it posits 
be sustained; and since it cannot, it makes the 
universe totally external to, completely unknown and 
not at all empowered by, God.  If there be some 
timeless God somewhere, there must be a God behind that 
God, a God who is temporal, at least in part, and who 
can thus coinheringly empower both the temporal world 
and this timeless God. 
 Classical theism also posits that God has all 
possible value apart from whether or not God creates a 
world.  Creation yields no value God does not otherwise 
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have.  But however much "nonsocial" value God might 
have apart from creation--even if there be an absolute 
maximum of this type of value--God cannot have the 
"social" value that comes from caring for creatures 
(and from having that love returned by some of them), 
except by having creatures.  Some confusion on this 
issue is caused by those who argue that God's love for 
the creatures is an agape that is in need of nothing 
and only gives value without receiving any.  While I 
would agree that God's love for the creatures is not at 
all corrupted by selfishness, by its very nature love 
or caring finds value and happiness in the happiness of 
others.  Therefore, though God not be directly or 
primarily concerned with God's own happiness in rela-
tions with the creatures, divine love and care, insofar 
as successful in promoting the well-being of the 
creatures, entail that God garners value and happiness 
from relating to the world.  (Though God not be 
directly or primarily concerned with such happiness, 
this does not and cannot mean the omniscient one is 
ignorant of the prospect of garnering happiness or 
value through the happiness of the creatures for which 
God is working.  Thus, in one sense, God's love is not 
entirely selfless, though it is not at all selfish.)  
That God realizes value from creaturely experiences of 
value finds its strongest expression in panentheism, in 
which these experiences are an utterly immediate part 
of the divine experience.  But it is entailed in any 
theism in which God is said to love or care for the 
creatures, in any theism in which creation is other 
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than a totally arbitrary and indifferent--or hostile--
enterprise.  (Of course, some classical theists have 
drawn the logical implications of their position and 
denied divine love, and many have regarded creation as 
a wholly nonchalant act.) 
 Note how the classical view differs from 
Tillich's in relation to value.  While we cannot affect 
the level of value for God by our decisions, God's 
activity in relation to the universe has value and 
significance for God.  It was not clear whether for 
Tillich God eternally possesses all the value creation 
might have for God.  If God does already possess all 
the value of creation, one might be able to salvage the 
idea that divine aseity entails that God unchangeably 
has a maximum of value (though not on the basis that 
this possession of value is entirely apart from the 
world).  However, if indeterminate creaturely freedom 
be granted, the degree of God's happiness with respect 
to the world will be dependent upon the extent 
creaturely actions promote creaturely well-being.  No 
kind of supplementation or synthesis of creaturely 
experience can change the fact that a caring God is 
happier the greater the happiness of the creatures.  
This is epitomized in panentheism, in which creaturely 
happiness is a very part of God, but it is true for any 
theism in which God is love.  Even if any freedom be 
denied, and thus God anticipates all creaturely 
experience of value, it is plausible that the actual 
realization of value by the concrete creature would 
have a greater value for God than the mere 
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anticipation.  Like unchangeability, the possession of 
all possible value by God conflicts with relating to 
the world. 
 Finally, classical theism denies that God is 
negatively affected by, or in any sense suffers with, 
the world.  Only a God who is totally insensitive, only 
a God for whom everything creaturely is a matter of 
indifference, could fail to be somewhat negatively 
affected and suffer with creaturely woe.  I find this 
failure incompatible with the idea that this God knows 
the world.  For even the more insensitive of persons 
cannot but feel some sympathy for those whose woe they 
know and understand fairly well.  How then can God, who 
will be regarded as in some sense omniscient by any 
theism which maintains aseity
 Thus, I believe I have established that a God 
who unchangeably possesses all possible value untinged 
by any negativity cannot be related to the world on all 
three counts:  unchangeability, absolute maximality of 
, be totally insensitive 
and unsympathetic to the plight of creatures?  This 
notion is certainly incompatible with the idea that God 
loves the world.  For a God who cares about the well-
being of creatures will not be absolutely blissful in 
the face of their distress.  This is especially true 
for panentheism, in which our sufferings are an 
immediate part of the divine life.  But it is true for 
any theism that upholds the divine love (or, I believe, 
the divine omniscience).  Therefore, a God who 
experiences no negativity cannot be related to the 
world. 
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value experience, and nonsubjection to negativity--
except perhaps if it be held that God is related to 
creation, though divine upholding and knowing of it are 
totally arbitrary, pointless, whimsical, and indif-
ferent, a notion touched upon in our discussion, but 
not given full explicit consideration.  Then it might 
be alleged that, though the concrete contents of divine 
experience change, God's possession of all possible 
value and nonsubjection to negativity are unchangeable. 
 But there are two problems here (not to mention the 
moral repugnance of such a deity).  If the world were a 
matter of total indifference to God, God would never 
have created it.  Moreover, even if God had a world in 
relation to which God purposed to be wholly 
indifferent, thus neither gaining value nor being 
subject to disvalue, God could not pull it off!  For, 
as argued above, God's knowing the world's miseries 
would have some negative effect.  Similarly, knowing of 
the world's ecstasies could not but bring some 
happiness, in spite of God's self.  This model then is 
not really compatible with God's relating to the world. 
 Even if a wholly indifferent relating to the 
world be allowed, through total indifference this God 
misses some possible value, namely, social value, the 
value of loving and having an interest in others, 
contrary to the premise of unchangeable possession of 
all value.  (Note how the concept of agape, discussed 
in relation to social value earlier, if construed as 
meaning that God derives absolutely no happiness or 
value from the well-being of creatures, is equivalent 
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to indifference.)  As implied when first presented, it 
is this concept of social value that points to the 
misconception involved in positing possession of all 
possible value by God.  That is where the basic problem 
or misunderstanding within our initial dilemma lies.  
Though God might immutably have all possible nonsocial 
value, God cannot immutably have all possible social 
value, by its very nature.  God obtains social value 
only by creating and relating to certain possible 
creatures rather than to others.  Even barring 
indeterminate freedom, it is questionable whether the 
full social value of a certain creature can be 
possessed in anticipation of that creature's actual 
existing and experiencing.  And if freedom be granted, 
what value is realized is dependent on creaturely 
choice.   
 While it might be granted that an absolute 
possession of all possible value is an unreasonable 
entailment of ultimate power which overlooks social 
value, it might still be insisted that ultimate power 
would ensure that there be no negativity in the 
universe and in the value that God derives from it.  
This is the issue of theodicy.  It is beyond the 
purview of this project to delve deeply into that 
question.  Suffice it to say that the following entail 
that natural and moral evil (which are not wholly 
separable) are part of the very nature of creaturely 
existence:  relative ignorance, the need for natural 
laws (which provide the order and constancy needed for 
creaturely life and interaction, but as such cannot be 
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modified or suspended for the particular needs and 
desires of each and every creature), and indeterminate 
freedom (a necessary aspect of at least the higher 
organisms, I think).  There is then no power ultimately 
independent of God (no "prime matter" or malevolent 
deity) that resists God and causes negativity, nor is 
there a weakness within God that causes it.  Instead, 
the very idea of a creation without any negativity is 
an incoherent or absurd one.  Therefore, there is no 
denial of God's ultimate power in the "inability" to 
effect a supposed notion, which in fact makes no sense 
at all. 
 Thus, some evil or negativity is the price 
attendant to social value, though it is always out-
weighed by the good in the universe.  This and what has 
preceded in this section point to why God's ultimacy 
and aseity
 But it is only the panentheistic God that has 
such ultimacy.  To the extent the creatures' 
experiences are not an utterly immediate part of the 
divine experience, God will not fully possess the value 
 demand that God have a world of which only 
God can be the ultimate source.  Ultimacy means God 
will know and be able to ensure that creaturely 
existence on the whole will be good, so for the 
creature's sake God will have a world.  Secondarily, 
God will have a world for God's own sake, for God knows 
that God will share in all the happiness of the 
creatures, which will outweigh the sadness, and will 
derive pleasure from love for the creatures being 
returned by some of them.  
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of these experiences.  And any attempt to keep God from 
totally immediate participation in the negativities of 
creaturely experience will likewise entail a relatively 
indirect and external relationship to the positive in 
same (for God cannot know just which aspects of an 
experience are positive and which negative without 
knowing the whole experience with perfect intimacy), 
thus resulting in lesser value for the divine 
experience, since the good outweighs the bad in 
creaturely experience on the whole.  And a God who does 
not garner all the value available is surely less than 
ultimate compared to one that does.  This applies all 
the more to classical theism, where any positive value 
of the creation for God is directly denied.  Moreover, 
to whatever extent the creation is imagined as more or 
less external to God, in order to lessen God's 
dependence on or passivity to the world for experience 
of value or happiness, or for any other reason, God's 
ultimacy is contradicted in the following manner:  Any 
externality means that God is not the totally immediate 
and coinhering empoweror of the world, thereby 
entailing a God above or behind God, who is the utterly 
coinhering empoweror of our supposed "God" and of the 
world, and who determines the conditions for the 
interaction of these relatively external or separated 
entities. 
 I have gainsaid the notion of an unchangeable 
possession of all possible social value, while thereby 
perhaps seeming to imply the unchangeable possession of 
all possible nonsocial value by God.  Actually, I have 
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not spoken for or against this latter idea to this 
point.  But first I will consider what comprises 
nonsocial value.  By that I mean the particular values, 
the aesthetic values, that God realizes apart from the 
world or any worlds.  As we realize values which are 
not (at least directly or primarily) social (that is, 
involving our encountering and appreciation of the 
experiences of others), such as enjoying a sunset or 
appreciating the beauty of a symphony, so analogously 
does God.  Of course, in the divine case, what God 
aesthetically enjoys is not relatively external nor 
dependent upon the creativity of others.  Very 
metaphorically, God paints pictures and composes music 
that only God can enjoy. 
 What about value that is beyond any and all 
particular values, a la a mystical or undifferentiated 
God or aspect of God?  The only senses of more or less 
undifferentiated value that recommend themselves to me 
are the following:  1) God has a feeling and apprecia-
tion of divine existence per se and ultimate power, of 
aseity.  2) God surveys possibility in general.  (This 
latter could not in any way be said to involve total 
formlessness, though, for possibility must have at 
least some form or definiteness.)  These, especially 
the former, do have real value for God.  Yet by 
themselves they are rather empty.  They have the value 
of experienced potentiality, of being poised for 
creativity, and are incomplete unless they issue forth 
in particular social and nonsocial values (and 
therefore should not be simply classified under social 
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or nonsocial value).  (As an analogy for God's sense of 
divine existence per se and power, I think of the 
feeling I have when I am done with a particular project 
or phase of my life, having a clean slate and clean 
closets and desk drawers, and looking forward generally 
and indefinitely to doing something.)  If someone else 
has some additional sense of God's appreciation of 
value beyond particular value, I would not have much 
quarrel with it, as long as
 We now return to the consideration of particular 
nonsocial value.  My position is that God may not 
unchangeably possess all nonsocial value, but that 
particular nonsocial values (like social ones) might be 
realized temporarily or processively.  This is tenable 
 particular values in 
addition to the undifferentiated value are regarded as 
real and valuable for God.  However, advocates of 
undifferentiation have often regarded particular values 
as disvaluable (and therefore sometimes wished them 
into maya or illusion), as sullying the simplicity and 
unity of God's experience with complexity and 
manifoldness--thus attempting to make God the cosmic 
equivalent of a lobotomy patient. 
only if possibility is regarded as more or less in-
definite (with Hartshorne and contra Tillich, insofar 
as he has revealed himself), rather than as a fixed 
group of wholly definite entities (waiting to be 
instantiated in the case of social possibilities).  
For, while in the case of social value, there is a 
valuational difference between God's seeing the 
possibility of Dave Nikkel realizing a particular value 
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and God's experiencing Dave Nikkel as actually 
realizing the said value, in the case of nonsocial 
aesthetic values, if they are "seen" in their total 
definiteness, they are realized, they are actual.  
Social values, by their very nature, even if 
determinate qua
 But certain problems arise in regard to pos-
sibility as indefinite.  How can God be the ultimate 
source and controller of possibility unless God knows 
all possibility in all definiteness?  And if God is 
not, there is something more ultimate than God (perhaps 
possibility itself, which is to say, chance) or some 
kind of dualism.  However, I believe that God can be in 
possession and control of possibility, even though it 
not be composed of completely definite entities.  God 
can do so by knowing the limits within which possibili-
ties lie.  On this model, possibilities can be thought 
of as being within a continuum.  Analogous to the way I 
know the real number line, without establishing (that 
is, without creating or bringing to full definiteness) 
each number of the infinite possible, or the spectrum 
of colors without seeing each of the infinite possible 
shades, God can know all possibility. 
 possibility, still depend upon crea-
turely actualization for realization, while divine 
nonsocial values obviously do not. 
 But apart from the need for possibility to be 
possessed by or be "within" God for God to be ultimate, 
this question arises:  If God is the ultimate power, 
unhindered by an ultimately independent power, why 
should not God unchangeably possess all possible 
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nonsocial value?  If nothing is thwarting God, why 
should God stop at only realizing a certain portion of 
all possible nonsocial value up to a particular divine 
time?  Does not this idea entail that there is a 
particular structure imposed upon God that limits 
divine power and creativity?  This type of concern, 
which certainly has some legitimacy, is reflected in 
Tillich's statements that God "precedes" reason or 
structure and in his admonitions against trying to find 
a "definite" structure in God.iii
 My answer is that it is the nature of 
possibility and of God's power to be inexhaustible 
(though the unlimitedness of possibility is one of 
"depth," of unlimitness within general limits, within 
an inexhaustible "continuum").  While God could realize 
any given amount of nonsocial value "right now"--
instantly or eternally, that does not mean the 
realization of all possible nonsocial value right now 
is a coherent idea.  Because, for any supposedly 
completed set of all value, even an infinite one, more 
  Of course, in one 
sense, even God's general sense of divine existence and 
power must have some structure.  That is to say, it 
cannot be absolute chaos, which is nothingness.  But I 
quite agree that God does not have a particular or 
definite structure in the way we do, a structure that 
sets the limits, conditions, and possibilities for our 
perceiving and creating.  There are no a priori limits 
on God's power and creativity.   But since I grant 
this, again the question raises itself, why then might 
not God unchangeably possess all nonsocial value? 
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values can be stipulated, can be created.  To use a 
mathematical analogy, though the set of all integers is 
infinite, the set of all real numbers is an infinity of 
a higher order; there are "orders" of infinity.  Just 
as one can be added to any supposed completed set of 
finite integers, "one can be added" to any supposed 
completed infinity.  Looking at it directly in terms of 
the divine power and experience, by stipulating the 
possession of the completed set of (supposedly) all 
possible nonsocial values, we may limit and exhaust 
God's power by disallowing God any further creative 
potency, and we may confine God to eternal boredom, 
save for God's social relations.  (This is even more 
the case in classical theism, where divine creativity 
with regard to the universe is eternally complete and 
completed.)  We seemingly deny God's inexhaust-ibility. 
 Traditional theology has been concerned that God and 
God's power not be exhausted in the creation of the 
universe.  I have a similar concern regarding the 
creation of nonsocial value. 
 The reader may have detected a basic quandary 
here in relation to God's ultimate power.  On the one 
hand we seem to limit or "hold back" God's power by 
holding that God cannot possess all possible nonsocial 
value instantly or eternally.  On the other hand we 
seem to limit or "hold back" God's power by holding 
that there is nothing further God can create beyond a 
given set of values.  This issue, which has very 
significant ramifications for God's ultimacy and 
majesty, is one that to my knowledge has not been 
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recognized anywhere, at least not explicitly.  Which 
side to choose does not seem obvious.  Perhaps it is 
mainly a matter of taste whether one opts for ongoing 
creativity and inexhaustibility as most expressive of 
God's ultimate power and majesty.  But at the least it 
seems in itself as supportive and as nondestructive of 
the divine ultimacy as the other. 
 Beyond the respective immediate attractiveness 
of each of the options, we have the following 
respective advantages with regard to God's ultimacy:  
On the side of a completed outpouring of divine power 
in respect to nonsocial value is that it allows for a 
more exact surveying of possibility.  On the side of 
inexhaust-ibility is the seeming divine ennui involved 
in the other option.  Also on the side of ongoing 
potency is the following consideration.  If God's 
experience, apart from creating and relating to a 
temporal world, is wholly atemporal and nonprocessive, 
it perhaps becomes difficult to see how God could, in 
fact, relate to a temporal entity at all.  If God 
creates a world at a particular time, "prior to" which 
God did not have a temporal world, the problem is 
fairly obvious.  It is questionable whether an 
experience that is wholly nontemporal and durationless 
could become temporal and durational, even in an 
aspect.  It may appear easier to relate a God 
intrinsically timeless to a temporal world, if there 
has always been a temporal world for God.  Then God has 
supposedly always been temporal in an aspect, and we do 
not have to imagine the strictly atemporal becoming 
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processive.  However, if God is intrinsically, or apart 
from the world, atemporal (rather than there being 
unchanging aspects to an experience with intrinsic 
temporality), while temporally relating to the world, 
we still have the difficulty of integrating the 
concretely durationless and nonprocessive with the 
concretely durational and processive within the divine 
experience.  A way to get around this difficulty would 
be in positing that God's experience is intrinsically 
temporal or durational, and that part of it is the 
continual possession of all possible nonsocial value, 
which has an infinite duration which is beginningless 
and endless (in contrast to God's possession of any 
particular social value, which always has a beginning). 
 That is, God's experience of nonsocial value is dura-
tional, though its concrete contents do not change.  
This seems to be a coherent way to avoid this 
particular problem, though I have never heard anyone 
advance such a model in any context.  With that model, 
I would call it more or less a standoff between a 
completed outpouring of divine power (and its more 
precise view of possibility) and ongoing creativity 
(and its avoidance of divine boredom), with one's own 
sense of which less compromises the ultimacy of divine 
power being the determinative factor.  In comparison 
with a model of God as intrinsically atemporal, though, 
I think the balance is tipped in favor of the model of 
inexhaustible creativity, for it is more clearly 
compatible with God's relating to a temporal world, 
which I have argued is demanded by God's ultimacy.  I 
302     Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich 
 
might note that in this model there is a unity or 
symmetry between God in relation to social value and 
nonsocial value (new values being ongoingly created in 
both areas), unlike with an atemporal possession of all 
possible nonsocial value, or even with a temporal or 
durational possession of all possible nonsocial value. 
 I doubt, however, that this, in itself, constitutes 
any evidence in favor of the model. 
 It is time to bring to a conclusion this whole 
project.  In the following ways, I believe I have 
offered a process theology that, unlike Hartshorne's, 
does full justice to God's aseity and majesty:  God's 
all-encompassing and coinhering power is fully 
affirmed.  (In this I do fuller justice to the divine 
power and majesty than does any nonpanentheistic 
theology.)  God's direct and immediate governing, 
shaping, and controlling of the world's nature and 
destiny is truly affirmed--though God also lets us do 
some of the shaping via our freedom.  (A God who can 
exercise ultimate power and governance only by 
determining everything to the last iota, who is not 
strong and secure enough to permit some indeterminate 
creaturely freedom, is not very majestic.)  God's power 
is not exhausted in divine creativity with respect to 
this universe (as in Hartshorne).  I uphold the 
possibility that God has many universes other than this 
one and affirm that God realizes "nonsocial" value 
totally apart from any and all universes.  And I 
suggest that God's "nonsocial" creativity is not 
exhausted in any complete set of values, but is truly 
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inexhaustible, which is at least as protective of 
divine power and majesty as the unchanging possession 
of (allegedly) all possible nonsocial value.  And, in 
the following ways, I believe I have advanced a 
Tillichian theology that is sensitive to his sense of 
the divine power and majesty and holiness, as above, 
and that is truer to his panentheistic intent and to 
his desire to affirm a living God in living 
relationship to a world with freedom, than he was 
himself.  I have suggested a God who is intrinsically 
temporal in eminent and ultimate fashion, who can 
without possible contradiction contain the temporal 
world (or worlds).  I have affirmed that we have some 
genuine freedom in determining the quality of our 
relationship with God, though the glory should go to 
the God who is immediately working through or coin-
heringly empowering us even in this.  And I have 
insisted that the degree of value or happiness in the 
divine experience can be affected by the free actions 
of the creatures God immediately embraces and that God 
is negatively affected by the creaturely sufferings 
that are a very part of God.  Yet I have also insisted 
that God's power ensures that creaturely experience on 
the whole will be enjoyable, that God realizes much 
value and happiness apart from inclusion of the world 
and any worlds, and that God enjoys the value of a 
general sense of divine existence and power.  Thus, we 
have a truly living relationship that yet does not 
undermine the divine ultimacy and beatitude. 
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 ENDNOTES  
  i.  Man's Vision of God, p. 295.   
  ii.  Man's Vision of God, p. 238.  See p. 120 above for full quote. 
  iii.  Philosophical Interrogations, p. 378.  See also p. 379. 
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